OPEN RECEPTACLES: IMAGINATION IN CONTINENTAL AND PROCESS THOUGHT, AND THE OPENING OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation is a study on the significance of imagination as it engages in the areas of truth formation and religious pluralism. In the field of Philosophy of Religion, the question of religious pluralism becomes a problem when engaging the multiplicity of truths. If one's reasoning is strictly held to a method of logic alone, it creates a hierarchicalization of religions or the exclusion of particular religious experience which does not fit its criteria. My argument is that when one moves from logic alone to a methodology of imagination, both logic and aesthetics, this problem becomes an adventure. By engaging with the imagination, and using Whitehead's understanding of immanence and creativity, religious pluralism becomes an integral aspect of truth formation, religious experience, and a deeper understanding of the experience of the Divine. Imagination is integral to this process.

My first chapter looks specifically at Mortimer J. Adler's argument that Religious Pluralism is not possible because it is not consistent with Aristotelian logic. I argue that Adler's development of logic as a methodology is problematic. Adler's logic cannot accept anything but a singular outcome, thereby marginalizing other possibilities of truthmaking.

My second chapter provides a history of the imagination in three areas: Greek, Medieval, and Modern Thought. This section highlights how the imagination is viewed in a pejorative manner and is used in a very narrow sense. The third chapter looks at Continental thinkers who return to the imagination as a mode of knowledge formation and meaning-making.

The fourth chapter looks at the work of Henry Corbin and the study of the Imaginal Realm. Here Corbin argues that the divine is the impetus for the difference of religions, and makes the place of the Imagination the center to finding truth and meaning, while also relating it to the divine. Corbin pushes for an "Active imagination," a mystic perception, which allows one to see the Divine in creative and multiple ways. This multiplicity of the divine is the "Divine Names." For Corbin, there is a parallel process of discovery between one's search of self, mirroring the divine.

My final chapter centers on the work of Alfred North Whitehead. I argue that his work on Mutual Immanence and Creativity could be understood as the relational space and activity of the imagination. By doing so, all things are given the imaginative potential for becoming what they are. But their becoming presupposes all other things.

Any progress of religious advancement cannot be done in the narrowness of one's own religious knowledge and experience, but by opening up to the imaginative interplay of multiple religions. This process of Imagining opens up one's awareness of the divine, as well as calls one to rethink their dogmatic ideals.

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Chapter 1: Adler: The Triumph of Logic and the Limits of Religious Pluralism

1.1 Introduction

How can a multiplicity of truths affirm religious pluralism? Conversely, how can religious pluralism (the reality that many religions exist) still maintain the truthfulness of one person or a group's experience without denigrating or marginalizing other religions? This chapter will engage the work of Mortimer J. Adler, a philosopher of religion whose text *Truth in Religion* points to this particular issue of truth, that truth is unable to take on a pluralistic form due to its contradiction to Aristotelian logic. Adler argues that if philosophy and religion are to move towards a trans-philosophy and trans-religiosity (the term "trans-," depicting its ability to account for all things), then its understanding of truth should conform to Aristotle's logic that centers around common sense and non-contradiction.

However, the trans-religiosity and trans-philosophy that Adler is attempting to develop does not maintain other religious and philosophical systems as necessary, but rather negates them for its own. This follows an exclusivist framework, negating other systems its truth. This problem is not remedied in other religious understandings such as inclusivism, as it contains a nuanced form of Adler's argument on non-contradiction and sameness. Inclusivism is based on the understanding that all things are integral. And yet its integration falls within a scheme in which everything fits as in a puzzle to form a wholistic aspect of truth. This enforces the method of logic rather than the method of imagination. The latter is my focus here.

I am introducing the imagination not as a counterpoint to logic, but rather as an intertwining of methodologies; I will speak of the imagination briefly here, but develop it in subsequent chapters. It is the imagination that seeks both its unity as well as its deconstruction. The

imagination is an integral aspect of any search for truth, because it calls for a unity of a multiplicity of aspects in the pursuit of meaning. The image produced in imagination lures one into the deeper complexity of the image itself, to its contours and suggestiveness. It lures one from beginning to end, and back again. This is why I argue that imagination be an integral aspect of thinking and formulating truth.

Adler does not include the imagination as an aspect of the development of truth. Rather, he relies on logic, common sense, and non-contradiction as indicators of truth. I call this the method of sameness for finding truth as opposed to finding truth through the method of difference. The poetics of imagination that I will be presenting may be of limited use to Adler, as Adler's sameness limits or conditions what one looks for and what one accepts. My argument is that if, according to Alfred North Whitehead, fundamental reality is a process of multiplicity, singularity, and addition, then truthfulness is an act of creation and comes from imaginative thinking.[1]

It is important that I introduce this particular author and his work. Philosopher Mortimer Adler was deeply influential in the mid twentieth century, having placed himself at the center of philosophical discussion. Adler focused primarily on psychology in his earlier years at Columbia University, and later on of philosophy and philosophy of religion at the University of Chicago. His main goal was to bring philosophy to the masses of people, simplifying without reducing the specialized information that was appearing in this field of science. He was co-editor of the voluminous *Synopticon*, *Aristotle for Everybody*, *Intellect: Mind Over Matter*, as well as the author of the famous text *How to Read a Book*. It is his text *Religion and Truth* that is of particular interest to my inquiry here, as in it Adler developed the question to which I am responding in this work.

[1] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (New York: Free Press, 1978), 7.

Adler's argument is as follows: 1) Pluralism leads to issues in deriving absolute truth; 2) If one is to derive truth, logic is the most pragmatic way of attending to it; 3) This logic cannot have any contradiction; and 4) Because of this, religious pluralism is not possible. How Adler builds his case is interesting, for he relies on the political philosophy of J.S. Mills, the logic espoused by Aristotle, and the philosophical theology of Augustine and Aquinas to develop a theory of truth that holds to unity.

1.2 Adler, Being And Society

1.2.1 The Removal of Opinion as Removal of Pluralism

In his discussion on the problem of truth and religious pluralism, Adler begins by noting where pluralism is desirable and necessary. He writes, "in the sphere of all matters subject to individual thought and decision, pluralism is desirable and tolerable only in those areas that are of matters of taste rather than matters of truth."[2] Adler here is delineating the space of his work, noting that in matters of truth there is no room for any form of pluralism, as propositional truth only leads to a precise response: it is either true or not true. In matters of taste—aesthetics, there can be a multiplicity of responses by a society and by an individual. But when it comes to realizing a particular goal, it is necessary that we lead toward a truth that guides us along a predictable path and is assimilable to prior knowledges. As a concrete example, Adler makes reference to the nation state. The nation state contains many individuals, and yet all have agreed to work in unity to make the nation state a reality through adherence to a set of laws and ideas that lead to predictable paths, paths which are morally desirable, such as justice. This argument alludes to Augustine's *City of*

[2] Mortimer Jerome Adler, *Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1990), 2.

God, where he dialogues with Scipio Africanus, stating that a society is "not every assembly of the multitude, but an assembly united in fellowship by common agreement as to what is right and a community of interest," and where Augustine comments, "what is a society except a partnership in justice?"[3]

These moral qualities that are realized in the nation state are desirable. Yet for Adler, the question focuses on the matter of truth in Augustine's statement. How can a society of persons be led towards a unicity of truth and yet individually maintain a level of freedom and adventure? In the movement towards truth, opinions are an important function of the human person, as it is necessary for one's own intellectual development to articulate why one argues the way one does. However, although one may be developing opinion as well as the rigor of critical thinking, from a societal perspective this does not interfere with the development of truth. Adler reasons this in his reading of J.S. Mill's work *On Liberty*, where he elucidates that while opinion is a necessary part of truth seeking, it is never the end result, implying that in the development of critical thinking, the individual coincides with the societal.

1.2.2 J.S. Mill On Liberty and the Limits of Pluralism

For truth to be unifying, Adler looks to varying systematic approaches from different areas of thought (Aristotelian categories) and shows how these can also be applied to religion. If logic works within the sciences and in society, then it can also function in philosophy and religion. But it needs to do even more: in introducing the revelatory experience of the divine as a basis for understanding the logic of truth, it needs to permeate from macrosystems to microsystems. A concrete example of this is its application from the nation state to religion, from the logic of society

[3] Paul Weithman, "Augustine's Political Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump, and Norman Kretzmann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 241.

to the logic of the individual. "Uniformity" is Adler's goal in explaining and introducing logic in its pragmatic use for understanding the religion. When religion is understood uniformly by way of logic, it should lead to what is right religion and what is not (by way of right and wrong). In order to show the problem of opinion in the political sphere and the necessity of uniformity, Adler introduces J.S. Mill's work *On Liberty* to develop his argument for a limitation on pluralism.

In *On Liberty,* Mill is advocating for the rights of the individual against society at a time when individual rights were giving way to the rights of the society. In the eighteenth century, the individual was given primary status. Individuals by nature existed prior to the understanding of the notion of the state, the latter being a communal creation. The individual, in his or her free will and in sharing his or her abilities, developed the social state into what it would become. In becoming a part of the development of the social state, individuals in their free will and in their own determination of desiring to be a part of said nation, limit their own action for the benefit and interests of the social organism produced by their being. Thus, a harmonization occurs between the individual and the nation.

However, Mill is troubled by the reversal of the above concerning the nation state at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The individual in her own reasoning may be prior to the state; however, in the history of the nation and in the order of nature, the state is prior to the individual.[4] Therefore, in Mill's writing, the freedom of the individual and the rights the individual possesses do not belong to them by nature, or by divine right, but by slowly acquiring them in their growth and its continual development in the social state. It is the state that gives the person the ability to

[4] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York: Walter Scott Publishing, 2011), xxiii. I find a pattern here as found in Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures 1926* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 18-23., as in the layering of emotion, ritual, and belief. But there is a stop there, as the society is the utmost, and the individual must be confined to that thought and/or experience. What is missing is the final part of his work, the rationalization, the return to the individual, what it is for itself, or what the society is for the individual.

act within a prescribed format. W.L. Courtley quotes Aristotle's writing in the introductory about the connection between man and society:

> Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and not accidentally is either beneath our notice or more than human. Society is something that precedes the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so self-sufficient as not to need to, and therefore does not partake of society, is either a beast or a god.[5]

The society functions as a machine; it moves along while the individuals that exist within it are non-entities until each are able to be a part of the system itself, to be a part of a community that gives the individual growing importance within the society. But in doing this, it severely restricts the individual's freedom. The society seeks unity; the individual seeks freedom. In seeking freedom, the individual can recognize the intimate communion with his fellows. The individual's sphere of activity is bounded by the common interest of those around him.

Mill therefore seeks some form of middle ground in which the individual is able to resist such uniformity to the point of monotony, and likewise is able to allow for some way of maintaining the essence of society and their thought. Mill finds it in the discussion on the question of Liberty and the setting of limits for a more just society. The individual and society become metaphors in Mill's work— as Liberty and Authority—, and he uses these metaphors to speak on the political as well as the philosophical notion of engagement and development of knowledge.

It is from this engagement with Mill that Adler helps shape his thought on pluralism. For Mill, the necessity of limits helps him to engage in a form of trial and error, of deriving truth from erroneous truth. Mill does not deny the necessity of opinion; indeed, he advocates for it. Mill is primarily concerned with an authority's excessive use of power over the individual, as well as the proper dissemination of truth to engage opinion. This ensures that when one forms an opinion

[5] Mill, *On Liberty*, xxiii.

concerning how something should be done, or concerning the rights of people or the self, it is precisely this liberty that allows one to speak in some fashion.

However, Mill is careful about what he calls an opinion. He writes: "Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion."[6] Here, Mill is critiquing how his society looks at the role of the individual. If the individual remains a non-entity within the nation state, he or she is in no way able to participate within the community, group, political party, etc. For this connection or relation is how the non-entity becomes an entity. The individual grasps some form of power when he is attached to some authority in which he can engage. Mill reverses this and argues that an individual is an individual, but being involved in the nation state limits that individual to working within that role. Mill gives self-authority to the individual, but this individual engages in some way with the rest of society through free and equal discussion. A person is not free nor equal in the state of affairs in which he succumbs to the power of the government, for in that case he is coerced into it. So, Mill advocates that individuals form and express opinions. But here is the caveat: the opinions, although protected, are formed from multiple sources.[7] But they are necessary, as Mill writes, for, "[i]f we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed."[8] Opinions seem to be the gut feeling in the midst of a well laid-out law and formation of thought in the political sphere. Opinions move us to act, whether in articulating a more reasonable response, or responding in protest. Opinions express an uncomfortable reality within the individual. They have truth.

[6] Mill, *On Liberty*, 19.
[7] Ibid., 9-10.
[8] Ibid., 34.

One may argue that law is established upon well-founded reasoning and not opinion. However, even this is not absolute. Mill writes that, "It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right."[9] In making choices, both governments and individuals, in free and equal discussion, are to seek out the truest opinion. Even the truth for what they are seeking is still held as opinion and not a fact nor the standard, but only as opinion for the moment.

Adler does something very interesting with respect to the issue of opinion. He takes Mill's argument and focuses on the notion of opinion, not on the individual. The individual should be tolerated, he says, but not the opinion. The opinion comes under the scrutiny of authority and its opinion of truth, which, at its most ideal, leads to some form of progress of thought and truth. Thus, opinion comes under scrutiny for its value in being truthful or not. And yet this still leads to the problem of the limits that are to be set for its evaluation. Mill writes that with doctrines that are no longer disputed or doubted, there is a narrowing of opinion, and that pluralism in respect to truth is therefore not possible.[10] Mill argues for opinion due to its possibility of truthfulness as well as utility. Its usefulness has much value, and thus it can be true in that case as well. There is a growth, shift, or development in Mill and his definition of truth: an opinion may be true, but what about its usefulness, which shapes the value of truth? Mill wants to open up the truth of opinion and its usefulness for all, some, and the few. To deny its usefulness would be to deny the opinions and values for the few because of the many. There needs to be Liberty in that sense. This is critical in my understanding of the value of opinion, that it work out and through truth. This also affirms how truth is developed.

[9] Mill, *On Liberty,* 34.
[10] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 6. See also Mill, *On Liberty*, 81.

1.2.3 Truth in a Limited Sense

When Adler takes Mill's use of truth and Liberty, he misses the applicability of that truth in the situation provided. For instance, in matters of public intellectual growth, the great social dramas unfold in the sphere of government, since it is there where truth is decided. It is in the place of practice where the truth unfolds and becomes accepted, rejected, or shifted. Adler agrees with Mill, advocating for "toleration of competing doctrines and opinions so that, when all are fairly considered and submitted to arguments pro and con, the truth is more likely to be discovered."[11] But he wants to make clear that for Mill the goal is not about all opinions being viable options for truth.

One of the issues I find in Adler's analysis is he has failed to see the second aspect to truth that Mill couples with it—that of utility. Mill writes, "In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false?"[12] I lift up his coupling of utility with truth, noting that in describing or prescribing truth, its usefulness is found beyond truth itself.[13]

Even so, Mill speaks of correcting opinions that are incorrect.

> He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on

[11] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 5.
[12] Mill, *On Liberty*, 41-42.
[13] By denying this value, I believe Adler was trying to deal with truth on its own, and leaving out some applicability to truth. This weakens the argument of seeking truth for truth's sake, but suggests that truth has attached to it some teleological function that exists beyond it.

> the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand.[14]

In this quotation, it is important to note a move that Mill makes. The opinion of the individual must be expressed, and in that expression an inquiry is begun towards a discussion. That discussion leads to facts and an argument. So, there is a move from the intuitive to the conceptual with the actual, and from there a proposition may be formed, a statement made about whether it is true or false. But facts are not what make something true or false; facts in Mill's sense, must come with a story, and that story is the meaning for this fact. Fact in itself is not true or complete; it becomes so only when coupled with some form of reasoning from intuition and conceptualization.

Mill is saying that for a society to function in continuous liberty, there must be freedom to give that opinion, and that through facts and argument this can lead to a new insight, whether in the social sphere or in the individual's opinion. This is the way in which liberty works.

It is helpful to see Mill's work here and what Adler takes from it. Adler wants to lift up the necessity of argument but says that it must be tempered with fact. And fact, once that is established, will lead to a very certain truth. What he does not want is complete control of the person, just control in the ways in which facts are handled. There can and must be differing opinions on all aspects of life. But these categories are only found in the arena of taste, and not in the arena of judgment. In the arena of judgment, Adler agrees, there should be pluralism, but that pluralism only fits within the arena of taste, not truth.

When a person searches for truth, says Adler, she finds it necessary to make judgments based on the mass of evidence she acquires, and to make choices which point in one particular direction rather than another. This is an affirming judgment—that what one concludes to be true is true rather than its opposite. Not to reach this judgment is detrimental, as judgment concretizes, it

[14] Mill, *On Liberty*, 36-37.

makes a decision from which one can build upon. This judgment is different in matters of truth. Truth in its larger sense is an aspect of science, mathematics, history, philosophy, and religion.[15] They may have competing hypotheses, doctrines, and propositions, but they are not at any one time established as true. Adler stresses that in the pursuit of truth, occasionally there are competing theories as to how one arrives at truth, as long as if it fits with what is being consistently experienced. Truth found in the hard sciences can have competing aims, but the judgments of these aims are exclusive judgments. There is a truth that is exclusive to what is known as reality, and the judgments within the sciences move us toward that reality.

The problem for Adler concerning the proposition "there are many truths" is that it runs counter to the unity of truth, as it relativizes truth in the space of taste, and not judgment. His insistence on particularizing these two matters is important to his work, for the pursuit of truth (if it is to be truth) must move towards progress, specifically toward the improvement of humankind. Progress is an important aspect, an intention, and it may seem as if pluralism is not responding to it.[16] For Adler, if one responds pluralistically, one accepts all movements of truth as relative, as all "good," as an "it depends," and thus one is not under any intention, any forward progression towards a goal or result. In other words, there is no proposition to respond to in order for logic to makes its entrance for the clarification of truth. Adler clarifies the use of Mill's text for the task of reasoning, placing opinion in its proper place in the pursuit of truth. Opinion is important, but it should not overshadow its progressive movement toward the goal that Mill sought, namely that of a truth, at least in consensus, so there is a progression towards an end result. For truth to be considered, there needs to be a movement from rhetoric of thoughts and ideas to facts. It is only

[15] Mortimer Jerome Adler, *Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy* (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 161-162.

[16] It is important to note that intention does not necessarily lead to a unity of truth on the said subject in focus, but rather leads to an opinion, response, a truth, not the truth. It is a unity, but an internal unity for further inquiry.

then, as Mill says, that a choice can be made, and one's own thoughts and ideas either are reinforced or changed in order to take in this new information. This process, for Adler, engages the use of logic.

1.3 Logic And The Fight For Being

1.3.1 The Pursuit of Logic and Truth: Adler's Revised Aristotelian Logic

In following Adler's argument on Mill, we find that opinion taken to the next level of public engagement requires the formation of an argument to be tested and verified. This is a mode of reasoning, of using logic to develop one's argument, but even more so, to develop knowledge as truth. Thus, there is a logic to truth. The logic of truth claims that something is correctly judged to be true and that all contrary judgments are therefore incorrect. This form of deductive reasoning, termed syllogistic logic, is the most common due to its ability to grasp the thing in its observation, and thus to have a form of common sense to it.[17] It is this syllogistic logic that Adler relies upon in his pragmatic theory of truth, for this can be demonstrated in the gathering of information, as realized in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals*. By gathering information, one deduces the functions of the things.

But Adler must transition from an Aristotelian syllogistic logic that is demonstrated in the causal world to syllogistic statements that are found in doctrinal belief that can be verified. This difficulty, due to the lack of verifiability of the doctrinal claim from revelation, is, for Adler, resolved by its pragmatic outcome, by its ability to effect right desire. Alluding to Augustine's *City*

[17] Aristotle and Jonathan Barnes, "Posterior Analytics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 71a1-6. See also John Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 33-34.

of God, he says that truth and our desire for truth come out of our desire for righteousness.[18] And the truth that comes out of descriptive proposition, i.e. a truth statement, is made apparent in reality when it correctly describes reality, but this outcome is coupled with the pursuit of right truth in relation to reality. Thus, revelation proclaims the truth in which it is tested in the outcomes of practical faith, in the lives of people. What emerges from it is a knowledge that should be assimilable to the body of knowledge that we currently possess.[19]

By restricting truth to its syllogistic form, Adler maintains a commonsense form of reality, for example, that what we see is what is there, that if one sees a chair, it is truly a chair as has been taught by ones context. This is what is made available to the senses. From this one has the ability to create a more uniform progression in a societal as opposed to an autonomous fashion. Not that he is against the individual pursuit of intelligence; quite the contrary. However, his mode of thinking well entails a common mode of thinking, so that there is a general consensus of values upon which one is able to reflect. One's own mode of thinking derives from the common mode of thinking.[20]

1.3.1.1 From Opinions to Judgements

Why the need for a common mode of thinking? Adler makes a distinction between speculative and practical reasoning. Speculative reasoning, the power to apprehend, judge, and reason, is used if the purpose is to attain some form of knowledge, or for understanding.[21] It is the basis from which assertions and judgments can be made. And yet this is not enough. Apprehension, judging,

[18] Augustine, Aurelius Augustine, *The City of God,* trans. Rev. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1871), Book V, Chapter 14.

[19] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 23.

[20] In reflecting on Mill, Adler's response is opposed to Mill, for, though to a lesser degree, he maintains the difference and freedom of individuals, and their ability to invest in the nation state. The nation becomes because of the people.

[21] Mortimer Jerome Adler, *Intellect: Mind Over Matter* (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 150-151.

and reason are not speculative but practical if the requirement or end result is toward a goal, or the need to make a decision, or execute a choice. It is practical if it moves into the immediacy of the moment and relies on a more prescriptive judgement.

To pause and reflect a bit more on the speculative aspect of thought, Adler cites its importance in linear thinking and its relevance in practical thought. The movements he notes are from concept to judgment to reasoning. The first concept is the apprehension of the object of thought and is non-assertive and non-discursive.[22] Conceptual thinking fits within the mode of perception, as it takes in the world through the senses. Descriptive and prescriptive judgments are distinct in that each has a different take on what it is doing to the object, and each has its own end goals. The descriptive judgments are made to decide whether the thing exists or not—whether it is a fact. They describe what is there, what is apparent. But prescriptive judgments take on a more wholistic character that includes a practical action. Prescriptive judgments are "ought judgments," that is, they are judgments which are regarded as true if they conform to right desire. There is a cognitive aspect of it that leads to a praxis-oriented response; What one ought to do is based on certain principles that do not correspond to reality as such, but to principles of moral goodness in the world. Prescriptive judgments should contain values that are universal in scope. Thus, any form of reasoning has a "practical syllogism," that in each moment calls one to a prescriptive judgment, what one ought to be desired or done.[23] Thus practical reasoning, common sense, requires a prescriptive judgment, which takes on a universal value as its motion to respond. It is what one ought to do. It is what has already been responded to, accepted, and made ubiquitous so that judgments can be made within that mode of thinking. The ought gives way to the response of whether a thing is what it is, by way of removing the mode of discovery, adventure, and novelty.

[22] Adler, *Intellect*, 152.
[23] Ibid., 158.

There may be some opinion as to its response, but it finds its correction in going back to the origin, the universal values to which the society adheres. Thus, there should be no contradiction between the two.

Adler relies on the law of non-contradiction to show that in practical reason there can be no contradictions. He credits both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas for defining this principle of contradiction, saying that, "we should not answer a question by saying both Yes and No to it as the same time…we should not both affirm and deny the same proposition."[24] This is helpful in a real sense in that, upon making choices that are prescribed, one who is capable of making judgment should make a judgment one way or another concerning the thing about which one is deliberating—in this case, the truth. Truth is, for Adler, what must be logical, united, and therefore cannot be pluralistic in any way.

Adler further qualifies his understanding of truth, on what he is looking to make logical and unified. He calls the sphere of truth the space of judgment and not of taste. Taste is a value statement that comes from subjective opinion. However, truth does not fall within the sphere of taste because it is not necessary that a group of persons objectively agree to a matter of taste. Because taste can elicit a variety of opinions and because it is not vitally important for there to be a consensus about it, it is alright if there are various opinions about it. But in the sphere of truth, Adler insists that it is important for objective, practical reasoning to take place. The reason for this is because in the matter of right and wrong, or of what is the most good, at its fullest expression there can be a desire for good. Adler writes, “Only if there could be truth in judgments that asserted that certain objects are good for all human beings, not just for this individual or that, would value judgments have objectivity.”[25] Because of skeptical judgments that state that all

[24] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 133.
[25] Mortimer Jerome Adler, *Six Great Ideas* (New York: Collier Books, 1984), 68.

judgments are value judgments, Adler finds it necessary to push back and argue that if there is any good that goes beyond the subjective, it also needs to be and do good for a vast majority, if not all, human beings. Then and only then can value be objective. Because we desire what is good, we should desire truth to discover the ultimate good. That entails a pursuit not only of descriptive truth, but also of prescriptive truth. Descriptive truth occurs in the mode of speculative thinking, in which the object or thing being described is being considered to be an existing or non-existing thing. If it does exist, the mode of speculative thinking ends and that of practical reasoning begins. The speculative task has ended, and then the goal of usefulness and the good is sought.

Prescriptive truth is important; it is the "ought" of religion and philosophy. Adler wants to hold to a commonsense view of things, as seen through the senses, but relies on his intellectual capacities to apprehend, develop, and apply that sense in the world around us. The prescriptive judgments are choices, but choices that are made by a consensus, and not by those unable to make judgments. By this I mean that Adler consistently states that those who are able to make judgments in matters of objective truths fall in the sphere of mathematics, the practical sciences, and law. This is far removed from what I believe was J.S. Mill's thought about the man of liberty, who thought through the process for all in the progression from opinion to judgment. Prescriptive judgments, those that fall outside the realm of objective spheres of influence, should permeate beyond those qualified and should be understood as judgments useful for all. This, I think, was Adler's goal in his own work—to develop more lucid ways of understanding Aristotelian logic and discourse on the belief in God. But Adler's focus on Aristotle's philosophy engages the political and the theological; it therefore requires a judgment, and that judgment requires the movement from opinion to truths. This judgment also comes from practical reason and thus from an agreement or consensus. For those areas of judgment in which prescriptions on things are given, it is paramount that a logic be in place that can defend it.

Adler is fair in stating that logic may be different in each case, and that in the unity of truth there needs to be coherence; however, the logic in practical reason can lead one to assuming or suggesting there is only one result, and, based on judgment, to insisting that reason is the valid one to use. And yet this does not speak to its applicability in a situation, which cannot be a form of deduction (commonsense), but rather leads to a more complex arrangement of fact, truth, and meaning.

When applying this thinking towards religion, Adler seeks a truth that describes a real presence of the divine at work, not by way of actual divine presence, but through the actions of the people. The best religion is the religion that pursues goodness and truth, that has the goal of the divine, but that also seeks out divine goodness in relation to humanity. This is translated as its practical impact. Truth and the desire for truth are an important part of the work of religion. Therefore Adler examines a religion's effectiveness by inspecting its practical side, it's praxis of orthodoxy. Praxis is necessary in any religion, even if no liturgical practice is apparent. Adler argues that any religion—if it is active and includes some liturgical practice, some practice outside of oneself—contains a practical aspect. Adler seeks the ubiquitous nature of religion so that it can be practical for all purposes. Just as in mathematics as well as in the sciences, for Adler the truth that religion holds cannot have any contradiction. If there is no contradiction, then, thanks to its ubiquitous nature, it becomes transcultural. Because of its transculturality, it can be applied in all situations. Thus, Adler desires that both philosophy and religion engage in trans-religiosity. If religion is able to move from a more poetic formation of truth—a truth that is oblivious to contradiction—and move to a more practical understanding that seeks truth and goodness as its desires or outcomes, then what happens is a shift of the role of religion: religion gains a more universal role. Adler is using truth and goodness, the virtues espoused by Aristotle, to guide a more

Aristotelian philosophy of religion that deals with matters of fact as opposed to more speculative aspects of religion, and therefore with multiplicity and the lack of non-contradiction.

In order for a religion to become universal, it must engage with other religious traditions; however, the pursuit of such engagement occurs not through growth in one's own tradition, but rather through true and false propositions, through asking: "Which system provides the better method for understanding the divine and the God/World relation?" His chief outcome is this: In Logic, there can be only one truth from a proposition. If God is the creator of the universe, then other statements about the universe are necessarily false. This also means that no other system of religion nor its pursuit is tenable if it does not pertain to this best system.

The movement from opinion to reasoning through logic still doesn't result in a satisfactory understanding of the reality of the world around us. The reality is that many religions exist, and thus logic requires that there be a way of understanding the variety of religions. Although Adler would disagree, he does entertain the differences of logic in what is known as lesser logics.

1.3.1.2 Lesser Logics

Adler is holding to a particular, hard logic. By hard logic I mean that for any proposition there can be one and only one response—either that it is true or that it is false. This is in line with Aristotle's understanding of the law of non-contradiction: namely, that no middle ground is possible.[26] In this case, the affirmation that God exists cannot coexist with the atheist affirmation that God does not exist.[27] Only one or the other can be true.

There also exists a logic of contraries, which is a weaker opposition or a weak force, as it contains a middle ground. In this case, Adler gives the example of differences between

[26] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 15.
[27] Ibid.

monotheism and polytheism, and that of atheism. In other words, it can be true that a god exists, and then the question becomes whether god is multiple or singular; and then there is the possibility that God does not exist. These are strong and weak disjunctions.[28] Adler places religion and religious discussion in the space of weak disjunctions or contraries, in which "if one of the opposed beliefs is true, the other cannot be truth, but both may be false."[29]

In the field of philosophy of religion, the question of truth is important for determining what is real and unreal, and thus toward what one should be progressing. The problem for Adler is highlighted in where he places religious movements, namely in the sphere of the poetic as opposed to the sphere of making judgments, of seeking the transcultural sphere of religion. Religion needs to move into the space of logical discussions on truth, for unless it does so it will always be a discussion of contraries, and not one of contradictories—or of truths that can co-exist as opposed to so-called truths that cancel each other out.

Adler identifies the logic of truth as central for understanding or making sense of the world. Because religion does not currently deal with factual truth, Adler has to develop another way of establishing a truth as factual and possible within religious thought. For religion to fit within his scheme, the question of the truth of scripture and creed/doctrine must be testable and provable based on the conclusions of historical research, science, and philosophy.[30]

Adler also insists on ideas being paramount for any practice. Thus, he establishes a logic prior to action. I say this because in religious systems that claim to have no orthodoxy, Adler argues that they do have an orthopraxy, a right way of living, and thus contain an implicit orthodoxy. If one thinks one can escape the question of the logic of truth for said religion because of its implicit

[28] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 15.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 20.

orthodoxy, one realizes that the logic of truth applies to propositions even within the implicit orthodoxy.[31]

From this Adler develops his definition of truth and the formulation of the unity of truth. Truth takes on two tasks, the first being that in propositions truth is what is true over what is false (correspondence). Its second task goes deeper: it asks the question "By what means and/or criteria can one determine whether a proposition is true or false?" Not only is Adler interested in describing things as they really are, he is also concerned with the criteria by which the propositions for the possibility of truth are to be verified. The two functions are circular in their verification of one another: The primary role of truth as correspondence of thought to reality helps the second function. However, the means or criteria for ascertaining whether or not the proposition is true is necessary in order for the proposition to describe the way things really are, so that if one acts upon it, one should be successful.[32] The proposition describing the thing objectively there is true because it corresponds to the way things are. This is the pragmatic theory of how to determine "whether our judgment about the truth of a proposition is correct or not."[33] His concern with the pragmatic theory of truth has to do not so much with the judgment of the fact realized, but rather with the efficient description of said fact. Even with this, the theory does not take into account the diverse perspectives of changing contexts, cultures, and knowledges. Adler's use of efficient descriptions, its reduction to fact, can be paralleled to the understanding of efficient cause and pragmatic understanding, and leaves unexplored the final cause regarding how things come to be, as well as the deeper meanings of things in themselves.

The proposition should be provable, meaning it should be possible to assimilate the proposition to the body of knowledge that we already have in science, history, and mathematics.

[31] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 20-21.
[32] Ibid., 21-22.
[33] Ibid., 22.

If there is a difference, then some aspect of that knowledge may have to be changed if the new proposition is to be judged true based on tests. This is a form of coherence that works with the pragmatic theory of truth.[34]

1.3.2 The Error of Averroes on Truth and Soul

Coherence is essential to come to grips with the multiple categories of abstraction in studies, as it ties them all together in the logic of truth. In order to show this, Adler addresses the question within a historical timeframe, the time of the scientific renaissance in the sixteenth century.[35] What Adler wants to affirm is a "unicity" of truth, that truth is one. This would also mean that that there can be no thing such as the two-theory truth, which seems to be upheld in the work of Aristotle, and in Catholic faith under Latin Averroism. Latin Averroism refers to the philosopher Averroes' consummation of the Aristotelian commentary on his philosophical works. He is one of the few Islamic philosophers to have been translated during the medieval period, and to have influenced catholic thinkers, consequently named the Latin Averroists. The historical situation introduces the problem: How can one reconcile two diverse realizations, that of the philosophical knowledge as espoused by Aristotle, and that of the Islamic faith (according to Averroes)?

I will be brief and provide some introduction but will give more detail in the Islamic tradition of the necessity of imagination as a space for ascertaining truth. One would need to begin with Avicenna, who worked with Aristotle's philosophy but worked through and provided space for the Islamic understanding of revelation, in so doing producing a natural theology. The problem

[34] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 23.
[35] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1938), 37.

here was that Avicenna did not clarify what he thought of the rational value of the Islamic faith.[36] The eleventh-century philosopher, theologian, jurist, and mystic Al-Ghazali had serious issues in reconciling Islamic faith and philosophy. His work, titled *The Incoherence of the Philosophers,* details twenty issues in both the metaphysics and natural doctrine of Avicenna. He calls philosophers mere imitators for having abandoned the beliefs and practices of Islam, for exchanging the "imitation of the true" for the "imitation of the false."[37] For Al-Ghazali, the problem that he was refuting primarily dealt with causation, or second causation. Second causation refers to the sequence of effects which ripple from one cause to the next. For the philosophers, a "cosmos not bound together by interlocking chains of secondary causality represents an absurdity."[38] But for Al-Ghazali this posed a great danger, as for him necessity is only found in God. If necessity is found in anything other, for example in the nature of things, it would infringe on divine agency and would comprise omnipotence.[39] For Al-Ghazali, what remains at stake is that which can be found through revelation, which is only given by God.

This brief introduction to Al-Ghazali is valuable as it sets the stage for Averroes, whom Adler confronts regarding his conception of truth. For Al-Ghazali, God is that which reveals truth, and that can be found only through revelation, specifically revelation in the scriptural texts. Adler introduces a variant of this—that in religion, in its revelation of the Divine as revealer of truth, all truths must coincide. Thus for Adler the goal is to allow for the various systems to cohere in non-contradictory ways, ways that lead to the Divine as creator of all.

Adler confronts Averroes' opinion on truth as it has been understood in the West, but not in its Islamic understanding. Averroes, in response to Al-Ghazali, wrote his *Destruction of the*

[36] Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, 39.
[37] Eric Ormsby, *Ghazali: The Revival of Islam (Makers of the Muslim World)* (Bloomsbury: Oneworld Publications, 2007), 75.
[38] Ibid., 78.
[39] Ibid.

Destruction as a refutation of the consideration of one truth as found through the revelation of God through the Koran. Averroes is pushing against Al-Ghazali's renunciation of philosophy in Islamic faith. Being both a person of Islamic faith and an Aristotelian philosopher, Averroes argues for the double truth theory, that religion and philosophy as separate sources of knowledge do not contradict one another as two different bodies of truth, namely the truth of faith and the truth of reason.[40] To respond to the question of the need for supernatural revelation although there being rational methods to reveal God, Averroes resorts to the distinction that Aristotle makes between three categories of argumentation: rhetorical, dialectic, and necessary arguments. The question is not whether something is true or false, but rather whether it is better that something hinders or develops the self into something beyond the self. Averroes would argue that "religion and revelation are nothing but philosophical truth made acceptable to men whose imagination is stronger than their reason."[41] This would be correct in the sense that each category of argumentation works for those within diverse intellectual developments. However, it would be necessary to go further in Averroes' thought concerning how he understood Aristotle, which becomes the main issue between those after him and Thomas Aquinas. The issue becomes that of the unity of the Intellect.

Averroes develops his Aristotelian arguments from his Islamic roots. Thus, he rationalizes Islamic faith so that it can make sense, to a degree. The divine in Islamic faith is realized in and through the imagination, but in philosophy it is realized through physical proof of God's Existence as the First Cause. The First Cause is a pure act, or Intelligence. The Intelligence is a First Cause, a pure act and not an embodied substance, because all embodied substances contain matter, which

[40] Adler here focuses on the critique of Averroes in Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*.
[41] Ibid., 43.

therefore contains potentiality, and is not a pure act.[42] From this pure act as motion come a total of thirty-eight intellects or primary causes of motion, the least of which is the Active Intellect. It is "the final rung in the incorporeal hierarchy, 'emanating' eternally from the intelligence associated with the lunar sphere."[43] Although the lowest, the Active Intellect is the sphere in which we have our being, and in which the material in its potentiality becomes actual. But it is also here that Averroes parts ways with Avicenna and Al-Farabi, who argue that the individual soul in the afterlife lives on; by contrast, Averroes argues against the individuality of the soul, because it relies upon the Active Intellect for its becoming. The Active Intellect remains a separate act because it is a pure act, and therefore cannot be a part of the material or efficient cause. To make the Active Intellect, the individual soul causes the Active Intellect to become passive. The Active Intellect must remain a pure act, but it does not have to produce solely one form, but can produce a multiplicity of forms, such as that of the First Mover or Cause. Davidson writes, "from one only one can proceed '[*sadara*]' is 'valid' exclusively for the 'efficient [cause]' in the strict sense of the term; it is not valid for the 'formal cause' or 'final cause,' even when they may be regarded, in an extended and analogical sense, as an 'efficient cause.'"[44] In this case, they would be convinced about something's value by rhetorical arguments alone, without considering the necessary or more reasoned arguments. Averroes argues against Avicenna and Al-Farabi, suggesting that they mistook the term *sadara* to be for all causes when it was meant for the efficient cause, which only leads the possible into the actual. So the material makes what is possible, the insistence, actual.

[42] Averroes, *Tahafut Al-Tahafut (the Incoherence of the Incoherence),* trans. Simon van den Bergh (London: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008), 218.

[43] Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 231. The lunary sphere is the world of changing nature, that of the elements of earth, air, water, and fire. This is the world in which physics has its effect. Another important thing to note is that Averroes "dismisses the notion of a diurnal sphere beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and he does not construe the intelligences as the emanating cause of the bodies of the spheres."

[44] Ibid., 227.

But this move towards possibility only happens beforehand, in the pure act of the Active Intelligence. This is important to note because Averroes removes any form of emanation and places all of the power within the form of the intelligences, within cognition, imagination, and memory. But they form a hierarchy that makes religion the least of the forms and makes rational thinking the highest form.

In going back to the way in which persons are able to understand and are introduced into the divine mystery, Averroes argues for two ways to enter the divine mystery, , and it is this double truth theory that produces a problem for Thomas Aquinas in his work *The Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists*, and for Adler in his contention with poetic truth. In the mode of the dialectic, it is not enough to convince the person through their imagination and emotions; rather, one must make sure that what is taught in revelation is not at "variance with verified scientific knowledge."[45] They also need to have good reasons to believe that they should have faith in a divine. This is the role of theology and theologians. For Averroes, the philosopher cannot adopt the methods espoused by the prior systems of argumentation, and instead must seek necessary rational demonstrations. The three modes are three different approaches to the same truth, and thus ultimately agree. Yet for Averroes, philosophy itself is absolute truth, as it is established by the demonstrations of pure reason, and closest to the pure act, which the soul desires.[46] For Averroes, like Aristotle, there is no difference between what the masses and what the philosophers know. The only difference lies in the way that philosophy can show how the revealed truth of Islam may be established as demonstrably valid. Since the truth of Islam lies in revelation through prophecy, all believers believe for the same reason. But the philosopher can justify the belief in another way as well as through acceptance of revelation. Similarly, Averroes argues that both the philosopher

[45] Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, 44.

[46] Ibid., 46. See also Léon Gauthier, *Accord De La Religion Et De La Philosophie: Traité D'Ibn Rochd (Averroès)* (Algiers: P. Fontana, 1905), 21-26.

and the ordinary believer can be happy, but they will be happy in different ways. The ordinary believer's happiness will lie in his observance of the *sharia* and social norms, while the happiness of the philosopher, in addition to such observance, will lie in his personal development of intellectual virtues. According to Averroes, Islam can account for the happiness of both types of person.

1.3.3 Aquinas, Augustine, on the Individuality of the Soul and the Unity of Truth

In arguing for the difference and unity of the ways of deriving the divine, Averroes produces problems for Adler, who focuses on Thomas Aquinas' focus on the *Unity of the Intellect*. In particular, the problem is with the place of intelligence in Averroes' thought. To Averroes, the soul is the outcome of the conjunction of the human body and the Intellect, but once the material form ends, though the soul ceases to exist, the Active Intellect remains. The Intellect in the material form is a passive intellect, only able to attain some aspect of the Active Intellect in moments in which the universal understanding appears, and only in some regards. Averroes believed that it is only the Active Intellect that contains universals, as it was a pure act and only it can move from pure act to potential to its actual material form. Although Averroes understood truth as one, it was a truth of differences and different stages of truth, in which religion becomes limited to the sphere of the imagination.

The unity of the active of Intellect causes a problem in understanding the human mind and soul. The problem for Adler is that religion, if it is revelation from God, must coincide with all truth. All truth is one, he would say. This argument, that truth is one, is found in Thomas Aquinas, who took on the opposing view that there is one all-embracing sphere of logical or factual truth.

All are parts, however various or diverse they may be in other respects, and these parts must cohere and be compatible with one another.[47]

I note that Adler speaks on the function of poetic truth, meaning mythology and religion. He does not disregard it; one can find value within it, ascribing meaning and understanding to it, and understand that it need not be logical to derive meaning. As an Aristotelian philosopher, he ascribes to poetry the notion that it gives us instruction and delight. Instruction comes from the insight and understanding that result from the imaginative exploration of possibilities and probabilities. It enriches the actual, about which we have instruction from history, science, philosophy.[48]

The problem for Aquinas, as well for Adler, is that the Intellect in Averroes' work is not a part of the individual as the soul is ultimately one, the divine, and this is further exacerbated by the duality of faith and intellect. To maintain the notion of the Image of God, we must have an intellect similar to the divine. Adler wants to lift up religious truth, insisting that it has the same ability to speak to reality, as the way things really are. But unlike Averroes he does not want to separate the two, as this marginalizes one over the other. Rather, in following Aquinas' thoughts, he insists that truth is necessarily one, and that regardless of the field, its truths must fall into place, they must be integral with one another, so that science meshes with history and math, and hopefully also with philosophy and religion.

That being the case, Adler once again reiterates the necessity of factual truth as that which corresponds to reality, to the way things really are.[49] Corresponding to that, the truths of faith are the same kinds of truth as the truths of philosophy, he says. How can the two different formations

[47] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 25. See also Thomas Aquinas, *On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists,* trans. Beatrice H. Zedler (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968).
[48]Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 25.
[49] Ibid., 26.

of truth be of the same kind, we ask? Adler responds, “truth is one comprehensive, integral, and coherent whole in which there are many parts, each part differing in the methods by which truth is pursued and also in the aspects of reality with which that pursuit is concerned.”[50]

By asserting Aquinas' critique of the Latin Averroists, Adler also critiques the question of the multiplicity of truths. There can be no double theory of truth, as that would limit the freedom of the individual by the loss of two parts: first, they would lose access to the individual soul, as Averroes asserts that the soul returns to the universal soul of which it is a part. This loss of the individual soul would also mean the loss of some liberty, as a distinction from the divine. It would also mean that the notion of the *Imago Dei*—that humanity is made in the image of God—is problematic. This leads to the second issue for Adler: the image of God, as Augustine and Aquinas assert, it is the Intellect which is made in God's image. The Intellect is able to reason and rationalize to a degree like God. By making the mind passive, as Averroes argues, one is no longer made in the image of God. Any universal understanding cannot be found by the individual unless given by the active Intellect. That would mean that the mind has a passive function and can only know of the things as external, as changing, and not one as universal knowledge.

Adler cares about the individual and her ability to reason for herself. Without the ability to reason it would be difficult to benefit society and its progress towards the kingdom of God. Adler argues that if we all have the ability to reason and rationalize, then we can all come to the understanding of the role society plays in the development of morals and order. And this move is further realized in the maintenance of a religion or religious system that parallels society, a holy city, the kingdom of God.

[50] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 27.

What is not mentioned here, however, is the role that imagination plays within Avicenna's and Averroes' work. Although Aquinas and Augustine discuss the imagination at length, they are more concerned with how it coincides with the maintenance of the soul of the individual, as well as the ability of the intellect to make known the universal qualities, in part, to the self through reasoning and rationalization.[51] If the imagination is not adequate in the life of the soul to pursue the divine, then neither can it function adequately within the modes of reasoning and rationalization. Rather, is it reasoning and rationalization that one makes sense of the divine, to move towards the divine, and the imagination is used in service of analogy. Adler uses this idea concerning reason, rationalization, and imagination to insist that the double truth theory that Averroes holds on to is incorrect and pushes for a theory of truth that is all encompassing, and that uses logic as its mode of inquiry and discovery. For Averroes, imagination does have a place. For Adler, poetic truth has no place, and religion should not use poetic truth as its form of discovery, precisely because it is not a reasoning system.[52]

1.4 Adler's Thoughts On The Imagination

In breaking down Adler's thoughts on the use of reason and rationalization, one can come to the conclusion that his concern is to maintain a common-sense philosophy, one of sameness, to discover or reveal the divine at work. His understanding of manifesting this is by way of common sense. Adler defines common sense as so; we

> have formed as a result of the common experience we have in the course of our daily lives—experiences we have without any effort of inquiry on our part, experiences we all have simply because we are awake and conscious. In addition,

[51] In my third chapter I discuss at a bit more length Aquinas and Augustine's thoughts on the imagination.

[52] I want to hold off speaking about this notion of religion and its use of poetic truth for the following chapters, as it becomes more relevant there as a critique of Adler and his pragmatic theory of truth as holding primarily to a hard logic.

> these common notions are notions we are able to express in the common words we employ in everyday speech.[53]

So the terms in our language that we use in common are considered common sense. With words we express matters such as "thing," "body," "mind," "change," "cause," "part," "whole," "one," "many," and so on.[54]

For Adler the experienced reality in the world is not constructed in our minds, even though our experience of it is mind-dependent though its reality is not. "In the course of human history many different worldviews…have been developed, varying from culture to culture, from time to time, and from one stage of scientific or philosophical speculation to another."[55]

Adler insists that these are all products of the intellectual imagination. He writes, "the plurality of worlds thus pictured or imagined should never be confused with the world that we perceive. Nor should these worldviews or world-pictures be assessed for their truth or falsity by their correspondence or noncorrespondence."[56] World-making or world-construction is not knowledge of reality. It may come from experience, but it goes far beyond that in flights of fancy that are works of the intellectual imagination. Adler would even argue that imagination in its imaginative or narrative form is not cognitive at all. Adler identifies this as noncognitive content.[57]

Thus, Adler's position is that the imagination, although having the power to create worlds, is not in the position to assure knowledge or to ascertain truth or a thing's truthfulness. What is ultimately necessary are notions of common sense and logic, common sense being the experience of the world in its reality, as well as the ability for logic to order the world so that sense of the world "makes sense," and therefore enters into common sense.

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[53] Adler, *Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy*, xii.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Adler, *Intellect: Mind Over Matter*, 124.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid., 124, 148n.

1.4.1 Against the Mythological

The common-sense notion coupled with logic forces religious truth to move in a direction that pushes against mythological truth. To say that something is mythical is to argue that it exists in the realm of fiction as opposed to fact, which highlights the imaginative rather than logical world he rejects because it is non-cognitive. Adler is pushing from two sides here, one from the proponents of mythology as religious, and those in the academic sphere who see little difference between the religious and the mythological, as the outcomes are similar.[58] Adler argues that those who maintain that their religious beliefs proclaim truth would be highly offended. This commonsense phenomenon forces one to argue that religion is not mythological nor superstitious.[59] This is a sharp argument that counters Joseph Campbell's own thoughts on religion as myth. As an example of his understanding of myth, Campbell writes:

> Saint Thomas Aquinas declares: "The name of being wise is reserved to him alone whose consideration is about the end of the universe, which end is also the beginning of the universe." The basic principle of all mythology is this of the beginning in the end. Creation myths are pervaded with a sense of the doom that is continually recalling all created shapes to the imperishable out of which they first emerged. The forms go forth powerfully, but inevitably reach their apogee, break, and return. Mythology, in this sense, is tragic in its view. But in the sense that it places our true being not in the forms that shatter but in the imperishable out of which they again immediately bubble forth, mythology is eminently untragical. Indeed, wherever the mythological mood prevails, tragedy is impossible. A quality rather of dream prevails. True being, meanwhile, is not in the shapes but in the dreamer.[60]

In this passage Campbell asserts that mythology has insight into the imperishable, that which cannot be shattered. But the imperishable is found in fleeting forms that break and return. This is

[58] Mircea Eliade takes a more sympathetic approach, arguing that mythology is foundational for any religion, in that the stories of faith are the ground for belief in a divine. See Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 16-17.

[59] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 53.

[60] Joseph Campbell, *The Hero With a Thousand Faces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 250.

problematic for Adler, because the imperishable is not able to be verified due to its dynamicity. It does not have the ability to maintain its form for objective analysis. These truths come in the mode of story, and in them truths are revealed.[61]

Adler's main contention with Campbell is that poetic truth, because of its non-propositional formation of truth, cannot verify its factuality; There is no ground from which to start. For Thomas Aquinas, the ground for truth is the actual events of scripture. From there, one can find their interpretation in the form of allegorical, tropological (interpretation of the moral metaphors of a text) and anagogical (interpretation of the spiritual connotations of a text) modes of understanding. The scripture is the ground for thinking, and from it one finds meaning. Adler's development of religious truth must move beyond the merely poetic, which is based on instructional usage and is used for understanding, to that which is factual, and truths that are foundational. His logic goes as follows: if mathematics is part of the whole, and history is part of the whole, then religious truths, not in a poetic sense, are also one part of the whole of truth that must cohere and be compatible with all the other parts of the whole. This is "what is required by the logic of truth in terms of the unity of truth."[62]

What still remains a problem for Adler are the truths found in religious creeds, dogmas, or articles of faith, which are necessarily contingent on the experience of Christian faith or faith in general, and are therefore beyond proof by any empirical or rational means.[63] Thus, in the current sphere of religion conflicts arise because in every religious system beliefs are contingent upon their context, experiences, traditions, and writings. If compared with philosophy, in terms of inquiry and reflection, there can be no conflict with it and the other parts of truth, as philosophy

[61] Adler would not disagree with this mode of truth, but would say it is not a reliable one. In this case myth, poetic truth, or imagination plays the role of teacher, i.e. "Imagine if," "Once upon a time." They speak truths and are powerful, but are not verifiable scientifically, and therefore not able to attain knowledge.

[62] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 27.

[63] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 27.

has a method that helps with defining truth. Not so with religious truth, since it does not appeal to physical experience but to its allegorical, tropological, and anagogical experiences.

Adler rectifies this situation by relying on Augustine's rules pertaining to conflicting truths and scripture. For Augustine, the scriptures are the revealed word of God, revealed to man through human voices that are inspired to communicate God's message.[64] Since scripture is divinely inspired, its message conveyed is true, but it cannot be read in a literal fashion. Thus the first task of the theologian is to exegete the text, that is, to do hermeneutics, to go beyond the literal meanings of words by various steps and stages of interpretation. It is only then that articles of faith can be formulated. Only then can the theologian philosophically understand the dogmas and what should be believed.[65]

The second task that Augustine proposed has two rules. The first is to "Hold to the truth of Scripture without wavering. Since it is revealed truth, we must never abandon our belief in its truth."[66] As a revealed truth, on the belief of God's inspired revelation one should not waver from it. The second rule is this: "Since Sacred Scriptures can be interpreted in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular version only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it if it should prove false."[67] It is the second argument that Adler rewords to deal more adequately with questions of certitude and knowing beyond a reasonable doubt. The second precept is this: that according to the logic of truth, no interpretation of sacred scripture and no article of faith to which it leads can be true if it is incompatible with what is known with certitude in other aspects of the

[64] Ibid., 28.

[65] This is an interesting part, the methodology for scripture is that is true precisely because it is divinely inspired; a silo has been placed around the system itself, in order for it to grow on its own and become what it needs to become, an institution. Like every other system, there are presuppositions and premises that cannot be removed from the culmination of the system itself, and therefore cannot be argued about. This is alright, but we must then confess the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, that this in itself is an abstraction, not solely the methodology in place, but the methodology of getting to the presupposition.

[66] Ibid., 29.

[67] Ibid.

whole truth, such as mathematics, science, and philosophy.[68] Adler here shifts from certitude to knowing beyond a reasonable doubt, because in reality one really does not know things "with certitude." However, if something is known beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be shifts in thinking, changes, even in history, science, etc. which may have created some tension before, but does not do so now, so that the Christian or other religious belief may be upheld.

1.5 Conclusion

To respond to the question of the possibility of religious pluralism, Adler requires a whole, integral logic of truth that can become a criterion of religions. This framework would then be able to deduce, based on the criteria established, the validity of religious systems and their truth claims. His position, as stated from the beginning of this chapter, is that there can be only one religion, one faith. His statement is consistent with his own ideals: that in matters of judgment, not opinion, there can be only one choice.

However, the question of religion is not a simple category that can be assessed simply on the method of logic alone. Even his inclusion of coherence, on top of logic as the load bearing system, is not enough to deal with the multiplicity of truths that extend from the realization of religions in the world. The problem that arises is a negation of the usefulness of poetics to introduce the multiplicity of religions as an expression of the divine, and thus pursue from that expression its fulfillment in the actual. My argument here is that both poetics and rationality are aspects of relationality, and to dismiss either is to dismiss both forms from being effective in their own method.

[68] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, 30.

In an assessment of Adler's responses and goals, there are certain realizations that arise, which contribute to his movement against pluralism. First, by drawing upon Mill, Adler wants to introduce a certain agenda concerning democratic society, in which the people, all those who exist within the nation, can grow and progress towards their intended goals and aspirations. Thus, if liberty is society's goal, it is necessary that those within society have certain ways of being; that is, they have to have to ability to make judgments on a large scale. And this is Adler's focus within political philosophy, that judges, mathematicians, and scientists are able to make large scale judgments that benefit all, and thus move society forward. There is therefore an insistence that the rest of society be conformed to this framework of the desire for truth and goodness, but that is found in a commonsense way, within the reality of the sensual world.

Living in society is part of this larger thought that Adler is idealizing. If the divine is at work in all things, and, in following the thought of Augustine and Aquinas, that we are in the image of the Divine (the *imago dei*) then what must occur is twofold: our internal way of being, like that of the divine, is one of logic and order, thus making correct judgment possible as a pursuit of right truth and right desire. Second, the society that we establish or are within must represent this reality of the divine at work. So, systems which become trans-, reflects an aspect of the divine in that it is suitable for all people, for all things.

1.5.1 The Problem of Transculturality

The transculturality that Adler espouses in and through the unicity of truth using the methodology of a syllogistic logic, although helps in progressing the agenda, is problematic. I would like to address some areas in light of this and ground the rest of my work on the importance of poetic truth, or the imagination, as an intuitive grasp of what may be.

Relying on J.S. Mill's understanding of the need for the political sphere to enhance progress, Adler perceives the limitations of pluralism as being that it moves against the intended purpose of unity. However, the focus of transculturality is not defined by a unicity of persons working in a singular way, but in more of a hybrid network that offers a variety of ways to approach unity. It is a unity of networks that creates an image or aura of unity. In the "City of God and the Global City" Warren Magnusson argues this very reality. If one were to conform to the reality of the city, one would see that the city is not a unified system nor is it run by a singular unity. He writes,

> Cities are key switching points for globalizing cultures and organizational centres for social, political, and religious movements…The city as the embodiment of urbanism as a way of life is not a merely local political entity. Nor can it be identified with the ancient polis, which is the model for the modern republic. No particular city is self-contained. Nor is there a singular order to the city. A city is multiply networked and diversely ordered, internally and externally. Most importantly, there is no sovereign centre to the urban way of life locally or globally. Forms of order (and hence centres of power) proliferate within and between cities. They do not remain stable. Whereas the state is characterized by sovereignty, cities are characterized by complicated practices of government and self-government, which overlap and modify one another. These practices work against any monopoly of authority.[69]

Magnusson realizes that the city has a more dynamic nature to it, that it resists stagnation from any unifying system that seeks to provide order by creating other systems within and between them. The stability of any city or state is at best mythical. Magnusson, in his writing, thus speaks of a poetics of the city and not a logic of the city, showing that the dynamic is traced from the terms of the multiple, networks, and limits. In terms of the city, the state, and the nation, its transculturality is not found in the ideal of the nation state, but its reality—that of difference—becomes the space for possibility. It is there, it is knowledge, but I would not agree that it conforms with reality in the

[69] Warren Magnusson, "The City of God and the Global City." *CTheory* 1000 Days of Theory (td043) (2006): http://ctheory.net/ctheory_wp/the-city-of-god-and-the-global-city/.

commonsense understanding that Adler is espousing, but its opposite, which is what remains open to new possibilities. We do not understand new possibilities and attain knowledge by what is common, but by mode of imaginative inquiry and the plasticity or malleability of ourselves and those around us.

Regarding the transculturality of technology, I also believe that it is not solely a system in which order is involved, but that it also takes risks. In *Theopoetics of the Word,* Gabriel Vahanian remarks, "Technology is not merely a tool. It is a machine, but not merely a machine. It is a system in quest of a method as an instrument of its own eventual implementation…it exposes us to further choices between life and death, imposing neither."[70] Ultimately, technology is a tool, a technique which springs forth from the space from which it emerges, and cannot be placed as the ultimate, but rather is a methodology that is itself seeking to be used in a multiplicity of ways. This enforces not assurance but risk and hope of its own meaning. Technology and technique seek to break away from their own utilitarian functioning, longing for meaning and purpose outside of their practicality. They too imagine a movement beyond practicality, of living life itself, of being a part of something beyond itself. To imagine is to live. So, countering Adler's understanding of the trans- nature of technology, it is technology that desires multiplicity, that desire to delve within various logics and imaginings, to form new worlds and new ways of being, and not vice versa. There can be no demonizing of the technology because of its non-domestication to Christianity and its vision of the world, as Vahanian critiques of Ellul, but rather there must be an acceptance of technology, and entering into risk, as it creates new worlds. And this role parallels poetry's role in language and truth, where everything is at stake. I am bringing this in because to narrow the

[70] Gabriel Vahanian, *Theopoetics of the Word: A New Beginning of Word and World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 30-31. Vahanian was a French Protestant Christian theologian who is most known for his work in the theology of the "death of God" movement within academic circles in the 1960s.

something to its utilitarian function and role, for its pragmatic use, without a relation of the speculative, the imaginative, gives an immediate result of usefulness, but never its deeper meaning, its other possibilities, and the introduction of various truths, or variability of truths.

Taking this cue from Vahanian, the role that even mathematics plays can be understood as a technique that is neutral but seeks its beyondness, that is, meaning, and not solely as a tool that is ubiquitous, nothing. Whitehead, in "Mathematics and the Good," writes: "The traditional logic overstressed the notion of individual character. The notion of 'any' frees us from individual character: but there is no entity which is merely 'any.' Thus when algebra is applied, factors beyond algebraic thought are relevant to the total situation."[71] Mathematics is about terminal relationships, giving credence to a thing's possibility and actuality, but opens up to a multiplicity of uses, placing risk at its disposal, and not assurance. Its place is realized in Whitehead's Religion *in the Making*, where he comments, "But as between religion and arithmetic, other things are not equal. You *use* arithmetic, but you *are* religious. Arithmetic…is there as a necessary condition, and not as a transforming agency."[72] Not to diminish mathematics, Whitehead couple's mathematics and religion as a tension or relationship that arises, coupling together the detailed nature of mathematics with the resistive agency of religion to make something beyond itself. It fights mediocrity; it pushes against utilitarianism.

To become utilitarian is to become mediocre, to show a lack of imagination. And so the notion of the state, as well as the understanding of mathematics, seeks to go beyond itself. This can also be said of science. The scientific system may be grounded upon experimentation, but its

[71] Alfred North Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good," in *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Rider, 1948), 110.

[72] Roland Faber, "God in the Making: Religious Experience and Cosmology in Whitehead's Religion in the Making in Theological Perspective," in *L'Experience De Dieu: Lectures De Religion in the Making D'Alfred N. Whitehead*, ed. Michel Weber, and S. Rouvillois (Janvier: Ecole Saint-Jean, 2005), 15.

initial move is always found in wonder.[73] The mode of experimentation that has the appearance of being objective, of being clear observation and therefore of being an adequate means of understanding how a thing is and works, is a fallacy at best. In *Philosophy of No*, Gaston Bachelard reflects upon the roles of scientist and philosopher, and the need for a mobile unity. The scientist in his development of knowledge thinks that it emerges from ignorance, without understanding that "ignorance" is not the lack of knowledge, but interdependent errors from prior structures of knowledge.[74] There is therefore a movement of knowledges, suggesting not a singular correct knowledge but a multiplicity of knowledges that emerge from non-scientific knowledges. Science, as a tech/nique, begins in the imagination, and once completed, ends in imagination. In Gerard's *Psychoanalysis of Fire,* he writes,

> "There is then a place, we feel, for an indirect and secondary psychoanalysis which would constantly seek the unconscious under the conscious, the subjective value under the objective evidence, the reverie beneath the experiment. One can study only what one has first dreamed about. Science is formed rather on a reverie than on an experiment, and it takes a good many experiments to dispel the mists of the dream.[75]

Gerard here describes the initial foray into science itself. If the grounding of science is found in experiments, where one believes that it is found in the removal of self from the thing and in addition in finding the reality of the thing, then one has forgotten that the movement towards the experiment itself began in a dream, in reverie.[76] Thus there is both a subjectivity and objectivity to it. Therein lies an openness to becoming more than just the fact that something is there in its utilitarian sense and that it moves beyond itself to what may be. And, in line with Gerard, if science

[73] See Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education: And Other Essays* (New York: New American Library, 1949).

[74] Gaston Bachelard, *The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind.* (New York: Orion Press, 1968), 8.

[75] Gaston Bachelard, *The Psychoanalysis of Fire* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 20-21.

[76] I will speak more on Bachelard's term of reverie in the following chapter.

does not maintain a form of mobile unity, a sense of openness and process, then science is just repetition building upon itself. It becomes devoid of choice; just experimentation upon experimentation. This is significant and shows a truth: that science, like math, technology, and history, is barren unless used in such a way in and through culture. The transcultural systems that Adler espouses are not united systems that expand beyond all things, but are new knowledges layered upon one another, creating new networks, and they resist and risk previously held notions in the hopes of forming something novel. This then necessitates not solely a logic of truth, but also a return to a poetics of truth.

1.5.2 Between Descriptive and Prescriptive Truth

Adler is chiseling down, describing what he maintains truth to be: that truth conforms to reality, that it corresponds to the way things are, that truth corresponds to reality in the case that what one sees is what it really is.[77] I believe that Adler has failed to realize that he is describing a very highly conscious statement, one that neglects the fact that things in themselves have been imbued with meaning due to what has been taught to us from generation to generation. In taking his simple example of the use of a chair, Adler argues that a chair is a chair because we see it as a chair. He neglects the fact that we have been given knowledge of this form of reality; someone has told us that it is a chair. The fact that it exists does not mean that it serves a single function, but that it finds its function in two places: in the creator of the chair, who gives it shape and function, and in the user of the chair, who if he had not known what a chair was, would make inquiries, would go on an imaginative adventure, to discover what the said thing was. Alfred North Whitehead writes, "If a dog jumps into your lap, it is because he is fond of you; but if a cat

[77] Adler, *Six Great Ideas*, 34.

does the same thing, it is because your lap is warmer." This is an important point: the experiences of each thing, in this case of the dog and the cat, are unique individual experiences of one's lap. There reflects the individual character within the relationship of the lap, the temperature, etc. Following this mode of thinking, the chair can have a variety of uses, and can be given a variety of names, based on the experience of the person or thing experiencing it. Thus there can be no one, ultimate way of experiencing, but is a terminal point, a place of beginning for the risk of becoming something beyond itself.

1.5.3 On The Soul

A third aspect that I have broached is the notion of the soul. Adler writes specifically on Averroes and his thoughts on both truth and the soul. What he lifts up is interesting. To lift up the soul as an individual being made in the *Imago Dei* maintains that the intellect is essential to any understanding of world around us and even to be able to understand knowledge both spiritual and physical. This requires a being both passive and active, one who can receive and can give to act and to be acted upon. This coupled with the truth of religious revelation ensures a truth that guides the individual in his being in the world, and in his relation to the divine. Both individuality and the necessity of one truth, or an absolute truth, can assure the notion of being and intellect.

1.5.4 Adler's Logic of Truth and its Effect on Religion

> In the realm of all truths consisting of propositions that can be affirmed or denied, incompatible truths cannot coexist. All the diverse parts of knowledge, including religious knowledge or knowledge by faith, must coherently form one and only one integral whole. (Adler, *Truth*, 32)

This is a still deeper development of Adler's argument for the logic of truth, one that pertains not only in the scientific field, but also as a prescription for the unity of religion. Truth must remain

as the response to a proposition, and its response cannot be many. Thus, Adler's focus is on the space of a factual judgment, reducing the possible responses.

The problem in approaching this statement is that it suggests a hierarchy or negation of religions. What I mean by this is that if a certain religion does not meet a certain criterion, then that religion is said to be erroneous, or missing an important piece in order for it to be on the right tracks. Such an approach does not account for the context in which the religion develops, nor for how a person has developed an understanding of their engagement of religion as part of their own cultural formation. To take the subject of religion and enforce qualities that have been decided upon, qualities in which the introduction of a new religion has become involved, already places that new religion in a state of suspicion, especially when it does not meet the demands of the criteria placed in a set of logical propositions of truth statements concerning religion in general, and theories of God and humanity within that context.

The use of the term proposition is in itself a very loaded statement. Adler considers the use of proposition to be a mode of pragmatic inquiry, one that attempts to verify the reality of the thing. One may consider it a discovery, in which a hypothesis is developed, and that hypothesis is engaged in propositional statements in order to come at the reality of things. But what is not being expressed is that the hypothesis still remains a hypothesis, and the reason for its intensity in popularity or “truthfulness” is because of its response to the proposition as true. But that proposition is true only in terms of the structure that has been developed for that proposition to be true. There is this hidden realization that the structure behind the proposition negates any other schema, and honors one thought above others. By placing it in the position of a strong non-contradiction, no other knowledge can counter it.

This realization, that the proposition given by Adler hides the structure behind it, gives it an objective status, and prevents any other schema from developing the proposition, suggests that if

an ultimate structure does exist, it is not found in any singular system.[78] It conforms to Whitehead's statement of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, that of making the abstract proposition a concrete reality.[79] Thus it is not transcultural, but highlights some aspect of reality that is a part of the conversation. To neglect this is to neglect an important layer of a truth that has been established as a proposition regarding its functionality in the world. It meets the world at an entry point and works from there, responding to the needs and values from that specific space, further answering to what is past, and reforming it for the needs of the present.

My argument is not that there is a lack of a logic of truth to ascertain ideals both prescriptive and descriptive; it is that its centrality negates any possibility of discovering anything beyond its context, and that stating it as an objective truth denies the relaying of how that truth came to be, including its interpretation.

Even so, Adler's work does relay an important realization: that there is an "interest," a desire for uniformity, for a togetherness that relates a form of peace. However, this peace comes at the price of exclusion of difference, the question of matters of taste. Adler argues that matters of taste do not belong in the space of a logic of consistency, for if there is any inconsistency, the desire is for a remedy or for a move towards order. How can there be order and difference in the matter of truth? This is Adler's concern. In matters of religious pluralism, there can be no pluralism because it would not coincide with the role of truth. Alder desires a universal trans-truth in all respects.

Since I am more interested in his idea of trans-culturation, I recognize that he is wanting a singularity, a combining of things into the overarching system. This singularity recalls George Orwell's dystopian novel *1984* and his discussion of Newspeak. Orwell writes,

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[78] For a look at authors in the field of hermeneutics that identify postcolonial or differentiating hermeneutics, please see M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010)., Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, *Reading From This Place* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995).

[79] Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 58-59.

> The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought—that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc—should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words.[80]

This leads to dystopian thoughts such as those in *1984*, where Newspeak reduces people's vocabulary to a basic language of good/bad, black/white, in/out. This metaphor of Newspeak has resonance with Adler's notion of the logic of truth, deducing things to what they are in "reality" through transcultural systems. Yet, I am not convinced of the reliance on the transcultural understanding of technology and science and their methods as the way to think theologically, religiously, spiritually, or philosophically. Such methods help, but do not guarantee. They risk for something new, novel, and multiple, and work for the opposite of what Adler is trying to achieve.

The goal then is to decenter the logic of truth in its syllogistic sense and turn to a more inductive mode of logic, an exorbitant logic, a logic of process. The methodology I am developing comes from a number of diverse authors but has found its greatest development in Alfred North Whitehead's work. Although he will be discussed at length in Chapter 4, there is one aspect of his work that I feel is necessary to include here. In his *Function of Reason*, Whitehead's use of speculative reason over reason itself keeps both the speculative and the pragmatic nature of reason in tension. “Reason appeals to the orderliness of what is reasonable.”[81] Speculation expresses the transcendence of any particular method. Thus there is a layering, a process in reason itself, not one that ends in the system provided but one that also finds its way into other systems. I am not arguing that Whitehead believes there is an integration of the systems that fits into a metaphysical scheme, although he would argue that a metaphysical system is needed that helps explain what is happening, the progress, the reason as to how things come to be. But the metaphysical system is

[80] George Orwell, *1984* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1987), 640.
[81] Alfred North Whitehead, *The Function of Reason.* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 52.

not governed by a universal point of departure but by the must contextual point of departure. Suffice it to say that in this moment, fact has to be rethought, that it lays out one of its perspectives that is shown or given based on the methodology placed upon it.

> Sense-awareness discloses fact with factors which are the entities for thought. The separate distinction of an entity in thought is not a metaphysical assertion, but a method of procedure necessary for the finite expression of individual propositions. Apart from entities there could be no finite truths; they are the means by which the infinitude of irrelevance is kept out of thought.[82]

The truths are finite in themselves, and multiple, and give relevance to thought. And yet truth and logic cannot be the center, as their finiteness limits their ability beyond its context. Therefore a layering of possibilities must occur and that, I argue, is found in the space of the imagination. And this imagination brings together possibilities of relationality, how they fit together, not solely how they are causal to one another. The relational aspect is at stake when logic is held as primary in the philosophy of religion, as well as in discussions of pluralism.

I am desiring a re-enchantment of philosophy of religion by a return to the poetic, a return to imagination, which suggests a reliance on coherence, how things, words, language, reality, loosely work together. But the engagement is not with the religious forms and ideas but rather with the actual images produced, how they can bring one not only to knowledge but also into wisdom.

What I am insisting, then, is that the interplay of ontology and aesthetics is necessary, or in the words of Adler, that an interplay of logic and poetic truth is thus a turn to imagination as a mode of knowing. The topic of the imagination in the humanities has been out of discussion in cultural theory in the 1970s and '80s due to the introduction of post/structuralism and other theories but has been making a return without any consensus as to its meaning and how it should be understood. In the following chapter, I will map out a history of imagination in Greek, medieval,

[82] Alfred North Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004), 12.

and modern thought. I will also speak about the purveyors of the imagination in the twenty-first century, those who engage imagination as an integral aspect of being and knowledge. Discussing how the imagination has returned as a mode of deriving knowledge provides an alternative to the syllogistic logic that Adler espouses, and affirms religious difference as a necessary aspect of understanding the Divine reality.

Chapter 2: Sameness and the Decline of the Productive Imagination

I am trying to establish the role imagination plays in deepening, or transcending, how Adler derives truth by way of logic. In order to trace his thinking of imagination, this chapter will look at the diverse currents imagination has gone through, beginning with Plato and Aristotle—its own development.[83] It is here that I lift up two modes of the imagination: the *phantasma* and the *eidon*. Both terms show the more imitative, or mimetic, qualities and responsibilities of the imagination. From Greek beginnings on the imagination, I move on to the medieval thinkers of Augustine and Aquinas, who each have difficulty with trusting the images produced in the imagination. The images are suspected of being hyper-real, as the imagination can produce what is not in reality. They push for an imagination tempered with Christian ideals.

Kant plays a pivotal role in moving the imagination from its mimetic qualities to a productive quality as he introduces the subjectivist principle, a principle that breaks the relation to things and relies on the subjective self for knowledge formation. It is from here that I then turn to Deleuze's work on the image of thought, the limitations of image and imagination, and his introduction of the virtual as a paradigm shift into freeing the self from logic.

2.1 Historicizing The Imagination

Imagination is not an easy term to define, as it encompasses many different aspects, from being a cognitive function, to existing in the mode of an organ bringing together the actual and the

[83] Although Adler does not have a concentrated work on the imagination (The writing he has praises imagination for its ability to engage with poetic, but not ontological, truth) he does hold to the history of philosophers on logic.

divine to produce the real. Imagination can be placed within religious and philosophical thought. Even so, there is a beginning to the thought of the imagination that can be established from Greek thought.

2.1.1 Plato

Plato introduces the terms that are maintained through this discussion, and what I am looking at here in his later writings of the Dialogues. In the *Sophist*, Plato introduces the sophist as one who imitates or creates false images and thus is different from the philosopher. To show what he means by this, he indicates two different ways of making images. *Eikasia* is the name given to the power of faculty in the lowest region known as the imagination.[84] The imagination is an opinion or conjectures concerning likenesses; this is why the imagination will reveal artificial images, shadows, or reflections as those that are held in water. *Eikasia* never begins from the object itself, but from the image of the object; because it is many times removed from the object, what we have is a mere shadow, a false image, in the sense that it is not the true thing in itself. Yet the idea of the imagination as *eikasia* is helpful because it allows one to identify an image as an image.[85] Although *eikasia* is the lowest power/faculty, it is not a primitive power; it translates and transforms, but it can only be understood from the upper levels of the intellect.[86] In Plato's understanding, the Idea, those invisible forms, are what act as the sources and/or principles of the lower levels. The forms are the things in themselves; the images that are made in the lower levels

[84] Plato, *Republic* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004), 509d–511e. Plato in the *Republic* writes a dialogue between Gaulcon and Socrates on the affections of the psyche. There are four segments that represent four separate 'affections' of the psyche. The lower two sections are said to represent the visible, while the higher two are said to represent the intelligible. These affections are described in succession as corresponding to increasing levels of reality and truth from conjecture (*eikasia*) to belief (*pistis*) to thought (*dianoia*) and finally to understanding (*noesis*).

[85] Eva T. H. Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 36-37.

[86] Ibid.

are but *eikons* (or icons), meaning they are in the likeness of the forms. One is not meant to focus solely on the likeness as seen in the image, but rather to be transported or sent on a journey to the higher forms by this likeness. The forms, when contemplated by the soul, meet "true 'steadfast' knowledge."[87] Eikasia, in the form of *dianoia*, meaning an in-between power, has a triple task: 1) It reasons. It makes sense of the image by articulating it as a form or idea; 2) It engages in a type of higher image-recognition, seeing "through sensory things to their mathematical originals"; and 3) It images the intellect.[88] This is important to note here, as what this reveals is the pejorative nature of the imagination. When the imagination is left on its own, it creates shadows and opinions, and leads one away to the real. It always needs a higher level of intellect to give it direction.

Plato also discusses another type of imagination called *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is the power of taking an appearance and apprehending it as appearance. An image has a likeness if it is taken from the form. An appearance is different. It can be the original, the thing in itself, or it can be an image, or it can be misrepresented as other than itself and be considered an illusion.[89] *Phantasia* mixes sensation and judgment. It takes in the sensation, and the sensation makes an impression on the soul. It then looks for an image similar to that found in the rational image recognition found in the *eikasia* to form a rational judgment. It makes a simple judgment about whether it appears or does not appear to be the thing described.[90]

There are two forms of truth in the realm of *eikasia*, one iconic, the other artistic, *logos* and *imago*. The iconic, *logos*, that is found in poetic prose, is a true image of truth; however, what is problematic is that there is no independent psychic power to poetry. It is later called the creative imagination, which Plato considers leads to deceit.[91]

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[87] Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, 36-37.
[88] Ibid., 38.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., 38-39.
[91] Ibid., 38.

Plato's concern with the imagination lies not in its ability to produce something, but rather in that it expresses something far from the ideal. It is the ideal that we seek, and not its expression in an image, as the image is one step removed from it. The role humanity plays in the pursuit of truth is not "to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived,…[but] to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed."[92] The expression that Plato voiced early in his writings was the limitations of the use of naming, the use of paintings, drawings, of art and its usage of materiality for its showing. Its limitations are the use of colors and form, which are far away from (re)producing the original. Only the divine is able to derive from reality/the original an image which transcends both form and color. Knowledge does not derive from names (limits) but from their essence.

However, Plato is unable to dismiss the reality of imagination, of its modes in *eidon* or in *phantasma*, as the fact is that "man is deceived by phantasies, by false appearances. To that extent phantasies are real."[93] He has to somehow to make space for the role of the *philosopher* and his work, whose dealing with concepts and ideas lead to right and truth in the *logos*, and that of the *Sophist*, who creates a world of images. Images lead toward the forms, and the forms, the archetypes, move towards key terms, such as the good, the right, the just, and the beautiful. The danger he is trying to overcome is the necessity of the material image, the use of limits, to speak of the virtues. The *Sophist* who, in his speech, is like the artist who creates images, can be led astray if he does not follow the way of the right or the divine. The question is one of pursuit or intention: Is it one of truth, or of some personal gain, one that is only for self, or one that moves beyond one's self? If truth is a matter of right vision, an aspect of the eye of the mind, what is truly

[92] Murray W. Bundy, "Plato's View of the Imagination," *Studies in Philology* 19, no. 4 (1922): 364.
[93] Ibid., 366.

real, then it cannot come from the imagination as the imagination has the power to hinder or distort spiritual vision.[94]

However, Plato does detail the role that imagination should play: it is the one that leads to the ideal form of thought.[95] The creation of images should always spring from some idea or concept so as to become an icon of that form. The artist, through creativity, can develop images that are untrue, not iconic. This may have a certain appealing intensity, but it leads persons astray from what is virtuous. Thus, the imagination must be reined in, in service to a form of thought. Plato develops a model that places the imagination in its proper perspective: first reason, which answers to the highest of the Intellect, then understanding (scientific knowledge), then faith (conviction), then imagination. On imagination, he writes that its task is to make shadows, or frame conjectures of the universe of things.[96] Plato needs to find some imaginative way to describe the use of the imagination, which tends to the conceptual, the idea. He uses the example of the triangle in mathematics. The triangle is a visible form, and yet is not identical with "the shadow or phantasm in the water or in the mirror," which is brought about by the imagination in its fourth phase. For when one uses the triangle, one is not thinking of a singular or particular one, but it stands as a representation of all, and thus it speaks to its essence, moving one from image to the ideal, from the material to its mental form.[97] Therefore, some imagination can be helpful, whether it be of the image as brought forth from the idea, or the images that come forth from the divine through dreams or day dreaming.[98] Plato could not escape the idea that the power of imagination could be another form of knowledge, an alternative or addition to that of the way of philosophy. But in his desire to maintain the validity of ideals as that which is behind all things, that which is eternal and

[94] Bundy, “Plato's View of the Imagination,” 367.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid., 368.
[97] Ibid., 369.
[98] Ibid.

unchanging, he makes this critique of the Sophist, the artist, the painter, and ultimately of the Imagination. Murray Bundy writes,

> That charge against the painter—and the sculptor and the dramatist—is that through phantasy they become subjective artists. Not only are they concerned with material objects rather than with ideas, but they insist upon reproducing this material world from their peculiar point of view. 'Imagination' leads the artist to deal with the material, the changing, the object of opinion. 'Phantasy' leads him to an error still more serious: to deal with the individual and the relative. He is by so much farther from the absolute, unchanging ideal.[99]

Plato does not want to espouse a positive means by which to take in the imagination, as then the poet, the sculptor, the painter, and the Sophist would be right in understanding that they too can connect with the divine in and through the material image and or the creation of images that spring forth from the background from which we emerge. To state otherwise would make suspect the dualisms he has developed and give way to the possibility that the material also provides some access to the divine.

What is important here is that Plato must struggle with imagination, and this affects his own writing moving forward from the *Symposium* to *Timaeus*.[100] He must re-imagine his own work to fit what always haunts him, and that is the pivotal role of the imagination. Another important thing to note is that in its formation of images the imagination has the power to bring about in the person a movement, a thought. This is the radicality of imagination itself: it leads to a position of wonder, of deep reflection. Plato was concerned that we hold to a right reflection. But the poet, the artist—the sophist—are able from images or in the creation of images to give an intense response that is a path to the righteous and is imbued with feeling and intensity. Images

[99] Bundy, "Plato's View of the Imagination," 373-374. Kant moves towards this mode of thinking, beginning with subjectivity.

[100] In Wincenty Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), Chapter 2. He argues that Plato has four phases in his writings, each representing a growth or development in his philosophy. Using this, Bundy shows that imagination is an important tension in Plato's work.

and their creation are risky and particular, creating diversities, whereas concepts long for the same, and yet in their doing desire uniformity by being for (or representing) all.

I am looking for Plato's desire, that which comes by way of logic. However, I do not want the logic that excludes. It is difficult to maintain a form of pluralism without some level of creativity that comes by way of imagination. Thinking of the imagination as the ability to mimic, to represent, although helpful, does not show what imagination is capable of doing.

2.1.2 Aristotle

Unlike Plato, Aristotle believed that imagination was an important aspect of the faculty of thinking. He emphasized *phantasia* as it plays a pivotal role in bringing to thought the felt experience or the thing sensed. For without a felt experience, there is no possibility for thought. This is a reversal of Plato's ideas, in which being springs from the idea. It is a way in which the material becomes apparent to thought by way of the imagination.

First, *phantasia* is not sensation, but an activity of sensation, a psychic process. It is a foundational process, which presents to the intellect an interpreted sensation. It comes into play when sensation fails. *Phantasia* is the function that presents to the intellect the world of individual, physical substances.[101] For Aristotle, the imagination as *phantasia* happens within an act of the senses, in which once the sensations are in movement, acting, or being acted upon, imagination comes into play as part of the process of interpretation for the intellect. This suggests that the imagination is always already there, as it were, so that in the act of sensation it is prehending all things and interpreting them in such a way as to make sense of them for the intellect.

[101] Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, 41.

In order that the imagination might present an interpretation of sensation, it prolongs the sensation past the presence of the object itself, and thus becomes a motion of the soul set in motion by the activity of sensation. More than an interpreter of the senses, the imagination calls forth, or brings into itself, the soul of the thing receiving the sensation. Thus, imagination is a receptacle. The sensation begins the process of imaginative interpretation, and the prolongation of that sensation provides the space for interpretation of the object into the soul.[102] Imagination is a way of perceiving the object that is prolonged into the soul.

But here is where there is something from Plato that carries on to Aristotle—that the image is still subservient to thought, that if an error exists, it exists in the image and not in thought. I say this for Aristotle says that the imagination is peculiarly capable of error, but it is the initial way into the sensation.[103] Thus *phantasma* comes to be through the imagination. These *phantasma* are not past images, images seen earlier, but are the result of the interpretation that imagination achieves. The imagination therefore presents to the intellect the image developed. The imagination receives the traces or movement left by the *phantasma*, and these affections or feelings form into a picture, an imprint of the sensation impressed physically on the bodily organ of the common sense.

The stored affections are the images or imprints that, after some time has passed, can be recollected as memories.[104] For Aristotle, memory belongs to the "part of the soul where imagination belongs."[105] *Phantasma* plays a role beyond just the creation of the image; it also has the role of a mental object held on to as a memory. The *phantasma* thus leads a double life: the image produced in the sensation, and the image remembered along with its affect. But this is

[102] Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, 42.
[103] Ibid., 43.
[104] Deleuze would argue that this is not the function of the imagination, and that memory relies on the virtual for its conceptual formation.
[105] Ibid.

necessary, as it is an interpretation of the image, and thus contains its double. It is an image seen in two ways—from the perspective of the image as conceived from senses and from the image as seen in its interpretation. This is the double life of the image: that the *phanstasma* within be an object of contemplation and that it be a mental image of something else, a mental object, and a copy, a "souvenir."[106]

For any form of thought, it is necessary that there be some image to work from, some concreteness. In terms of contemplation, it is necessary to contemplate some mental image.[107] When one desires, one desires some object, something to desire. Therefore, the imagination always precedes desire, always precedes the intellect in some way that gives us the opportunity to act upon it.

In terms of the poetic, Brann understands Aristotle to exercise phantasia in the production of poetry. Aristotle states that in poetry, *mimesis* is used, the imitation of things, through and by which human beings enjoying learning. However, this mimesis is the "appearance-presenting *phantasia*":

> The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with meter no less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type on occasion speaks or acts, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. (Aristotle, *Poetics*, Part ix)

Some would say that Aristotle advocates for the poetic and for prose, but I am unsure about that. Although there is some value to his work on the imagination, he identifies the imagination as belonging to the faculty of the senses, as an imaging machine, which to me seems to be a

[106] Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, 44.
[107] Ibid., 44.

diminution of its role. In his work, Aristotle gathers knowledge, and in that gathering of knowledge through logic he produces the thing. It is from what can be seen or sensed that a thing is. This is important to maintain: that the imagination does create out of experience. But it would be too narrow of a focus that it moves from sense to the intellectual. Rather, the imagination must perform something more that the transformation of sense to images.

My concern in looking through both Plato and Aristotle is that they do not risk the power of the imagination: truth as created through the imagination is something that both cannot rely upon, for fear of its results. To my mind, they therefore limit the imagination, placing it within a specific space in which its correctness is policed by logic itself. Thus, in the creation of the image, it contains within it the thoughts and processes of what has been previously thought.

2.1.3 Medieval Imagination

In Plato, there is a beginning to the *logos* of imagination, in both its forms of imitation (*eidon*) and in its likeness (*phantasma*). In Aristotle, he puts to use the *phantasma* as a faculty and process within the realm of sensation, interpreting the images and forming a representation to be understood by the Intellect. In this way, the imagination is in service to the formation of thought, to understanding reality. And yet it is limited to the role of either the idea or the senses. In other words, Plato and Aristotle focused on its passive role as opposed to its active role of creating images. In the Medieval period, it is important to note two pivotal scholars in philosophical theology and their viewpoints on the imagination. Whereas in both Plato and Aristotle there remains a divine/human aspect to the imagination, Augustine and Aquinas, introduces a subtle shift of the creative imagination.

In the Medieval era, St. Augustine writings suggest a distrust of images, as they hinder philosophical contemplation. But Augustine does not want to rely on the terms *phantasia* but rather on *imaginatio* to articulate the more proper use of imagination. This distinction allows him to offer a corrective to the use of images in relation to theological and philosophical contemplation. As an example, in his *De Vera Religione*, Augustine writes: "Let not our religion consist in phantasms of our own imagining. Any kind of truth is better than any fiction we may choose to produce."[108] Here Augustine initially is against any form of imagination.

Yet in his *Confessions*, Augustine shifts from *phantasma* to *imaginatio* and thus indicates a more Aristotelian understanding of the imagination as *imaginatio.* His criticism of the imagination is reserved for non-Christian literature which he says produce false emotions, and which Augustine says distracted the state of his own soul. For Augustine, imagination drew one away from what is truly real.[109] Here we can see the Platonic fear of the imagination found in the Sophists' notion that anything which detracts from the real or ideal is dangerous.

In Augustine's *Confessions,* the imagination takes on two distinct roles. First, it has the ability to formulate new mental images in a general sense, in its ability to recall past memories, for instance to imagine the sun rising and memories of past instances of the sun rising and periods of happiness and truth.[110] Imagination also has the sense of expectation, or prediction. Thus, imagination has a creative power. Augustine uses the notion of memory, of images in the past to focus on the object, and an aspect of the future, for example, "the sun will rise in the morning." And he places the imagination as the connecting piece, that which puts the images together to

[108] St. Augustine and John H. S. Burleigh, *Augustine: Earlier Writings* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 279. See also Todd Breyfogle, “Memory and Imagination in Augustine's Confessions,” *New Blackfriars* 75, no. 881 (1994): 215.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

move from point A to point B. Imagination "fills gaps" in memory by picturing what one can expect in the future.[111]

St. Thomas Aquinas, profoundly influenced by Aristotle, thought that the imagination stands as mediator between mind and body; it passes up to the reason in the form of images what it takes from perception, and the intellect then clarifies these images into abstract ideas. And yet, even in this passive role, the imagination is considered a suspect and weak part of the mind, because it creates only images of the thing in itself. All uses of the imagination remain subordinate to the superiority of both reality and reason. In this, Aquinas is espousing both Platonic and Aristotelian thoughts. The reason that the imagination remains suspect for him is its tendency to confuse images with reality — or being induced to do so. Aquinas writes, "Demons are known to work on men's imagination, until everything is other than it is."[112] Richard Kearney in the *Wake of the Imagination* writes on this medieval suspicion of the imagination, "As a mimetic faculty of representation and storage, imagination takes its place. But it must be kept in place."[113]

From both Augustine and Aquinas, one gets the understanding that the imagination conforms to a mimetic model, one of imitation, a copy or a representation of the thing in itself and moves away from any form of created image formulated by the imagination. Bringing back the idea of the Sophist, earthly images conform beauty to an earthly state and is unable to move beyond to a higher understanding of beauty; it is no longer symbolic of a higher form of beauty found in the divine because it robs the symbolic move from the intellect and maintains it within the sense. The imagination therefore is a mediator, perceived to be either positive or negative. It could be "positive in the measure that it related the inner world to the outer world of the body and vice

[111] Augustine and Burleigh, *Augustine*, 216.

[112] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947), 5, 147.

[113] Richard Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 130.

versa," or "Negative in the measure that it frequently deviated from the supervision of the higher intellect and confused the rational with the irrational, the spirit with the sensible, being with nonbeing."[114] Thus the imagination maintains its status in the realm of the senses, in the lower forms of the faculty of the mind.

Because of its placement in lower levels of thought, the role of the imagination is to only produce what is found in the sensible. In that way it is forming a mimetic property; it is tasked with repeating what is really visualized, what is seen from the senses to an image to be used in the intellect. Any connection is one that happens internally. Its danger is in what happens to the image upon its repetition; The repetition of images may make the imagination take control over the intellect, and argue, in its showing that the object of beauty is just that and may sway one away from seeing a deeper connection, that the object of beauty is only a form of a higher ideal of what beauty is. Augustine and Aquinas are protecting the intellect so that it does not lose its place. This introduces then what I argue that the imagination is not a part of the thinking process, but a mechanism of repetition of images. It functions as a machine.

In arguing in line with Adler's thoughts, what one desires is sameness, and sameness requires that the idea maintain its focus and control the outcome of what comes through the senses. Imagination here can only serve a role of performing its task. There needs to be a freeing capacity of the imagination. One which allows the imagination to speak to the intellect in a mode of production, of creation of knowledge. It is here where we move to the modernist notions of Kant that moves from the mimetic imagination to the productive imagination.

[114] Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture*, 131.

2.2 Modernist Approaches Of Imagination

In most of the definitions above, the role of the imagination is that which repeats, represents, or mirrors. In this sense, it serves a mimetic function. In the time of the Enlightenment, the imagination moved from having a mimetic role to a productive one, from an imitative role to being the source of its own truth.[115]

Above, we see that the faculty of the imagination falls into two roles, one in which the imagination is a space beyond the individual, which highlights the forms, bringing one closer to the proper form of the virtues (Plato), and then you get to the Aristotelian aspect, which claims that the imagination is primarily a mental faculty that acts as mediator between the senses and the intellect. For Plato, the imagination holds to the image, and searches for its form, as we see in the allegory of the cave. One sees the shadows and begins the process of seeing what those shadows disclose, but the imagination strives to move the individual to pursue that which is true, the form of the thing in itself.

Both Aristotle and Plato maintain that the imagination is meant to mimic things, to show representations of things so that one may move into the forms. However, in the Enlightenment era, there is a shift of the role that imagination plays, one which takes it into the mode not of mimesis, but of production. This move was not always taken in a positive manner. Hume understood that all things are fiction, and thus we have no foundation in which to ground ourselves upon. Thus, we are always imagining. He then pits reason against imagination, in order that reason may bring to truth that which is false—among which he includes the imagination. Here we can see a hint of the productive imagination at work, and the necessity of reason above imagination as its sobering

[115] Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture*, 155.

factor. Imagination, because of its ability to produce images and make sense of things, if not reigned in, produces chaos.

Kant makes a radical shift in the understanding of the imagination, both in positive and negative ways. Firstly, his shift in epistemological thinking is to make the claim that it is from the imagination that any process of thinking begins. Thus, there is a move away from reason, the intellect as the beginning place, and toward the senses on the other spectrum, making imagination the mediator. Imagination is the "transcendental" space in which experience is made possible. This thus does not reproduce the image, as the earlier mimetic models did (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hume), but produces the image through Kant's "transcendental model of formation."[116] The productive imagination becomes the root of the formation of knowledge. In the reproductive aspect, the imagination empowers the mind to "connect the diverse impressions of the senses" by placing a prior perception along with another perception, creating a sequence of perceptions, as if moving fluidly.[117] However—and this is where the productive imagination is revealed—the productive role provides "rules" according to the particular combinations in which the perceptions are preferred.[118] This synthesis is the role of the productive imagination, its ability to set forth, to schematize, and to construct what is the best combination in which the perceptions that emerge are preferred and revealed.

In addition, Kant also introduces another role of the productive imagination called the "unity of transcendental apperception."[119] Richard Kearney in *The Wake of the Imagination* writes,

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[116] Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture*, 168. See also Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, 89-99. For Brann Kant's transcendental idealism makes imagination the center of knowing by the powers of the knowing subject. Imagination has a transcendental "logic," which makes all representations presentations that are produced by the self and make experience possible. Second, they also connect each representation to one another through synthesis.

[117] Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture*, 170. See also Mary Warnock, *Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), ###.

[118] Later in this chapter I will discuss Deleuze' take on this aspect of the imagination, its limitation, as an image of thought.

[119] Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture*, 170.

"the synthesis of perceptions might well remain arbitrary unless its rules of 'association' and 'affinity'…were themselves related to a connected whole of understanding."[120] Here Kearney makes sense of Kant in saying that what we are perceiving at any given moment will only make sense as one begins to connect it to some larger whole of understanding. Kant therefore relies on the conscious self as the ultimate source of unity to say that one is conscious of the things being perceived and can make sense of them. Through one's experience of them, they come to have a place in the development of one's knowledge formation.

Kant makes imagination a critical aspect of thought; And yet I would argue that instead of maintaining imagination in the space of philosophy and introducing functions of aesthetics, he limits its functionality by placing it within the realm of aesthetics and art. This is the point, then, at which Kant begins to deal with judgments, primarily aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments find expression when we speak of something that is beautiful, where we see a pattern or finality in an object. This final form is enjoyed by the imagination itself, where it is "liberated from all outer constraints," and finds its own meaning and purpose.[121]

Although there is power in the free play of the imagination to create a second nature in which it has the power to develop its own meaning and purpose, there is one thing that is not possible: although the imagination is capable of producing much thought, it is incapable of making possible any definite thought, understood as the concept.

2.3 Gilles Deleuze and The Image of Thought

Although Gilles Deleuze should await the follower chapter on Continental thinkers, his critique of imagination is helpful for my argument here. If Kant limits imagination to the aesthetic

[120] Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture*, 170.
[121] Ibid., 172.

(in the form of production of images), Gilles Deleuze problematizes the imagination and therefore returns imagination to the production of the same, that of mimesis, which is unable to perceive novelty, and merely makes a representation of the same. Imagination has been problematic among the postmodernists because, similar to the Platonian mindset, the imaginary is on the side of myth. For thinkers such as Foucault, the imaginary moves one away from truth. In this, Deleuze introduces an interesting turn, namely that a particular thought is ultimately strengthened through the use of the image of thought, a production of the imagination. Imagination is the faculty in which images are made; however, in order for imagination to exceed itself and move into a trajectory, it must become subservient to the notion of the idea, the *doxa*. Deleuze understands this aspect of the imagination and its limits, its inability to grasp, its conforming to being that which forms the image of thought. The image of thought is the idea itself, that which has grasped the event that is being perceived, which already and automatically gives us a loose structure as well as an end response to that which we perceive.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze writes, "it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being or with beings, as long as thought remains subject to this Image, which already prejudges everything: the distribution of the object and the subject as well as that of Being and beings."[122] The image upholds and hides that which is within. If, for example, we take the thought of God, an image or understanding already comes to mind. If it holds to the sequence of truth statements already held by the subject, or object, it does not matter any longer; the image already conveys or prejudges everything. The only thing is to assemble it as necessary to bring out the same "truth." The image of thought is thus a dogmatic, orthodox, or moral image, an image that "represents" concepts and ideas, and is therefore a repetition of the same.[123] For

[122] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 131.
[123] Ibid.

Deleuze, philosophy seeks to break with *Doxa*, but as long as it holds to the three levels of the image of thought (a naturally upright thought, an in-principle natural common sense, and a transcendental model of recognition) it maintains the status quo. It retains within its essence the form and the element of common sense, and the essential aspect of recognition, the model itself.[124]

Regarding such upright thought espoused as truth, Deleuze writes:

> Truth may well seem to be 'a more modest being from which no disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy creature which is continually assuring all the powers that be that no one needs to be the least concerned on its account' for it is, after all, only "pure knowledge"…' What is a thought which harms no one, neither thinkers nor anyone else? Recognition is a sign of the celebration of monstrous nuptials, in which thought 'rediscovers' the State, rediscovers 'the Church' and rediscovers all the current values that it subtly presented in the pure form of an eternally blessed unspecified eternal object.[125]

Deleuze is concerned about the notion that truth. He suggests that if it be an upright thought realized from pure knowledge, it can benefit all persons. Thus, when moving towards the role of recognition, it only sanctions that which is "recognizable or recognized; form will never inspire anything but conformities."[126] But can any truth be understood as pure knowledge, and thus be for all? This is where Deleuze disagrees. He shows the repetitive nature of truth, and the problem it develops, namely the inability to think beyond that which is imposed within the image. Thus, the truth that is imposed is recognized in the image of thought and continues to point to the same within the image so as simply to highlight its own understanding.

The common sense that turns from both "an upright thought" as well as "recognition" of the same introduces the third mode found in the image of thought—that of common sense.

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[124] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 134. This problem with a trilogy of sorts will be reiterated, in which the three introduce a thought that impedes new ways of thinking due to its own intensity of being and recognition.

[125] Ibid., 136.

[126] Ibid., 134.

Common sense, as Deleuze writes, "shows everyday – unfortunately – that it is capable of producing philosophy in its own way," and yet its production flows from the same image of thought that repeats the same.[127] Although it has the capacity to produce "in its own way," which can be interpreted in various ways (like the mode of difference), it still produces philosophy from the same image of thought and the linear structures within it. Thus the image of thought has the ability to produce various things from the same thought, but those various things are neither truly different or novel. This triad enforces a recognition of the same, that which we know and of which we have an image. That being the case, we are always holding on to some image of thought that already shapes, whether it be *doxa* or methodology. The image of thought that is spurned from thought already contains within it everything it needs to categorize it. This can also be seen as a critique of Plato's own work and use of the figure over the imagination or images. As he writes, "the image of thought is only the figure in which *doxa* is universalized by being elevated to the rational level."[128] The image therefore is not even produced by the imagination, but is given over to *Doxa* to give it shape, make an image, and thus control the process.

The image in thought is a container for thought itself, and is a receptacle for the same. So what is most important is the thought that maintains itself throughout. And in the process of thinking, the role of the imagination and the image of thought is not one of production of the new, but production of the same by synthesis. In *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Deleuze discusses how imagination is used in this task. In the process of understanding, one must make a choice, which in turn is a synthesis.[129] Synthesis is the joining together of several concepts. Once this synthesis takes place, the imagination performs the act of schematizing.[130] For any function of the

[127] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 135.
[128] Ibid., 134.
[129] Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 18.
[130] Ibid.

imagination to work, a synthesis is presupposed because the synthesis is the "determination of a certain space and a certain time by means of which diversity is related to the object in general, in conformity with the categories."[131] In other words, the synthesis realizes a pattern in play, and thus the role of the schematization in the imagination is to develop the structure in which that is made possible, by way of the thought that the image is trying to express. And here we see that the image itself is not important, and the role of the imagination is not that of the image, but that of the concept, moving beyond the appearance of the image, as Deleuze writes on the schema as a "spatio-temporal determination which itself corresponds to the category, everywhere and at all times: it does not consist in an image but in spatio-temporal relations which embody or realize relations which are in fact conceptual."[132] The role of schematization for Deleuze functions solely within the imagination as it acts in a judicial sense (when it has a legislative power), in determining what the thing in itself or the object in the category could be.[133] In other words, imagination has no force in and of itself, because prior to its schematization a choice has already been made, the task of synthesizing has already been accomplished, and therefore its role is to structure conceptually how the object exists within its category. It does not function in the role of mimesis nor production of the new, but rather as a production of the same, a repetition in line with the Platonic notion of the idea in which the image is its form, in order that the object exists within the thought as held in the image. The image becomes a container, but nothing beyond it. And because of this, imagination becomes merely an aesthetic judgment, where the realization that "this is beautiful" is known, but no reasoning takes place.

[131] Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 18.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.

2.3.1 On the Sublime

According to Deleuze, the function of the imagination in the unfolding of the image of thought is one of schematization, that of structuring and placing, making "sense" of the object within the realm of thought. It does not judge, but presupposes judgment in the role of understanding. But imagination takes on a different role in the act of prehending the sublime.[134]

The sublime is the excellence of the thing, beyond that of imagination or placed at its limit. Due to the immensity of the beauty or power of the sublime, in that space the imagination is forced to stretch itself, ultimately falling back upon itself, because the imagination and its role is not one of judgment but of schematization: it constructs, not decides. In the aesthetic judgment it presupposed a synthesis, an understanding on which to build, and thus a concept of the same. Here, the sublime is formless or deformed, and the imagination is unable to grasp on to anything.[135]

The stretching and falling upon itself is a recoiling, the imagination falling back within itself, realizing that it is unable to take on the immense task of the sublime. But Deleuze here is stating that for Kant imagination fails to grasp the immensity of the things, not because of nature itself, but because of reason itself, because reason pushes the imagination "to the limit of its power, forcing it to admit that all its power is nothing in comparison to an Idea."[136] In other words, reason steps in and introduces the reason for the failure of the imagination to take in the sublime; it is not the sublime which is the issue, but the need of the thought, the idea, of making sense of the whole of things, which forces the imagination to become impotent. The idea desires that the sublime become a part of the idea itself, and thus it limits the imagination from performing its task of structuring and making sense of the sublime.

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[134] Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 50.

[135] According to Deleuze, in its apprehension the imagination has no limit to its taking in of things. It is in its schematization that, if it has nothing to hold to, it falls upon itself due to its lack of friction. See Ibid.

[136] Ibid., 54.

The sublime, the limit, introduces us to

> a direct subjective relationship between imagination and reason. But this relationship is primarily a *dissension* rather than an accord, a contradiction experienced between the demands of reason and the power of the imagination. This is why the imagination appears to lose freedom and the feeling of the sublime seems to be pain rather than pleasure. But at the bottom of dissension the accord emerges; the pain makes a pleasure possible.[137]

And yet here I wonder about two things that I suggest are problematic for Deleuze. First, the problem of dissension, of discord, leads to a negation and/or negotiation of the imagination. In its limitation by reason, in its failure, some pleasure arises. But Deleuze does not accept this, since any negation reintroduces the common sense of the same. In other words, rejection happens because it does not fit within the logic of thought, and in so doing any discord is a rejection of other possibilities of becoming.

Second, the problem with imagination for Deleuze is that it works for logic of the identical, but not for any formation and acknowledgement of difference. Imagination is problematic because it relies on synthesis itself, and synthesis is a negating system that leads to unity rather than showing any form of difference. It hides the layers of disparateness under an air of unity. For Deleuze, difference and its affirmation is the rejection of Hegel's dialectic, which is synthesis, and which represents the most extreme development of the logic of the identical. The dialectic, formed of two opposite terms, such as being and non-being, operates by synthesizing them into a new third term that preserves and overcomes the earlier opposition. This is a dead end because,

> identity is the sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thought. It is only in relation to the identical, as a function of the identical, that contradiction is the greatest difference. The intoxication and giddiness are feigned, the obscure is already clarified from the outset. Nothing shows this more than the insipid monocentrality of the circles in the Hegelian dialectic.[138]

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[137] Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 51.
[138] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 263.

There is no hiding what happens in Hegel's dialectic, as what is obscured is already clarified beforehand by the idea taking hold. So what Deleuze reveals is that "history progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, but by deciding problems and affirming differences. It is no less bloody and cruel as a result. Only the shadows of history live by negation."[139]

2.4 Conclusion

The chapter looked at Greek, medieval, and modern thinkers concerning the imagination, and argued that the imagination has been critiqued in a pejorative sense and assigned to being a lower function of the intellect. Yes, it may be helpful, but its helpfulness is critiqued because it fails to get at the thing as it truly is. From Plato to Aristotle to the medieval thinkers, the imagination's role is to translate images for use in the upper intellect, which is where Deleuze, pick up certain discrepancies of imagination in its eidonic and phantastical senses.

The understanding of imagination as *eidon* limits its usage. If the intellect is able, through the mode of an idea, to encapsulate the imagination, so that one can put in place the speaking partners within the bubble of the eidenic imagination, it produces a result that is governed by the idea itself. This is what Deleuze sees as the problem of the image of thought. The reverberation of the image at this point, of the image as developed from the idea, poses issues, as what is echoed is the idea-imbued image, which is not the image itself in its formation in the imagination but within the encapsulated imagination. This Deleuze deems to be the image of thought, the image as controlled by thought.

[139] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 268.

The problem Deleuze highlights is critical in dealing with the problem with the logic of sameness as found in Aristotle's categorialization, and Plato's diminishment of the novelty of images and its focus on perception. Plato's critique of the Sophist in their use of the making of images, it's *poeisis*, does not allow for a deeper understanding of the particular image as produced by the *logos*; it does not produce a concept. The sophist, in their engagement, is in some way stating that there is a non-being in our beingness that instills something more than what is seen, but will always be introduced by the image made. By negating this, there is a negation to the horizontalizing aspect of the divine as found by the other. This is where I see a problem with Adler and can see his statement that pluralism is at issue. Sameness seeks closure, difference affirms openness and a continual process. The opening of the imagination is an inquiry into how the experience of the other's understanding of the divine in the world can engage, and shape your world, and not take over it. The imagination has to capability to expand its spatial extension, to bring in more ideas and representations of the world, so that in its difference, a new idea or understanding of the divine can be encountered that does not negate but enlarges ones understanding of the divine. However, when one holds within an Aristotelian limitation of imagination as synthesizer of the senses, it leaves out the place of space that the imagination also functions in.

Imagination is used in the way Deleuze describes it, as a mirror which produces the same, the image of thought. This is the fascinating part. The image of thought produces the same thoughts and ideas because in its reliance on the sameness of its logical system, one's imagination becomes subservient to the imagination and image of the other. What is forgotten is the self's way of organizing, of becoming. This is the danger and power of the image of thought. I would like to take a moment to couple this with Adler's engagement of J.S. Mill's work, as it sheds light into Adler's thinking on it. Thinking about the qualities of sameness, the goal of the state is to bring

forth and maintain a particular truth; this truth can be different from those that live within the state. The person with differing viewpoints is considered the one with the opinion of a different truth. Right here the use of language already creates the image that the person with the opinion is in an incorrect stance, and thus in need of correction, for those who stand with the truth that is correct can stand the test that it has made for itself, the system that has been developed to support the truth being tested. When the opinion has been made, it is not tested based on the opinionated criteria, but by the criteria of the state's truths. This follows a logic of superiority, of sameness that places the opinion within the imagination of sameness. Thus the image produced is one which will seek for its repetition. The opinion has been replaced with the truth of the image of thought. It is as though one has lost the ability to think and critique outside of the receptacle formed that makes this worldliness in the mode of logic.

What is needed is a way for the imagination to be rethought of as an integral process, along the lines of Kant, but with the mode of difference, that affirms difference in its development of knowledge.

Chapter 3: Continental Thinkers, Difference, and the Rise of the Imagination

3.1 Imagination and Novelty

Deleuze's critique of the image tries to establish the limits of the use of imagination, the notion that its ability to function is found in the conception of the idea, of which it must take hold, and therefore become focused; it is from that point that the imagination is able to function in the capacity of production, of progression within the framework of the idea. The imagination, once the receptacle of thought, now hangs on to the walls built around it so as to tunnel through and create from the aspect of the idea itself. The openness of the imagination has now been turned into a structure, a receptacle, so as to bring forth the same as opposed to the novel.[140]

This is what interests me. The receptacle speaks to the limited imagination, but does not speak to imagination as receptacle itself to bring forth or allow to manifest the idea, the concept. The concept is different from an image, which is why ideas and concepts fall within the framework of thoughts. The image, however, is imbued or filled with limitless possibilities from which it will always be possible to receive. This means that the imagination is a receptacle of receptacles; it enwombs itself. The imagination as a space gives of itself so as to shape what is to come. It is a structure, but a structure that begins as an enveloping space before it becomes an attaching frame from which to build.

Consequently, I find it necessary to consider all this through two thinkers on the imagination. The first is Gaston Bachelard, who has created a phenomenology of the imagination. What makes his work of interest is that he does not rely on the logic of imagination, or a logic at

[140] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 253-259.

all, but rather on a web of coherence in the imagination with a focus on the images themselves as the place of novelty. The second thinker is John Sallis, who is an American phenomenologist and writes on the imagination. Sallis provides the space in which to show that imagination itself is a form of logic that forces into existence both the originary and the novel, the same and difference.

3.2 Bachelard and the Rehabilitation of Imagination

Images and concepts provide a good metaphor for the journey that Gaston Bachelard studied throughout his career. Part of Gaston's work in the field of science was to make sense of what is held in the realm of science and what is held in the realm of philosophy. Science deals with facts, but philosophy lies in the space of the rational, of the coherence and unity of thought, a synthesis of knowledge.[141] Bachelard rightly realizes the bifurcation of knowledge between the philosopher and the scientist: philosophers and their principles are too general, while the study by scientists remains particular.[142] He further breaks this down in the argument that what are polar opposites are images and concepts, the imagination and reason, The image, in its manifestation, cannot give matter to the concept; that is, it is not matter itself, but rather what manifests from it. The concept longs for stability, and in giving stability to the image, stifles its existence or what it was trying to present in its showing.[143]

Bachelard understands that the movement solely within the particularity of the field leads one to engage philosophy and science, and to create a rigorous system that engages both sides to become a dispersed and distributed philosophy.[144] Bachelard's realization that there is a disconnect in the methodology behind each system introduces a need for coherence. This coherence is what

[141] Bachelard, *The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind*, 4.
[142] Ibid., 5.
[143] Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Reverie* (New York: Orion Press, 1969), 52.
[144] Bachelard, *The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind*, 11.

is important for Bachelard, and doing so requires a movement of thought. And yet this movement is hindered because of the systems that are in place. For example, Bachelard writes, "Words…have so often been defined, redefined and pigeonholed with so much precision in our dictionaries that they have truly become instruments of thought."[145] An instrument of thought has a streamlined function, in which to explain the function of the things; the words, the language itself, has been streamlined to speak to this particular concept, system, or idea. In a way, the image has been removed, the words have lost their weight, and all that remains is that which is needed of the system. Words lose their weight because the image has been lost, and only the outcome of thought remains. Thus, there is a need to return, in a real way, to the image. And yet a return to the image is not possible because of three movements that replace the image and its world making, its wildness, which in itself has its own order, for a different sort of order. Bachelard argues that the system that hinders this is a triadic formulation of Aristotelian logic, Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian physics.[146]

Aristotelian logic, when coupled with these other methods, creates a system of identity. This frame of thought suggests that our task is one of identifying the things before us, that what surrounds us are real things, real substances, and it is from that point that we are to identify and categorize. There is a need to identify the permanence of an object through characteristics or a group of characteristics. And yet one can only suggest an absolute in this sense, because the logic behind it is itself a proposition, a postulate that helps to move the method along: "the law of identity may be only approximative; it may govern one level of reality and become confused at another, different level."[147] That being said, here Bachelard is already suggesting the limits of the system

[145] Bachelard, *The Poetics of Reverie*, 35.

[146] Gaston Bachelard, *The New Scientific Spirit* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). In this text Bachelard focus on non-Euclidian and non-Newtonian formulations in science, moved by the imagination. This Trinitarian formulation is akin to Deleuze's own triad in thought, which seeks to produce the self-same.

[147] Bachelard, *The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind*, 98.

that leads to Aristotelian logic, namely that its limits are found in itself. The problem is that whenever any new form of logic arises, it is critiqued by the same system as held previously, thus maintaining or perpetuating the same images of thought. Bachelard argues that with the introduction of the Heisenberg principle and quantum mechanics, a new form of thought was needed, specifically a new logic.

For Bachelard, logic is simply a true or false mechanism to ascertain certain specific values of the system. And yet, with quantum mechanics the Aristotelian logic with its trinity was no longer adequate to discuss this system. For the logic was unable to hold necessary rules in place, that 1) What is, is; and 2) That what is objective, is. What is in one's vision, for example a chair, is not really a chair, and holds these exact qualities that make it what it is. Bachelard argues for a new way of thinking, namely that what is, BECOMES. Bachelard suggests that there is a movement of thought, what he calls the ability to shift, grow, move beyond. Without this, there can be no advancement of thought. This shift is also understood as a mobile unity.[148] This shifting character "is an ability to shake off intellectual habits, to accept the lessons of an evolving science."[149] This is essentially a mobility of concepts, the movement of concepts, which is a move away from fixed reference points. His use of reverie "shatters frozen meanings and restores to old words ambivalence and freedom."[150]

For Bachelard, there is a need that one move beyond the stagnation of still images, by its relegating to the formal imagination for its knowing. The formal imagination is but images that are copied and recopied, as they have been named and categorized.[151]

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[148] Gaston Bachelard, *On Poetic Imagination and Reverie: Selections From the Works of Gaston Bachelard.* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), xxxii-xxxv.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid., xxxiv.

[151] Gaston Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement* (Dallas: Dallas Institute Publications, 1988), 203-204.

3.2.1 The Reverberation of Images

In his *Poetics of Space*, Bachelard returns to a phenomenology of the image. He pushes back on the causation of the image, which also means that he pushes back on the previously held understanding of his past works. In his previous works, he was a "good scientist," as he relegated the images, and thus the poetic imagination, to the space of the cultural. But here he divests himself of the cultural causation of images, because it betrays the phenomenological immediacy of the image. This shift is important. He wants to see what happens when he allows the images to speak for themselves, to tell of their life, to see what gets drawn out from gazing at the image.

This is evidenced in his discussion of dreams and reverie. Dreams, for Bachelard, are as if one is viewing the life of another, and is seeing the many things that are happening, that are most important to the self, in which the self is trying to make sense, or to speak of any issues that may arise. To a large degree, dreaming is focused on the self and its areas of need.

Not so reverie. Reverie focuses on the image of the moment, and one is engulfed in the moment of the thing in itself. There is an immediacy of the image that forces one to focus and be in awe. In dreams, one can analyze the images using a culture of images at one's disposal. It is not the same for reverie. Bachelard does not want to fall into the temptation of delving into the study of images as things, thus creating a separation between the image and the thing experienced. For Bachelard, images are "lived," "experienced," "reimagined" "in an act of consciousness which restores at once their timelessness and their newness."[152] But this then leads to something interesting about poetry or the poetic imagination. The immediacy of the image allows for an intuitive understanding, seeing the whole at an instant. It is only then that we can begin to go through the task of analyzing it, or evaluating it, of deriving its value.

[152] Bachelard, *On Poetic Imagination and Reverie: Selections From the Works of Gaston Bachelard*, xli.

Bachelard takes on the use of reverberation. This word, meaning an echoing, has the resonance of Deleuze's notion of the event, the vibrations that are repetitive of the event on and on, not a repetition of the same, but a repetition of the thing itself in its intuitiveness, which allows one to take on the image anew. Reverberation awakens "poetic creation," through the use of a single poetic image.[153] The image itself places us at an origin. It is from the image that one begins purposefully to seek out what it is that one has experienced. One could say here that imagination forces one, not in a coercive but in an adventurous way, to understand what the thing is, and yet it does not begin with an objective analysis, but as felt through an image, an object that gives of itself to be known. But this in turn already suggests a change of the image reverberated, shifted, taking on a double of the image, a duplicity of the image. It is a duplicity because one receives the image, but it is changed upon its turn from reception to expression.

This suggests that when one begins to dialogue with the image outside of the formal imagination and goes into the more oneiric imagination, then one sees the meaning of the image opening up, becoming dynamic, progressing in a way different than that of the formal imagination, a progress of width and depth rather than just a progress that is constituted by what is "real" and "factual." The reverberation of images is necessary for its becoming. Yet as stated before, these images that are formed from the imagination do not emerge from the formal imagination, nor from the space of dreams, but rather from the space of reverie.

3.2.1.1 The Poetics of Reverie

Bachelard suggests that reverie is an opening to another world, that it falls into the realm of irreality. Poetic reverie is "a cosmic reverie. It is an opening to a beautiful world, to beautiful

[153] Gaston Bachelard and M. Jolas, *The Poetics of Space* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), xxiii.

worlds."[154] It is not a mistake that his focus is on the awe of beauty of the world. The beauty is taken on in the unreal function of poetic reverie, of poetic truth/imagination. Bachelard makes a distinction in our psyche between the reality function and the irreality function. The reality function "require[s] that we adapt to reality, that we constitute ourselves as a reality and that we manufacture works of realities."[155] But the irreality function, devoid of life itself, introduces the feeling of worry, of the inhumanity and negativity of the world. The role that irreality plays in the "I" is its ability to stay on the fringes "of all brutality of a hostile and foreign non-self."[156] The non-self is the non-I within the I of the dreamer, which allows the I to be in the world. Bachelard, in order to make sense of the world, creates the non-I, a way of self-enveloping the world that one exists within, and can, in a moment of time, make something of the world. The world in its reality does not speak; the world in irreality does. Bachelard makes the world alive, speaking to us, a magical realism where inanimate objects have life and are in discussion with the self. The non-I allows one to slow time down in order to realize its presence, its space among others.

The irreality function is made available through the imagination, a safe space in which one can confidently make sense of the world. It is here that the imagination takes in the world in its barrenness, and, by its ability to create, makes "us create what we see."[157] But it would be incorrect to say that the irreality function is a negative, or mythical function. Bachelard also calls this the unreal cause, which is absolute necessary as it produces the flow of images, a continuity that makes sense of the world.[158] The flow of images can only be formed from the imagination, and not when one encounters the real, as the real "serves to halt, inhibit, and *reduce* images so as to give them

[154] Bachelard, *The Poetics of Reverie*, 13.
[155] Bachelard, *The Poetics of Reverie*, 13.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid., 13-14.
[158] Gaston Bachelard, *Earth and Reveries of Repose: An Essay on Images of Interiority* (Dallas: Dallas Institute Publications, 2011), 59-60. See also Warnock, *Imagination*.

the sole value of a sign."[159] Thus the imagined cause is what produces dynamic nature that now makes sense of the world around it.

The imagined qualities are important as opposed to the real qualities, as the real qualities are, in Bachelard's case, unable to be fully grasped. It is necessary that one not take the qualities of the whole, but rather through the "total adherence of a subject who is deeply committed to what he or she is imagining."[160] In this sense, Bachelard is attempting to make the case that the subject in their intentionality through reverie is in a deep relationship with the object being valued. The imagination therefore is integral to any formation of qualities and values of the object as it produces a flow, or how it relates to the world in the present.

One of the things that gets lifted up is the sensitivity that the imagination produces, in order that the self is able to apprehend the object. It is as if the images that come from the objects themselves are full of energy and life. But for Bachelard, it is the imagination that creates a "tone" that comes from the subject in the feeling of the images. The imagination is the "tonalized subject."[161] The tone grasps at two sides, which Bachelard keeps in movement. He navigates between organismic consciousness and sensory extravagance, as well as navigating between too much and not enough, for each of these tells of the becoming of the thing and not its being. The qualities that we are attending to are also in a process of development.[162] When Bachelard turns to this idea of the tonalized subject, he is speaking of the vibrations and movements that are not necessarily a seeing of vision of the eyes, but that of the ears, telling of something far deeper about imagination and imaging; the images are not subject to seeing, but to vision, to a way of developing sight that is not founded upon the sense of sight alone, but upon many aspects around it, from

[159] Bachelard, *Earth and Reveries of Repose: An Essay on Images of Interiority*, 60.
[160] Ibid., 59.
[161] Ibid., 63.
[162] Ibid., 65.

feeling to hearing through vibrations. And these images are delicate, always changing. Bachelard writes, "Between the *not enough* and the *too much* an image is, because of its sensitivity, never definitive; it lives in a tremulous duration, in a rhythm. Every *value* associated with light is a rhythm of values."[163] This then attends to a polyvalence of values within the image.[164]

The terms non-I and irreality seem to indicate that what is happening in the world of dynamic nature is not real, but I would argue against this way of thinking. Just as in Deleuze's fabulation, it is a creating of a world based on feelings and values that connects one with the real world. Imagination is the deep connection to the real world. It cannot be narrowed to a set of images, in which the intellect connects, but rather the intellect connects to the real world and feels it in the realm of irreality. The intellect changes based on the dynamic role that the imagination plays.

3.2.2 Air and Dreams

In *Air and Dreams*, Bachelard discusses the role of imagination in a different sense. He pushes back against what both Aristotle and Plato write on the function of the imagination. Whereas the imagination is often understood to be that which forms images, Bachelard suggests instead that it "*deforms* what we perceive," since it frees us from the immediacy of images and it changes them.[165] Plato and Aristotle want images to be as real as possible, because the symbolization of the image is what is important to the movement towards higher ideals through the intellect. But for Bachelard this is not the imagination. The imagination espoused by Plato and

[163] Bachelard, *Earth and Reveries of Repose: An Essay on Images of Interiority*, 66.

[164] I would argue that this counters Deleuze insistence on the system of values within the image of thought. If the object in reverie, in the rhythm found in the tonalized subject (imagination), produces or is revealed as a polyvalence of values, it is to show that the singularity of the image contains the multiplicity that is available as options. The image is a complexity and is not contained within the concept.

[165] Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement*, 1.

Aristotle is the memory of perception, a habitual way of seeing an object's form and color. There is a movement beyond repetition or reverberation of the image, where now there is a call for something to be done with the image, or in actuality, that we follow the image in its opening. Bachelard wants to slow down what Aristotle understands of the perception, of moving into the characteristics of an immediate perception, of a definitive form, which "clips the wings" of the imagination.[166] Bachelard is cautioning us on the movement from perception to formal thought, as it just repeats the same, and thus removes novelty for possible wider forms of meaning. But this is found not in what we do with it, but in what the image displays of itself for us. Bachelard writes that "a given image often has its own way of moving…it should bring us to the point where we can actually draw, for each image, an odograph which would summarize its kinetic activity."[167] The power behind this quotation lies in a more persuasive role that the image plays with us, in that it calls us to follow its path, its movement that seems wild, to show its patterns. This affects our minds, revitalizing them, providing deeper meaning, living, calling for its expression through speech.

> In the realm of the imagination, infinity is the place where the imagination asserts itself as pure imagination, where it is free and alone, vanquished and victorious, proud and trembling. Then images soar upward and vanquish; they rise and are shattered by their very height. Then the realism of unreality is evident. Forms are understood through their transfiguration. Speech is prophecy. In this way, the imagination is indeed a way of going beyond, psychologically.[168]

Bachelard here reverses what is to be understood as the primary notion or direction in philosophy, that the idea grasps the imagination, and through it becomes reality. However, the idea is not here. What is and returns is the image. Not only a single image, but what is understood as the doubling of the image, as Bachelard writes: "Eager to experience the realities of the upper air, the

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[166] Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement*, 2.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid., 5-6.

imagination as a whole will double every impression by adding to it a new image."[169] So the image, as it develops a vertical trajectory upon every impression, adds a new image, which is in itself a multiplicity of images, feeling the impressions of each moment, seeking its satisfaction of becoming. And yet this is not a composite image; it is an image in becoming.

Imagination not only is a space but has mobility. And therefore it is the journey towards the imaginary to find its reality. Bachelard here quotes Benjamin Fondane, saying that, "an object is not real, but a *good carrier* of what is real."[170] That is to say that an object itself, when witnessed, is not real; it is what it contains that is real. This is profound, since then language is not the space of articulation, in which the makeup of language creates and verifies the thing, but language is in dialogue with the object, in the imaginary, through the journey, that when it rises in its becoming transforms, and its impression gives power to speech. And thus speech prophesies. It is at that moment that the space of reason and of logic takes its turn.

For Bachelard, the imagination enforces the dynamicity of imagination in bringing forth something about the thing in its focus on reverie. Bachelard focuses on reverie due to the ability to forgo analysis for listening, making statements for the gaze. In that listening gaze, one sees the movement of the image in its becoming in irreality and yet making an emphasis within the real world. This has resonances with Deleuze and his work on imagination as fabulation, the triadic formulation of thought in stasis, and the need for a dynamic movement of novelty. But Bachelard maintains that the role of imagination is tantamount, even if it stays within its mode of unreality. Like Deleuze, in the imagination's gaze of the real, one needs irreality, the virtual (in Deleuze's sense) to make sense of what is. And from that mode the formal imagination is able to continue a process.

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[169] Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement*, 6.
[170] Ibid., 4-5.

Bachelard introduces the ability to maintain the imagination as an impetus for thought, enforcing a return to images for the dynamic flow between the imaginary and the actual for novelty to arise. This dynamic nature that Bachelard introduces works well in situating the imagination to create worlds that take on depth of feeling and interaction with the external world; the world speaks to us. But there is more to say about this aspect of the world speaking to us. It shifts the notion of objectification, in which the subject sees an object and is able to make sense of it, to the object speaking itself to us, as we gaze in wonder at its showing. This makes knowledge formation and truth come to the awareness that we have deep connections, a relation to the other. John Sallis is therefore helpful in lifting this awareness that can be done when imagination is an integral aspect of knowledge and truth.

3.3 John Sallis and the Force of Imagination

John Sallis is of interest as he reshapes the imagination from being the lowest aspect of the intellect to a parallel force in the mode of the sensible. The imagination is repositioned from what is idealistic, to the mode of experiencing the thing in itself, the thisness of the object. Similar to Bachelard's reverie, the imagination deals with the mode of the sensible image, the image as experienced. Thus there is a turn from the noetic, which seeks to make sense of the image by way of the intellect, to the aesthetic, a being taken off by the image itself.[171] This move allows for the sensible to break free from subordination, yet not to take a stance above the intellect. An interplay results, what Sallis calls the "double sense." For Sallis, it is the loss of the intelligible and the search for the enduring signifiers which are intelligibles. There is a move from the noetic aspect of interpretation as already shaping the contour of the image in the sensible (which in turn is the

[171] John Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 33.

same critique of Deleuze), and a gaze toward the image of the sensible itself, to allow to manifest what are signified as intelligibles. This troubles the use of *logos* (language, concepts) here because it is no longer secured or anchored to the noetic aspect of language, but to the aesthetic aspect, which plays with language itself, unseating its position of power.[172]

There is the necessity of the play of images in the mode of the sensible. But this play is part of the necessity for ascertaining the formation of things. In his *Being and Logos*, Sallis points out that mythos and logos are necessary aspects of the whole of knowing and understanding. Mythos can be taken as Deleuze above would understand it, as a fabrication, a fabulation. But it would be more appropriate to render it as something that harmonizes with logos, and therefore more along the lines of Bachelard's term of making extravagant the senses in order to come to some harmony. Sallis limits his writing in *Being and Logos* to discussing Plato's work, to decipher what Plato is struggling with in his own writing and thinking. For Sallis, both *mythos* and *logos* are equal. He begins with a citation from Plato's *Phaedrus*: "There is one point at least which I think you will admit, namely that any *logos* ought to be constructed like a living being, with its own body, as it were; it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work." [173] Sallis reads the notion of head in the above passage as indicating the *logos*, but does not define it as a form of discourse, not at *ratio*, but rather an ongoing "problem and challenge."[174] The feet, in turn correspond to *mythos*. Sallis writes that

[172] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 34.

[173] Plato, *Phaedrus* 264c, 14. See also Bernard Freydberg, *The Thought of John Sallis: Phenomenology, Plato, Imagination* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012), 63.

[174] Sallis writes, "to allow *logos* to be taken as *ratio*, hence, as reason, we reaffirm…one of the most overwhelmingly decisive transitions in that movement away from the Greeks that constituted the course of Western thought. To assume, in advance, a specific, well-defined determination of *logos* in this direction—to take for granted in an interpretation of Platonic writings subsequent notions of " rationality" and " demonstrative argument" —is to be misled by the tradition, made possible by Plato's work, into ignoring the original struggle with the problem of determining logos which takes place in the Platonic writings and which is of the greatest decisiveness for the entire tradition." John Sallis, *Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 15.

"what is of utmost importance...is that mythos not be taken, in advance, as merely an inferior kind of logos…as a mere compromise between knowledge and the logos appropriate to it, on the one hand, and sheer ignorance and its inevitable silence, on the other hand. The contrast between logos and mythos is not a contrast between a perfected and an imperfect discourse."[175] The beauty in this rendering of the platonic text is that both the logos and mythos must be taken both in part and as a whole work. It may be abstracted in order that one may delve into more, but it is still a part of the whole, and cannot be understood fully without the other roles in its making. A conversation thus appears. Freydberg in his work on Sallis writes, "Sallis observes… a mirror-play of *logos*, *mythos*, and *ergon* within each of the three dimensions, and writes: '*The totality of this mirror-play constitutes the dramatic character of dialogue.*'"[176] There are three here in this conversation, and Sallis is purposeful in making that known. For Sallis, Socrates emitted that which was hidden, a place in which the logos can provoke an action within it. The logos, then, the rational, requires an *ergon*, a soul, and for Sallis this is the human soul. This suggests that both *mythos* and *logos* are meant to accomplish something together and cannot be understood as being inferior to one another.[177] What seems to be missing is the notion of the image, since all that is being noted here is about dialogue. But what Sallis also includes is the subject of mirror-play. Freydberg uses the language of mathematics to show its inability to grasp the relations between *logos* and *mythos* to say that the knowledge and ignorance (*logos*) has some relation to light and darkness (*mythos*). Both knowledge and ignorance are asymmetrical, showing that ignorance is the absence of knowledge. But it is neither symmetrical nor analogous to light and darkness. The language that is

[175] Sallis, *Being and Logos*, 16.

[176] Ibid., 18. See also Freydberg, *The Thought of John Sallis: Phenomenology, Plato, Imagination*, 64.

[177] There is this hint of the image of the Trinity in Sallis' work; that that of the *Dynameis* of the Divine being mythos and logos, problems and possibilities, in which the soul is the space of provocation. The logos is the beginning of the problem and challenge, the mythos the manifestation of possibility, provoking the soul towards action. This also speaks to what I will later talk about in Alfred North Whitehead's own work, which speaks of mutual immanence, the thought that one cannot define something without the other being an aspect of it, and cannot be explained without it.

introduced from the logos is unable to show the relations that are at play between *logos* and *mythos*. What is introduced is a mirror play, the focused, intentional play to show something. And this showing is an image between *logos*, *ergon*, and *mythos*. But it gets at what Sallis wants to show, that the image must be introduced in the sensible where it manifests and is becoming. This hints that mirror is the play of process, meaning that to make sense of something, it cannot be held within the *logos* alone, nor within *mythos* alone; even the *ergon*, which is the space in which both join is for a temporal time, having to take one other aspects for its return (for instance memory, or even more important, the image).

With this, what is still necessary is to understand some of the aspects of Sallis' work which lifts imagination away from the noetic, and gives it a prominent place in which both enter into dialogue. These can be found in his details on the move from representation to presentation, an interplay of intentionality and gazing, and the mode of showing and understanding the look of things.

3.3.1 From Representation to Presentation

Sallis reinvigorates the role of the imagination as necessary for the whole of the "body," of the whole of knowledge, and that it becomes parallel with *logos* so that to respond to *logos* one must venture to *mythos*, and vice versa. But what Sallis does that is unique to Deleuze's fabulation is that he rethinks the role of the monstrous, the showing, which also takes on "representation." Representation makes the notion of copy or sign/signification a problem for it removes one from the original. It then only has significance within the space of thought. For Adler, representation is adequate for the imagination, and the imagination maintains its place as a purveyor of truth as repetition, as a way of getting to truth through narrative, not relying on logic or a non-contradictory

logic. But when moved into the mode of deriving knowledge and meaning, imagination is not to be trusted due to its placement as removed from the thing in itself. Thus imagination represents the original, and can be several times removed from it. The turn to aesthetics and the method of the imaginary creates deeper issues in that the imagination as creative develops the multiplicity of values, never situating itself as one of non-contradiction. Images as representations are problematic as they do not deal with the things themselves.

Sallis is well aware of the problems that images have produced to date. He critiques that there has been an inflation of the image, and thus a loss of the notion of the original and its image. Now all that remains are images of images of images—representations with no original. Sallis is once again limiting himself to the archaic understanding of image, in the text of Plato's *Republic* and the allegory of the cave. The image always leads ever closer to the original. But this is not the case in the postmodern context. Sallis introduces Baudrillard's critique of the rise of technology, in which "technological innovation has provided the means for the reduction, for a massive reduction of the relation between image and original."[178] The bombardment of limitless images produce by technology is both exposing and invasive, forcing one to be intertwined with the barrage of images and its flow, reducing and deforming its usefulness.[179] Images become copies.

Baudrillard is not concerned about the imaginary, but the loss of the imaginary due to simulation, as it produces the hyper-real, simulacra.[180] Sallis takes Baudrillard's critique as an exposure of the quest of simulacra, thus extinguishing its ability to perform that which it set out to do. Returning to the Platonic text, Sallis still sees the problem witnessed both by Baudrillard as well as for Plato: the image, in its attempt to attain the original, is integrated into a figure, the

[178] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 81.

[179] Ibid. See also Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation,* trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 1-40., for his critique of representation as dissimulation, pretending, forcing a removal of the real, and entrance to the hyperreal.

[180] Ibid., 12-27.

platonic line figures which are a structure of deferral that in effect already "programs the deformation."[181] To move toward the original is to once again produce a figure, which in its reiteration produces another, the original of the original. This is realized in Plato's allegory of the cave, in which there remains an infinite nature of images.

For Sallis, the goal is to break free from the intellect and the limitless number of images as deferred from the origin. He seeks the image of the sensible itself. But this entails a surprise, because for Sallis there should be no opposition between truth and appearance. The appearance is not an appearance of another, it is not a remote truth. It is, as for Deleuze, an expression of truth as perceived. In order to do this, however, Sallis focuses away from a schema of space to a schema of intentionality. What is usually understood is that there is an inner and outer aspect of consciousness. The inner aspect is the self, and the task is to find out about the object outside of self. What is therefore required is a representation of the object in my interior self.[182] Sallis' use of the intentional schema disrupts, "opening the space of perception to the things themselves, dissolving the interiority and especially the boundary isolating this space from that of the things perceived."[183] This allows for a showing of the object, its presentation of the self. It also shows that the object is itself living, dynamic, flowing. For Bachelard, the actual reduces while the imagination makes dynamic. But it is not an inward-outward movement, but rather an enveloping which does not single out, placing the presentation of the image at the fore. The schema of intentionality allows one to move across the separation of the perceiver and the perceived.[184] Thus the presentation of the image is of the object itself, which comes through the senses, not piecemeal, but as a whole. It does not build from sense content; it is not showing its redness, its stability, its

[181] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 84.
[182] Ibid., 90.
[183] Ibid., 91.
[184] Ibid.

design to show that something is a chair, but rather to show that the object being perceived is a presentation, an expression of the thisness of the chair.

What this introduces for Sallis is the duplicity of the image, which some contend is the same as representation. But Sallis is clear that the doubling or duplicity of the image does not mean a mimesis as originally thought, that it may not even fit because it introduces a countermovement.[185] The "image" names an occurrence, a means, a locus, in which sense becomes and is present to sense. The image is one's own; the image belongs to one's self, as it is the act of perceiving what is situated and differentiated from the perceived. It is one's own because of one's engagement with the image. The engagement with the image is thus an engagement with the "inner double of the objective quality," something "projected within by a certain theoretical schema[.]"[186] The significance that I find in Sallis here is that the image is not something initially internal to the self, which would then create the notion of representation, an image removed from its form. Rather, Sallis is making the claim that all things are presenting their selves, and thus the image we are perceiving is a presentation of the thing in itself, and our intentional interaction creates a duplicity of the image, which is still not a representation, but a difference from that which is situated. The images which we deal with are "aspects, faces, profiles, of the thing itself."[187]

But the how, the role of the imagination in the showing of the image, is what I am trying to get at. If the thing in itself is already presenting itself, that it is "showing" or "shining" aspects and qualities of the thing in itself, then what is the mode of the imagination? Sallis writes,

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[185] Charles E. Scott, "In the Interest of Justice to Art," in *The Path of Archaic Thinking: Unfolding the Work of John Sallis*, ed. Kenneth Maly (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 90-91, 267-268. Scott argues that Sallis' doubling, the duplicity of the image, is representation.

[186] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 95.

[187] Ibid. Although not a focus of the paper, I would like to note that Sallis writes on the delicacy of the image, that due to the various ways in which one may interact with the image, one understanding of the image may come to the fore, while others maintain an aspect behind, hidden, yet supporting the foreground image.

> it is by the force of imagination that the configuration of showing is drawn. This drawing takes place as a circulating, a hovering, between the upsurge of presence and its bound horizons. Hovering so as to draw forth and yet withdraw the horizons, circling perpetually between protraction and retraction, imagination deploys its force so as to let things that are present show themselves as themselves…Shining from within the horizons gathered around them by force of imagination, things show themselves as determinable and to an extent determined and yet as submitted to an indefinite deferral of their determination.[188]

There are certain things that are important to note in his defining of imagination as tractive. He uses the term horizon to set the image apart in an apartness that leaves open the differences between this image and others of the thing in itself, allowing the differences to persist in their opposition.[189] Horizonality allows one to see the thing in itself; however, it is surrounded by and held together with peripheral horizons and lateral horizons. For Sallis, the lateral horizons are lateral images, images which once you face them, are no longer lateral images. They cease that function and become frontal images. This is the spacing of laterality, and does not include presence. One cannot see the lateral images as lateral, precisely as doing so makes them frontal. One, however, needs the horizoning process, the cutting off in Deleuzian terms, to see the thing in itself, to deal with what one is experiencing. The horizonality is important precisely because, like logic, it is closing off the space to get at the thing in itself. But it does not distill the space around it, but rather just marks off the parameters for its revealing.[190]

In its function, the force of imagination also hovers, which entails unifying "what is not unifiable," and stands between what is determined and non-determinable.[191] This is fascinating

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[188] Ibid., 126-127. Sallis makes a slight change in his later work concerning circling, shifting to a spiraling effect to maintain an openness, the ability to return and find new properties. Please see Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 24-25.

[189] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 111.

[190] This can be understood as also similar to what are considered cuts and cross-cuts in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), chapter 1. There remains both a showing of the particularity of the image as well as the delicacy of the image, which has some relation to the porosity of the cut to allow the "fog" to permeate. Images are delicate precisely because they are personages, aspects, only parts of the whole.

[191] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 127.

because its task is to bring together or yoke together two disparate things; it both brings together and sets apart. Sallis writes, "It can bring together what cannot be brought together, effecting what is absolutely prohibited…without violating—without assimilating or cancelling—the force that holds apart, that enforces the prohibition; thus it brings together without simply forcing together."[192] There is the power of presence that forces the self to accept, to make sense of that which is. It breaks whatever image has been held about the object, forcing one to come to realize that that which is desired in the role of logic, the law of non-contradiction, is exceeded in the force of imagination, and the logic of imagination now comes to the fore, which exceeds any formal logic, infracting the very law of law and of discourse itself. On the other hand, the force of imagination is both strong and weak. It is strong because in its hovering it brings together things which are disparate, things which cannot but could be. But it also is a weak force, as "it does not force such opposed moments together, does not turn against the force that separates them," but the function is to allow the things themselves to show themselves as what they properly are, lending to things presented the force of protraction and retraction.[193] This protraction and retraction takes on other terms such as unfolding (showing) and withdrawing (hiding). In order to show a property of the thing in its showing, it is necessary that other images in its laterality hide, disappear into the background, on the cusp of the horizon. The image shown is the manifestation of the thing in its revealing. The force of imagination allows the truth to emerge by the act of hovering, which brings together without removing that which keeps them apart. This introduces a form of relatedness; the realization that they are separate is in part due to the showing of their difference from one another. So in maintaining their difference it is also necessary to hold them together. Indeed, for Sallis, "separation is also relatedness; that is, one moment can be kept separate from the other only insofar

[192] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 127-128.
[193] Ibid., 128-129.

as, in connection with the one moment, account is taken of the other–hence only insofar as a relatedness is maintained."[194] This beautiful rendering of the force of imagination suggests rather than forces what is possible. Logic may desire a hard choice, but imagination, knowing difference, can only show what lies ahead of seeming contradictions, to what is possible in different states.

In his *Logic of Imagination*, Sallis furthers his discussion on the problem of non-contradiction, due to logic's inability within its own system to formulate a consistent method by which no contradiction exists. Sallis argues that Plato had no logic or logical principles in place in his writing. There is no coherent discourse in the form of logic that can be extracted for the purpose of saying logic was formed from his work. It is in one of the writings in Book 4 of the *Republic* where Plato writes: "For of course, we say the same thing would not perform opposed actions [τάναντία πράττει] concerning the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time."[195] In reading this, one can see the limitations that are placed here: the "same thing," "same part," "same time." And this suffices to anticipate what is later found as the Aristotelian formation of logic. In other passages in Plato's *Republic*, there is a sense of logic, but what is most fascinating is what Sallis describes as the affirmation of contradiction in philosophical inquiry, and not its removal of it. What happens with Aristotle (and philosophers after him) creates a sense of narrowness and intensity, but enforces a vagueness that is engaged in writings after Aristotle, primarily by Husserl, Kant, and Heidegger. Sallis writes, "For what is taken to differentiate the sensible from the intelligible is that it sustains contradiction, that it both is and is not…the affirmation of contradiction plays a decisive role in posing the distinction between intelligible and sensible."[196] We see here that initially there is no sense of non-contradiction in Plato's philosophy because contradiction is necessary to differentiate, to find and accentuate difference itself, between the

[194] Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 162-163.
[195] Ibid., 27.
[196] Ibid.

intelligible and the sensible. It is the pursuit and movement from sense and intelligence. Sallis looks at the discussion between Socrates and Glaucon as another prime example of the affirmation of contradiction.[197] When discussing knowledge and opinion, knowledge is typically seen as directed towards a correlative and non-contradictory discourse. Yet in matters of opinion, to be able to discuss and come to an idea of what the thing is requires some form of contradiction. This later becomes the function of the intelligible and the sensible, knowledge and opinion correlatively.[198] Thus, borrowing from Deleuze, there are always two things or ideas, as only in difference can there ever be any distinction, and thus some form of contradiction is necessary in order to show what things appear to be.

Sallis continues the discourse between being and not-being (being beautiful and not-being beautiful). There is a movement from appearance to the name, which he gives the term λογοσ. When a name is introduced instead of its appearing, there is a transition from the "way things look to the names by which they are called."[199] There is a directionality, a "stabilizing" effect by naming something, as one then sets out towards the thing named, for instance the beautiful and not-beautiful. But this poses an even greater problem between Socrates and Glaucon. For Socrates even in naming admits that the thing named beautiful may also be named ugly. The thing in itself, thus, has a facticity to it, an ability to hold a manyness in its relation to other things, and this leads to a troublesome realization if the thing can be held in a firm and stable sense. Glaucon further unseats the stability of either the appearance or the naming by citing that nothing can be being, since it may also be non-being, and the non-being cannot contain at any one instant that of being, that is, at any one time: "For the many are also ambiguous, and it is not possible to think of them

[197] John Sallis, *Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 13-14.
[198] Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 28.
[199] Ibid., 29.

fixedly."[200] For Sallis (and I believe him to be correct), the discussion for Plato on the thing in itself is that of being and logos, and the reality of the thing and what is being said of it. The two should somehow relate to it.

What I am trying to bring forth from Sallis' reading and understanding of the imagination is its active/passive movement in order that the thing in itself be capable of its own expression. Logic is unable to develop a clear thesis as to the thing in itself, due to its inability to come to a conclusion that in order to judge, it negates the other, and yet in its negation of the other it removes its ability to judge, therefore questioning the mode of logic. The turn to imagination produces in a way that logic can, and yet in a way that maintains things without corrupting or negating them. It holds to the function of what Sallis calls the tractive imagination, as that which "neither produces nor reproduces something seen in advance…it is neither productive or reproductive, but tractive. Its dexterity allows the horizons around the upsurge of presence, its lines of force constituting the field of protraction and retraction between the present aspect of the thing and the horizons that enclose it, gathering the nonsense of sense to sense.[201] It is neither productive nor reproductive because it brings forth by way of drawing, drawing forth the horizons while at the same withdrawing them and others so as to introduce the image.

Sallis reinitializes the understanding of the poetic imagination from its once pejorative space because of its erroneous view that it leads to fantasy and is dangerous. Anything can be dangerous. But imagination is neither that which leads one back to the origin of the thing in itself, nor is it a producer of things. It is the progenitor of all these things by being in between them.

[200] In the chapter on Alfred North Whitehead, this is argued against, that a thing in itself, the actual occasion in the mode of datum, can be many things to many other actual occasions in their concresence, thus indicating that within itself there is the possibility of all within, thus holding to an imaginative potentiating force of what it could be in each instance.

[201] Sallis, *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*, 138-139.

Sallis arrives here by arguing for the tractive imagination as that which pulls by drawing, a force of excess, of insistence, that requires its announcing, its existence.

3.3.2 Exorbitant Logics

Exorbitant logic refers to Sallis' thinking through the problem of logic and non-contradiction. For Sallis, when logic, Aristotelian logic, goes to the limit, it is understood that non-contradiction is not possible, as difference is a necessary way in which logic is made useful. But this cannot be known till one reaches the limit. Now Sallis does not want a removal of logic, but a renewal of a certain logic, a logic that is a sense of logic, a logic of imagination, an exorbitant logic.

In order for this exorbitant logic to show, it is necessary to expose the ontological paradigm that exposes the scope of its logic. This is fascinating, as there is an introduction of a schema, a blueprint, where a trace reveals the paradigm being used.[202] By exposing its limit, one also provides the place in which an exorbitant logic can be introduced, or take place. It is the reverse of what was done by Deleuze prior to the imagination, a turning of logic on its head. Imagination needs something to grasp; logic cannot grasp it all.

An exorbitant logic is the logic of imagination, a logic which does not have as its necessity to maintain the theory of non-contradiction, but rather holds things in the mode of the imaginative, the holding together of two moments. It is precisely their separation that creates their relation, that is, that the imagination is already in play, as it were, holding the two in separation yet also in relatedness.[203] Consider that exorbitant logic does have a structure, but this structure holds together

[202] Trace here has a play on the tractive, as tracing is done both as something there yet never before seen. It is what manifests from the possible in the form of vision, but functions as an act, an act of the hand which draws, traces to bring forth, and thus produces, a poetic truth.

[203] Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 162-163.

two disparate structures, and nevertheless, when you see it, in its separation, you see it together, coinciding, and somehow functioning in its separation precisely because a relation is built between the two.

3.3.3 The Look of Things

In his *Logic of Imagination*, Sallis refers to the mode of manifestation to how things present themselves. Because it is termed how the thing in itself "looks," this provides something interesting with which to grapple. Adler argues that a thing is as it is seen, that a chair is a chair. One may also argue that a chair is argumentative because it depends on the subject viewing the chair. Thus the subject is involved in the process of formulating what the thing is.

In his use of manifestation, Sallis places more upon the object in its making, and the subject as receiver, or gazer of the object in its manifestation. For the object, upon the request to be looked upon, presents or manifests itself in a look. This look is at the moment. This is important because the look upon its manifestation represents its animated character, that things are animated, and are unable to be alike, in the Aristotelian sense, that is born from a fabrication. A fabrication is a construction, but it remains such from form to material. This is why the notion of fabrication doesn't work for Sallis, and for him fails in an Aristotelian sense. To derive qualities by freezing the object, that there is no longer any interaction but a sense-image, denies some relationality and intentionality of the object as well as the subject.

The terms look and manifestation therefore introduce something beyond the mere sense image as produced in perception, and the mere formation of the thing by our senses, to the mode of gazing and seeing what manifests from the thing itself.[204] Sallis writes, "the emergence of the

[204] Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 126-129.

look has the effect of crystallizing and intensifying the antecedent manifestation…the look enhances, gathers up, and reinstates at a superior level the self-showing of the thing, lets it show itself more distinctly as what it is, accords it its truth."[205] Also, the "look of things, even when drawn into the open, cannot be set apart from the things themselves without violating its very sense."[206] Upon my gazing at the object, and upon its manifestation, the thing in itself upon presenting itself provides a look that cannot be set apart from itself, and cannot be set apart without violating its very sense, meaning that upon looking at that object it is connected to the image it has produced as well as to that which is produced in the subject. But the thing shows itself, a self-showing. In the thing itself is an intentionality to show itself. This is why Sallis rethinks Aristotle's understanding of products fabricated by humans, which moves Aristotle to presume that the nature of things are inanimate, a mass, a solidified form. It is Sallis' movement to the reality of animate objects, to the constant presence of self-showing, that pushes beyond construction to things themselves opening up their mystery.

3.4 Conclusions

There is a lot to Sallis and Bachelard's work, but there need to be some thoughts that respond to Adler's own thoughts on the limits of the imagination. First, Adler looks at the world as objects, as a person capable of seeing the thing fully as what it is. so for Adler in his search for the qualities of a thing sees it as an inanimate object which is only able to produce certain parts of certain qualities. It is the intellect that forms the concepts and these concepts come from universal ideas. this would fall on the Aristotelian notion of substance that things are passive, that they are material, inanimate. But both Sallis and Bachelard show that with the imagination what was once

[205] Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 127.
[206] Ibid.

inanimate is now animated and hints at the vivacity of the thing in itself. One could say that it is no longer an object, but an other with qualities that we witness in its becoming. We see its movement, its structure, it speaks to us; upon gazing on the image of the thing it speaks to us and it gives us vision.

We see here that the imagination shows us by way of vision, by way of a deeper transformation that is not only mechanical but it is a fusion of the intellectual and the senses. It is how we perceived things to be. Just as Sallis, in his notion of horizonality and lateral images, is forcing us to see that our images are one of many that surround us. This is why the image is fragile, able to be changed and shifted, as we change our perspective, we are able to see a new image, a new frontal image which better articulates what one sees at the present moment. Images thus are malleable, and push beyond Deleuze image of thought because for both Sallis and Bachelard the image is broken and made anew. Even Bachelard's poetic approach of deforming the image is precisely needed to create anew and to provide new meaning for the self in order to create hypotheses for new discoveries. And yet this all suggests a way of looking at things that are more in the move of the sophist as well as the platonic. It is an exorbitant logic within the space of the imagination, the *logos* and *mythos* with the *ergon* that allows for perception to bring forth an image, the possibility of conceptualization through difference.

How is this speaking to the role imagination plays within religious pluralism? Imagination opens up the possibility of bringing together disparate things and showing their relation; but in there relation there is the possibility of some form of becoming through modes of compositing, of gazing, slowing down, looking beyond simplicity and engaging the complexity of the image. By shifting from the ideal to the sensible, we engage the presentation of thing itself, it speaks to us, it gives us itself. By this way there is both a logic and a dialogue and a way towards novelty, new ways of thinking.

Under Bachelard, the phenomenology of the imagination does the work of novelty in that the consciousness enters into a dialogue with the image. The image comes in the form of reverie, through the daydream, a sort of awakened sleep in which the self is able to be in on the act. This is different than the dream, which for Bachelard keeps the self as a spectator in the dream, as watching instead of living in and through the dream. Reverie is the focused gaze upon the image that arises. It is an invitation to dialogue with it, an intentional form of play with the image, by which then, in an intuitive formation of knowledge, a hypothesis can occur. Reverie therefore introduces imagination as that intentional engagement with the image for the formation of knowledge that can then enter into a form of verification. In its unreal function, the imagination helps one to be with the image confidently in moving from possibility to actuality. In its real function, the fact is verified in the hypothesis, and there the imagination in reverie proves its usefulness. For Bachelard there is a need to remove oneself from the moment to deal with the presentation or the showing of the thing, to focus on what it wants to reveal. This is because in the real function of the world, the reality, it remains barren. It is barren because it shows itself as what it is as it is. But this is because we are only giving it a superficial viewing or sensory appreciation. It is our engagement with it, our intentionality, that opens up a space to know beyond the senses. And yet it begins in the imagination because it is a safe space in which to make sense of the world around us. It allows us to produce the novelty desired out of the mundaneness of the world, which, in Bachelard's terms, tends to be cruel and depressing. Here one can see feelings, an image expressed in the world of the real, but with no interaction, hence described as one of barrenness.

When we engage Sallis, the imagination is not the images in play, but rather the receptacle in which the images have play. Imagination is not representation, but the receptacle by which the duplicity of image has its place. It is in the Sallisian use of the tempest, where the storm surrounds the space of tranquility and allows for tensions to manifest and harmonize, not performing a

harmony of rejection but one of acceptance and greater purpose, precisely not because it is a reduction but a complexification, a sense in which the image is formed as a double, the image itself, and the image as seen by the mind, as found in difference.[207] Is this not what is desirable in religious pluralism, that in the space of play, within each' differences there can be engagement, and from engagement some novelty of the divine is revealed?

Imagination is a receptacle, that as in the process of luring, birthing, is also a force, one that calls one into the mode of making a choice for possibility. The imagination is no longer one of fantasy but formation, of production but of more than production. In Sallis' words, it is one of *poeisis*, of the bringing forth, the bringing out, not a production of what is already there, but the drawing out of the new by way of drawing, tracing, in order that two things occur: the novel as well as it representation. It maintains both its affirming and negating stance, its deconstructive and its constructive stance. It understands that the materials used are found in the multiplicity of singularities, but its novelty is found in the construction through the senses, and then through the intelligence, a double procession; imagination is the force, the intentionality with no desire for its own particular meaning but meaning nonetheless. It is a faculty of formation that works like logic, but does not enforce the mode of non-contradiction; it leaves its presence there in the tempest of the receptacle. Sallis does a fine job of reintroducing contradiction as a necessary component of difference, allowing for imagination to have its place in maintaining tensions.

In my opinion, Sallis responds to Deleuze's idea of the limitation as given by Kant of the imagination, that in its accepting of all things and in the demands of reason for a response, it falls upon itself. There is then a necessity for the idea to make a place for it to hold on and travel. Sallis' response is much different. He says that it is the space by which one enters the imagination that

[207] Sallis, *Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental*, 1-7.

provides the trace for its involution, for the formation as well as complication of the image, the object.

For Sallis and Bachelard, the imagination is the place of novelty, where truth arises by way of difference and becoming. This gives weight to the question of religious pluralism; It is in difference that one finds the novel, because as differences join together, upon their awareness, reveals a deeper understanding of the divine as well as purpose of religious traditions. But the next question is how can one utilize the imagination to experience and come to some truth of the divine? I would argue that it is the intentional schema which can be called a form of revealing. The imagination thus must remain in poeisis in order to draw forth any aspect of the divine. The centrality of imagination, in the role of speculation, as well as in the form of analysis makes way for Henry Corbin's work in the phenomenology of religion. His use of the Imaginal realm introduces not only the divine at work in the space of imagination, but the introduction of many logics, in which the cohering function is realized in the imaginal realm.

Chapter 4: Corbin, the Imaginal Realm and Difference of Religions

4.1 Introduction

Adler establishes the imagination as the promoter of ideals, the human capacity that relates truth to the world in the form of narrative so as to create the beautiful, and from the beautiful, the good. This mode of the imagination is *mythos*, mythmaking to bring forth truth. The establishment of truth can only be realized in the pragmatic theory of truth, in its verifiability in the sphere of what he argues to be real, that which lies in fact. Truth is true because it relates to some fact in the world.

And yet there is a loss of reality, of meaning, and of the vibrancy of the universe when we hold only to this way of thinking. As I mentioned earlier in regard to Gaston Bachelard's statement, the real function, which is the world as we experience it, can make us become depressed, lose confidence, become dull, because the real as experienced is devoid of any meaning outside of fact. Reality states that all there is, is what exists in the external world. Bachelard thus calls for an unreal function, a turn to the imagination, to give one confidence, a chance to analyze the world and make choices about it. There is no denying the necessity of analysis, but this, he says, can be done in the space of the unreal. The unreal function has a quasi-reality, but helps one to function in the real, to make more meaning within the dullness of bare fact.[208] Thus there is more than just fact; there is a need for adventure, for something beyond fact and more like meaning. Fact and truth may be a part of the real, but it is not all there is to reality. It is part of the engagement of the real. Imagination, as expressed in the second chapter, provides the basis for making ideas, finding meaning, for deriving knowledge, and thus for discovering reality.

[208] Alfred North Whitehead also makes this statement in Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 174.

And yet what Adler holds, and what others' writings on the imagination miss, is the understanding of God in the midst of this study of imagination. Adler holds to a Christian Thomist understanding of God, namely that our own free will is found in the mode of consciousness, in the mode by which one has the ability to make choices. However, the ability to make a choice is not found in the imagination but rather in the intelligence. There is a distinction here: the imagination in Augustine and Aquinas holds a passive position as intermediary between the senses and the intellect.[209] It serves the needs of the intellect as that which transforms the senses into that which the intellect can make known as the object. The imagination retains the lowest position; it is merely at the cusp of the sphere of reason and logic. It serves the intellect. For Augustine and Aquinas this is rightly so, and is a means to discern between truth and error within the movements of revelation and reason. Logic is essential. And God is a God of logic. There is no need for imagination, as truth and logic exist and are given us by the divine. With Augustine and Aquinas, the function of imagination is, in the Aristotelean sense, to hold memories, to make images, and to move us towards the upper sphere of intelligence.

I introduce a quite different understanding of the imagination: imagination as a mode of knowledge, as the place in which the other can show itself. It is a phenomenological understanding of the imagination. But in this aspect of the imagination, primarily with the help of Bachelard and Sallis, I describe a return to elementals as either a mode of thinking in the imagination, or as the ground of things. As pivotal as it may be, their work stops short of speaking of the role of the divine in the world of the imagination.[210] Therefore, a study of the imagination in the work of

[209] Augustine has, in his lifetime of writing, articulated three distinctions of the imagination, as fantasy, which he speaks of in the pejorative, as producer of mental images through memory, and as the creative power to see the future through past memory. See Breyfogle, “Memory and Imagination in Augustine.”

[210] Corbin does not go into the idea that God imagines. This is in part my argument, that if "God…is their chief exemplification" of metaphysical rules, then it can be argued that God imagines. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 343.

Henry Corbin is of interest for he suggests that the imagination brings things together to develop knowledge. Here, knowledge is a complexification rather than a reduction of things.

4.2 Corbin

I introduce Henry Corbin as a scholar whose work warrants retrieval because his methodology introduces what I believe has largely been lost in the work of philosophical and theological circles—namely, the role of the imagination. Corbin became a much-respected resource in his study and translation of texts in the area of Shi'ism, Sufism, Islamic philosophy, and the wider spiritual traditions of Iran. What makes him interesting to me is that, in a field that is primarily studied and taught by historians, Corbin approached Islamic philosophical and mystical thought as a philosopher and thinker.[211] This meant that Corbin sought out only the ideas in themselves, not their historical context.[212] This approach shifts the notion of image to being not about representation, but rather about the presentation of the thing in itself, the idea as present now.[213]

Corbin's study of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Ibnʿ Arabī introduces what has been sorely lacking in the field of thought—the *Mundus Imaginalis* or world of imagination—and highlights a space of Imagination as the place of knowledge formation and meaning, but also of transformation. This essential space is not a faculty of the mind, but a faculty of the heart, of the spiritual, which melds both together. Thus initially he breaks with any form of development of logic, as logic is a form of making sense of things, making them correlate with one another, while

[211] Nile Green, "Between Heidegger and the Hidden Imam: Reflections on Henry Corbin's Approaches to Mystical Islam," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 17, no. 3 (2005): 220.

[212] Ibid.

[213] Christian Jambet, ed. *Henry Corbin* (Paris: L'Herne, 1981), 25-26. See also Green, "Between Heidegger and the Hidden Imam: Reflections on Henry Corbin's Approaches to Mystical Islam," 221.

the imaginal, as Corbin describes it, breaks this worldly logic for a different type of "logic" or way of understanding things. In this chapter, I use Henry Corbin and his perspective primarily of Ibnʿ Arabī's work to introduce a mode of Imagination as central to accessing the divine, and thus as a way of seeing how the role of religious dialogue can coincide with and begin to transcend some of the issues found within logic and reasoning.

To this end I begin by briefly showing three central concerns at the heart of Corbin's work, concerns that affect what makes imagination possible: that of the person, the individual, and beingness. Persons becomes true human beings when they are aware of and move towards their true selves. Thus their pursuit is the pursuit of the being of being. The importance of the soul necessitates the imaginal realm where true transformation takes place. Three things arise that thwart the pursuit of the being of being: the removal of purpose, the removal of the soul, and therefore the removal of the philosophical/mystical pursuit of the self. Corbin's work pushes back against all three.[214]

4.2.1 Nihilism

One of the challenges Corbin is trying to push back against is how time is to be understood in and through the understanding of nihilism. Since nihilism rejects any religious and/or moral principles, and life is essentially meaningless, it makes imagination become imaginary. In removing the imagination, creative transformation and action is now lost, and time is just a progression with no real meaning. Our pursuit of knowledge becomes knowledge for the sake of knowledge and not for personal transformation. In the last years of his life, Corbin remarked:

[214] This has parallels with Alfred North Whitehead's own thoughts, that the mystical and philosophical move along the same journey, from direct insight to rationalization. See Orwell, *1984*, 171-174.

> The phenomenon of the senses, which is fundamental to the metaphysics of *Sein und Zeit*, is the link between the signifier and the signified. But what is this link, without which the signifier and signified would remain objects of only theoretical consideration? This link is the subject, and this subject is the presence, presence of the mode of being within the mode of understanding. Presence, 'being there.'[215]

This presence of which Corbin speaks is pre-sense; in order for something to be felt or experienced, there needs to be some receptacle that can, through the senses, partake in that event. This receptacle is the subject, which prehends the event taking place in the space around them. It is the subject as both a receptacle as space and someone who feels that allows for the act of symbolization, or symbolic reference, to take place. More than that, Corbin does not want the signifier/signified to remain in an objective state, and requires that it also transform both signifier/signified into something for the self, for one's own being. Presence takes precedence. Here he is hinting at the role of the person as being. The loss of presence entails a loss of integration, a loss of transformation, and a loss of progression beyond what appears in the external world. Thus the nihilism that Corbin is pushing against is a metaphysical nihilism that has an immense effect on the role of the subject. In his writing, Corbin frequently uses the terms East and West, not referring to ethnic, geographical, or historical terms but rather to mark a spiritual plane, that of the sacred and the secular. It is the spiritual that is lost in metaphysical nihilism, and with this comes a cultural nihilism.[216]

Corbin relates the destruction of metaphysics to the destruction of the human soul, the soul being the space by which one enters into the sacred. He writes, “the phenomena of sacralization and secularization do not primarily *take place or have their place* in the world of external forms but first in the internal world of the human soul.”[217] Corbin understands that the human person

[215] Jambet, *Henry Corbin*, 25-26. English Translation by Green, “Between Heidegger and the Hidden Imam: Reflections on Henry Corbin's Approaches to Mystical Islam,” 221.

[216] Adler's movement of transculturation, transphilosophy, and transreligiosity move toward this way of thinking, not of nothingness, but an understanding that there is only one true meaning.

[217] Henry Corbin, “Apophatic Theology as Antidote to Nihilism,” *UMBR(a)* Semblance(2007): 61.

projects “outwardly the modalities of his internal being” in order to construct the phenomenon of the world.[218] The phenomenon of the world is the being's own world, where one makes choices concerning one's own freedom or service. For Corbin, nihilism exhibits itself when “the human being loses consciousness of his responsibility for this link and proclaims, with desperation or cynicism, that the gates that he himself had shut are closed.”[219]

Corbin is vehement concerning the need to move away from theology to other frameworks of study; he finds it problematic to reach understanding only in and through history, sociology, psychology, biology, physics, engineering, and so forth, because all of those are linear, historic ways of understanding causality, are composed of matter in space. They abandon anything beyond such causality, where thoughts of the beyond are mere thoughts of fancy, and our being and becoming can only be understood from reductionistic viewpoints. The removal of the theological removes any discussion of the divine worlds, including the arenas of cosmology, anthropology, and angelology. These aspects happen within the world of the soul, and make up an integral part of reality, both what is seen and unseen. Both poles of theology, its cataphatic and apophatic modes and back again, get lost when we move from the theological to the sociological.[220] With the reciprocal movements between both poles of theology gone, the loss of the person as human being arises, due to the sociological framework, which tends to the external but not the person's internal postulate. Reality is now only externally or efficiently causal.

[218] Corbin, “Apophatic Theology as Antidote to Nihilism,” 61.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid., 71.

4.2.2 Averroes, the Loss of the Soul, the Loss of Imagination

In my initial chapter on Adler, we saw that he takes some time to argue for a rejection of a double theory of truth. The double theory of truth is the view that religion and philosophy, as separate sources of knowledge, might arrive at contradictory truths without detriment to either. He rejects Averroes because Averroes lifts up philosophy over religion. Averroes did hold that in a procession or emanation from the Active Intellect, truth is revealed in different ways. This would mean that a person understands according to the way in which he or she understands.

In his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, Averroes seems to be at an impasse in dealing with the material intellect. Aristotle posited an intellect in humanity which is potential, it "is what it is by virtue of becoming of all things."[221] What does this mean? Averroes tried to make sense of it.[222] He postulates that the passive, or the potential or material intellect, is "a single power common to [all] individual…human…souls."[223] Averroes understood this to mean that as the material intellect receives forms, it cannot "contain the nature of those material forms itself," which the material intellect processes. As Gunther writes, "this one 'passive' intellect shared by the entire human species was understood as an 'ungenerated,' 'indestructable,' and 'eternal' disposition."[224] Averroes understood all of humanity as being born out of this passive, potential, material intellect. All humans have the capacity or potential to think, as all come from this passive intellect. It cannot be "numbered to the number of individuals" but must be wholly separate from matter to ensure its

[221] Aristotle and Jonathan Barnes, "De Anima," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3.4.429a.

[222] See Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect*, Ch. 7 for a fuller understanding of the role of the material intellect, as it goes outside of the scope of this writing..

[223] Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn ʾAḥmad Ibn Rušd, *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle,* trans. Richard C. Taylor with Therese-Anne Druart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 269-271. See also Sebastian Gunther, *Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas on Education* (Washington: Endmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2015), 14-16.

[224] Ibid., 15.

power for knowing universals.[225] This means that there is one soul in which all human beings partake, and it is this that allows them to know universal principles. This also means that human beings have no individual soul of their own but return to the one passive soul. At this point, humans cease to be individual, or other than.

Thomas Aquinas rejects this Averroessian concept of the one "eternal" material intellect shared by all of humanity. For if there is only a single "information-receiving-and-processing" intellect, then all people would receive the same identical "intelligible structures" of things.[226] In his *On The Teacher*, Aquinas writes on Averroes that the "educator would teach the students nothing but 'how to order' the information 'already existing' in their souls so that it becomes fit for intellectual comprehension and education."[227] For Aquinas, the issue with Averroes is similar to that of Corbin: by reducing all things to the passive material intellect, one places all cognitive function not to the potential but the passible intellect, and therefore allows for no ability to integrate with any spiritual intellect. Such a move results in the loss of the soul, the individuality of the soul to think, to make use of the intellect, and find both difference and sameness, but more important to find truth. The loss of the individuality of the soul, according to Aquinas, is the same argument proposed by Adler. Adler wants to maintain the individuality of the soul, allowing the opportunity for human beings to discover truth as found in and through social structures, one being the structure of the church, which through revelation comes to the singularity of truth as found through God.

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[225] Aquinas, *On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists*, 3.

[226] Gunther, *Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas on Education*, 15. Averroes understood the differences as experienced in humanity as coming from the individuals' histories of sense perceptions. See Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect*, Ch. 7.

[227] Gunther, *Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas on Education*, 15. Beatrice Zedler writes, “Man's highest powers, the cogitative power, imagination, and memory, have the task of preparing the sensory data that the separate intellect will utilize. So important is this highest task that man by himself can perform, that Averroes sometimes dignifies the cogitative power with the name of intellect: not possible intellect, however, but passible intellect, to designate its generable and corruptible nature.” For Averroes, the human intellect is passable, corruptible and thus separate from the universal intellect. He did not understand there to be a spiritual intellect that can be a form of the body without need of the body. See Aquinas, *On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists*, 3.

However, the manyness of truth suggests that one cohere to structure born from an absolute truth. This is why Adler believes structures are important and need to be established and maintained: the State, Country, and Religion, in its particularity, are to be upheld and maintained for their coherence to one another and to an absolute truth, and not be understood by differentiation. I say particularity because the central feature for Adler is the absolute, and larger structures therefore handle truth that should be upheld and repeated.

Adler makes a significant turn in his development with truth in the work of Averroes. His prominence in this work makes for a turn to Aquinas' mode of truth coupled with Aristotle. Corbin here marks the turn historically as the death of medieval philosophy in the West, as well as at least in the West of the Islamic world.[228] Adler's reluctance regarding Averroes's understanding of truth is his way of describing different formations of truth. In Averroes's world, truth as developed from different perspectives can be closer or farther from the divine, depending on the rigidity of the discourse. For Averroes, philosophical discourse provided (at least for himself) a deeper understanding of the world in his presence, as well as a deeper understanding of the divine order.[229] What Adler misunderstands about Averroes is his ability to see many ways to the truth, as Corbin describes in his historical development of Averroes; Averroes grounded himself in the knowledge that the Quran contains the exoteric letter, the *zahir*; but that it further contains within it the esoteric meanings (*batin*), which consist of one or more meanings. The problem is not with how truth is revealed, but rather the function of the soul in the derivation of truth in its manyness.

This lack of understanding on the part of Adler opens up a certain reality, namely that universality cannot be understood objectively but requires the development of the objective meaning itself, or its subjective side. Tom Cheetham writes that the way one thinks is an expression

[228] Henry Corbin, *The Voyage and the Messenger: Iran and Philosophy* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1998), 205.

[229] Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 245-247.

of being, and this thought is expressive of who we are, our moral and spiritual mode of being.[230] It is this particularity of being which then makes objectivity a difficult thing to realize, as objectivity would be something irrespective of the self, and the thing in itself. So our expressions are in part necessary to understand our ways of defining the thing as observed. Cheetham, writing on Corbin and Heidegger, speaks to the realization that our history of being is interwoven with language, thought, and our mode of presence.[231] Adler's work, in trying to ascertain the truth of a thing, tries to remove the self, the being, from the process of truth. In his reliance on logic, he shapes it to be the sole way of understanding the world. But from the Islamic perspective, truth is interwoven with the self, in the seeking of knowledge of the ultimate, the real. It is not distilled and separated from the self, but the self is an integral part of it.

Aquinas' understanding of Averroes, according to Corbin, is incorrect. He writes, "Averroes was not the first in Islam to say that the text of the divine Book revealed by the Prophet consists of the exoteric (*zahir*) letter, and one or more esoteric (*batin*) meanings…he knew that it was always the same truth that was present at different levels of interpretation and comprehension."[232] This parallels what Aquinas would claim concerning the senses of interpreting Christian scripture.[233]

But, in addition to the destruction of a soul that moves beyond the material self, Averroes' Aristotelian cosmology erases Avicenna's cosmology by removing the second hierarchy of Avicennian Angelology, known as the *malakut* or *Anima Caelestis*, which is the world of

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[230] Tom Cheetham, *The World Turned Inside Out: Henry Corbin and Islamic Mysticism* (Woodstock: Spring Journal Books, 2003), 46.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 245.

[233] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1.8, 1.10. Aquinas writes that everything begins from the literal sense of scripture. However there is a debate about whether a multiplicity of literal senses is available or whether from the literal sense come the mystical and spiritual senses. See Mark F. Johnson, "Another Look At the Plurality of the Literal Sense," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 2(1992). Corbin takes the approach that the text takes on the role of recital, and so is hidden behind the exoteric, in the esoteric.

autonomous Images perceived in their own right by the Active Imagination. It is situated between the pure separate Intelligence and the celestial orb. In removing this realm of beings, the space where prophets and mystics receive and authenticate their visions given is removed.[234] In addition, by the removal of this realm one also makes questionable the birth of the journey of the soul, as the soul is in part a passage into these realms. They function together. Corbin thus wants us to enter into the spiritual hermeneutics of *ta'wil*, meaning "to cause to return," to lead back to the origin.[235] It is an inner spiritual exegesis which "is symbolic, and esoteric."[236] The *ta'wil* is important for Corbin and as it ignites one's awareness of the imaginal, and brings us to another mode of perception by way of the *Mundus Imaginalis*. If one removes the soul as well as the realms, *ta'wil* becomes a technique, but nothing more.

Averroes' rejection of the *malakut*, coupled with Aquinas rejection of Averroes' understanding of the Aristotelian formation of the material Intellect, makes suspect the notion of the soul. In Averroes' case, it leaves out the birth of the soul in its progression through the imaginal realm. As Corbin writes,

> St. Thomas Aquinas gives each individual an active intellect, yet affirms that this intellect is not a 'separate' spiritual entity. He severs the direct relationship of the individual with the divine world a relationship established by Avicenna's doctrine of the active intelligence, itself identified with the Holy Spirit…Once this relationship is severed…the authority of the church takes the place of Hayy ibn Yaqzan's personal norm. Instead of the religion norm signifying liberty in the sense that it affirms an essentially individual initiation, it now becomes socialized…once socialized, this norm ceased to be religious, and veered from monotheism to monism.[237]

[234] Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 246.
[235] Ibid., 11.
[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid., 249. See also Tom Cheetham, *Green Man, Earth Angel: The Prophetic Tradition and the Battle for the Soul of the World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 95-99. for a similar critique.

The origin Henry Corbin begins to lift up here is of the relational connection between the divine world—the *malakut*—and our actual world. Corbin will reintroduce or present this idea again in his work as way of showing the necessity of the *Mundus Imaginalis*, and its function.

4.2.3 Problem of Historical Retellings

Corbin centralizes theosophy, the direct intuition, and not solely either philosophy or mysticism/theology, but maintains both in order that no particular method can fully grasp what is understood within the works of the Sufi texts. For instance, Corbin affirms that a causal historical account removes the personal aspect of what the texts intended. This is why Corbin reawakens the use of the recital, which does something particularly interesting: it forces an engagement of the reader to act in the world, to be fully present in the place of the recital.

Corbin writes and develops a hermeneutics, or phenomenology, that is spiritual, that takes from all things, but never gives priority to any tool for knowledge other than that which is given from the *Mundus Imaginalis*. Following Ibnʿ Arabī's understanding, "I only speak of what I taste," Corbin charts an Imaginal course that is a journey of his own mystical, visionary experience.[238]

Corbin's ahistorical retelling of Islamic mysticism works has been met with concern. For instance, Wasserstrom writes,

> The problem with a gnostic History of Religions is that it imposes patterns on the past that were never (demonstrably) there in order to draw lessons for a present that isn't (demonstrably) here. This ahistorical recycling, this eternal return of the same, suggests a gnosis arrogated to the historian by an a priori disgust with modernity, not by research into previous reality. The presumption of such world-rejection-as-history is insight into totality—surely an unacceptable assumption for the historian to claim. The historian lights historicity no more than the lightning bug produces lightning, to vary a phrase from Alfred North Whitehead. The light shed by historians is not nothing, but it is certainly not revelatory. At most, its lamp lights

[238] Claude Addas, *Quest for the Red Sulfur: The Life of Ibn 'Arabi,* trans. Peter Kingsley (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 10.

> an infinitesimal patch. There may be more light, but not for us historians to bestow. We are limited, fallible—not all-too-human, but human only.[239]

Although I will speak of Corbin's understanding of the necessity of gnosis in the determination of an ahistorical account of the experience of the divine and therefore religion, here I suggest that the reason for an ahistorical turn is to make present that which is not. That therefore necessitates a turn to dramaturgy, which brings the whole self to involvement, to a journey, towards a transformation of the self. This is in keeping with Wasserstrom's critique, that Corbin, among others, sought a religion after religion. He is correct that Corbin sought something more than what was found in Christian religion, among others, but that is because what was being lost in the popularization of religion is the individual search for the divine.

In his essay "The Time of Eranos," Corbin discusses briefly the notion of time. This is a reflection on the notion of "our time" as opposed to external, actual time, and therefore a critique of the role of history. The problem with actual time and the role of the historian becomes clear when he describes what the historian performs:

> The historian may suppose every kind of favorable circumstances, draw all possible conclusions, he would be merely reasoning *in vacuo* if there were not the first and signal *fact* of gnostic minds. It is the "main currents" that evoke them and bring them together; it is they that decree the existence of a particular current and bring about their own meeting.

Corbin introduces this because of the limitations within which the historian works. The historian works within an idea and within actual time itself in order to bring forth logically what happened within that event time. Yet what a historian misses is the question of what fact is. Fact is not the thing in itself, but the person in which the event becomes possible. It is the human individual, and not, according to Corbin, the "pseudodialectic of facts," which bring forth objective evidence; the

[239] Steven M. Wasserstrom, *Religion After Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin At Eranos* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 241.

reason for this is found in Corbin's argument that it is the individual in their process of individuation that allows one to imagine and explain their world around them.[240] Corbin is tackling multiple references of knowledge in this small pericope of sayings. He challenges the notion that things happen only due to physical causality, and introduces another causality, a final causality that allows one to explain as well as provide meaning, which moves beyond the scope of external causation.

The Imaginal realm that Corbin introduces pushes against actual notions of time in favor of cyclical time. His essay titled "Cyclical Time in Mazdaism and Ismailism" acquaints the reader with the development of limited time, time that is considered actual, with limitless time. Transparition, the term that allows for the transmission of light unseen, he says, affects how we see without limiting the viewing of the object beyond it, but more important, he says that time is a "plastically defined figure," which allows for what happens within the imaginal realm.[241] The imaginal realm allows for time to be molded, shaped, so as to provide an outcome with a time frame. Corbin details the formation of time from time, from infinite time to limited time, in turn to frustrate Ahriman. Although historical retellings may provide a benefit to a larger audience of readers, Corbin does not want one to forget that it is beyond the literal or exoteric reading and move one from reading to a recital.[242]

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[240] Henry Corbin, “Cyclical Time in Mazdaism and Ismailism,” in *Man and Time: Papers From the Eranos Yearbooks* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1958), xv.

[241] Ibid., 121.

[242] Wasserstrom, *Religion After Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin At Eranos*, 241. I believe Wasserstrom's critique is correct when one is looking are the broad spectrum of study in the history of religions. Nevertheless, what is always missing is what Corbin suggests, what it means for the self, which affects how critical studies are performed, amongst others.

4.3 Charting the Imaginal

These three aspects— the push against nihilism, the push against the Averroist understanding in the West, and the push against historical telling—is a reinvigoration of the soul. For the Soul to be the place of meaning-making and knowledge formation for transformation requires a world in which it takes place. The external world has elasticity; it is possible to create with the world from without, but its meaning and knowledge is an act that happens within. As such, Corbin introduces the importance of the Imaginal Realm. Three important thinkers in Islamic thought—Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Ibnʿ Arabī— develop this trajectory of his thought. There are authors, such as Chittick, who critique Corbin's analysis and emphasis on the notion of the *Mundus Imaginalis* as emphasizing too much the individuation of the soul and religions, and not emphasizing as much or more the unity of religions as espoused by Ibnʿ Arabī. He writes,

> Corbin's rhetorical flourishes and passion for his subject put his work into a unique category... [He] is concerned with his own philosophical project... Any reader of Creative Imagination soon begins to wonder where Ibn al-'Arabi ends and Corbin begins. The lines are not clear, especially if one does not have access to the Arabic texts. Certainly we come to realize the Ibn al-'Arabi is a precious larder from which all sorts of delicious vittles can be extracted. But most people familiar with the original texts would agree that Corbin has highly individual tastes.[243]

With this in mind, what is of interest to me is not solely the imaginal but how the imaginal provides space for understanding the multiplicity of religions in addition to its necessity. The multiplicity of religions doesn't speak about differences in the pejorative, but relates it to the multiplicity of the divine nature, hinting that the vastness of the divine cannot be limited to a single religion. I return to this in the discussion of Ibnʿ Arabī's work on the Divine Names.

[243] William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), xix.

4.3.1 Avicenna and Intelligences

Corbin's *History of Islamic Philosophy* provides an account of some of the Islamic philosophical schools from an esoteric perspective. It is an overview of Avicenna as a precursor to the understanding of the *Mundus Imaginalis*. Avicenna's importance becomes clear in how he formulates the theory of knowledge, which has an effect on how one understands the formation of the universe.[244] This theory is derived from the general theory of hierarchical intelligences, which takes the form of an Angelology. This lays the foundation of a cosmology and defines the place of anthropology. In other words, this theory of knowledge establishes the foundation for all of creation. It is from intelligence that creation begins. But more important is the interaction of imagination in the process of creation.

Creation begins in the process of emanation, in which the divine, in the act of thinking of itself, is the act of the first intelligence. This First Act of thinking of oneself is imbued with Creative Energy and is identified with Divine thought, ensuring a transition from "Unity to Multiplicity," a turn from the one to the many. It is from this first intelligence that the multiplicity of Being proceeds. What Corbin shows is that this cosmology, that moves from the first intelligence to the creation of multiple intelligences, also introduces a spiritual phenomenology, one that requires an awareness of spiritual consciousness in order to see the Angelic reality, a reality which contains that which is not seen within the actual world, primarily because the actual world in which we exist is but a part of the whole of reality. As Henry Corbin states,

> the first intelligence contemplates its principal; it contemplates its Principle which makes its own being necessary; it contemplates the pure possibility of its own being in itself, considered effectively as outside its principal. from its first contemplation proceeds its second intelligence; from the second contemplation precedes the moving soul of the first heaven (the sphere of spheres); from the third

[244] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (Great Britain: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1978), Ch. 12.

> contemplation precedes the etheric, Supra Elemental body of this first heaven– a body which precedes, therefore, from the inferior Dimension, the dimension of Shadow or non-being, of the first intelligence.[245]

What is important here is this progression from intelligence to intelligence, meaning that all of creation emanates from an intelligent being. It is in a triple surrounding, in which one begins with the self and then thinking upon the self creates an intelligence, the second contemplation. Reflecting or contemplating upon that instance creates the third function, which is called the non-being of the first intelligence. This shows a great deal of creativity that does not begin in the soul, but from which the soul emanates. Thought and contemplation of thought develops a hierarchy in which the universe is established in an act of love. This triple contemplation continues to proceed so that the "hierarchy of the Ten Cherubic Intelligences" is made complete. They are known as the celestial souls, or *angeli caelestes*.[246] What is key here is that the souls, although not containing or held within the senses (and thus a material form), still maintain the imagination. The senses are understood as that which allows one to feel the outside world, and in which the imagination makes symbolic reference to the intellect; in short, it connects the two together. But in this case the Celestial souls possess the imagination in a pure state. The imagination makes symbolic reference to what the souls most desire, namely "the Intelligence from which they proceed."[247]

4.3.2 Suhrawardi and the Centrality of Lights

Suhrawardi continues Avicenna's theory of knowledge, or his oriental philosophy. What he focuses on is a missing component of this philosophy, the "oriental source," which "authenticates the qualification of 'Oriental.'"[248] Oriental Philosophy, or theosophy, means a

[245] Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 170-171.
[246] Ibid., 171.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Ibid., 207.

"doctrine founded on the Presence of the philosopher at the matutinal appearance of the intelligible Lights."[249] Metaphysically, it refers to gnostic knowledge (*'irfani*) in which the Orient is "the world of the beings of Light, from which the dawn of knowledge and ecstasy rises in the pilgrim of the spirit."[250] Oriental Philosophy postulates "inner vision and mystical experience….because it originates in the Orient of pure Intelligences….an Oriental knowledge." It is "based on inner revelation (*kashf*) and mystical vision (*mushahadah*)."[251]

It is in his magnum opus, *The Theosophy of Oriental Light* (*Hikmat al-Ishraq*), that Suhrawardi set out to expound on his transformation, known as the Eternal Leaven, by conjoining the various traditions that had once possessed it: "a revived Zoroastrian philosophy of Light and Darkness and its angelology with the prophetic tradition of the Quran and the pre-Islamic traditions of wisdom handed down from Hermes and the Greeks (Pythagoras and Plato especially)."[252] Suhrawardi's main philosophical contribution is his concept of existence in terms of light. Light-being is understood as existence. In Suhrawardi's own words:

> The Essence of the First Absolute Light, God, gives constant illumination, whereby it is manifested, and it brings all things into existence, giving life to them by its rays. Everything in the world is derived from the Light of His essence and all beauty and perfection are the gift of His bounty, and to attain fully to this illumination is salvation.[253]

The centrality of light for Suhrawardi is important because of its axiomatic qualities. It continues the thought of Avicenna in the hierarchy of realities, each of which are different in the

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[249] Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 209.

[250] Henry Corbin, *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shiite Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 110.

[251] Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 209.

[252] Samir Mahmoud, "From 'Heidegger to Suhrawardi': An Introduction to the Thought of Henry Corbin." (2007): accessed July, 2017, https://www.amiscorbin.com/from-heidegger-to-suhrawardi-an-introduction-to-the-thought-of-henry-corbin/, 21.

[253] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Ibn Arabi* (Delmar: Caravan Books, 1976), 69.

degree that they possess being.[254] This movement is important, as it breaks from a solely Aristotelian system of the rational. For instance, Suhrawardi tells us that while most of "Ibn Sina's writings are devoid of any theosophical significance, there are references to the existence of a type of wisdom other than the Greeks and their discursive method."[255] Corbin may be realizing the value of Suhrawardi's input as to his insistence that there is more than one method to truth, beyond the rationale of Aristotle. Corbin's translation of Suhrawardi's work cautions against relying on the understanding of Peripatetics alone, as they misinterpret and diminish the reality of the imaginal realm. Corbin, translating Suhrawardi, writes,

> We deny the right to the Peripatetics to speak about the forms and realities which become visible to the visionary contemplatives, for what is in question is a path which scarcely any of them has followed and even in those very few cases the mystical experience remained weak and precarious. The follower of the mystical path who has received his initiation from a master with theosophical experience, or thanks to the special divine assistance which guides the solitary exile—the latter case being very rare—will fully understand that the Peripatetics have entirely overlooked two sublime universes which never figure in their discussions, and that there are a number of other things that remain beyond the scope of their philosophy.[256]

Philosophy is limited in its understanding of the universe. To elevate philosophy is to negate any way of understanding hidden things, or of the creative possibilities found in the function of the imagination.

4.3.2.1 From Intelligences to Lights

Suhrawardi rethinks the role of realities (Intelligences, Angels) based on the intensities of light. Although strange in some respects, the principle of light allows one to see the relation one

[254] Mehdi Amin Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), 78.
[255] Ibid., 50-51.
[256] Henry Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 124.

has with other things in respect to its space; for example, the Divine who is the supreme light from which we all stem from and have their relation. The Divine has the purest light, from which all derive, and our desire is to move towards that light, becoming brighter as we journey toward it. As Razavi writes, "The ordinary light that the eye can see is only one manifestation of the light of lights with a specific intensity. All things in existence are therefore various degrees and intensities of light and darkness. Darkness would then be one of ignorance, or initial pursuit, but that is only found in relation to where one is at on one's journey.[257]

In this orientation of lights, in which ecstatic visions take place, Suhrawardi introduces a fourth world, the world of the imagination, the *Mundus Imaginalis*, not to be confused with the imaginary, as a space where the archetypes are revealed, and from which reality becomes.

With this, Corbin's focus on the place of the imaginal world beginning with Suhrawardi can give us a sensitivity towards what the Imaginal realm reveals when in its presence. Suhrawardi discusses the place of the eighth climate, the *alam al-mithal*, the world of images and archetypal forms. This requires an imaginative perception to be able to grasp as well as transform these symbols and to understand their true meaning.[258] These images cannot be imprinted on the material self; for example, images cannot be imprinted within the eye, as the eye's function is not to maintain the memory of the form but to be made aware that something is there, to be the aperture by which one can see the form. He also speaks about the notion of the mirror, which does not imprint the form materially upon itself, but stands in a form of suspension. It is in the presence of the thing in front of the mirror that it is able to present its form, and yet it does not stay imprinted upon the mirror itself. In the same way, imaginative forms—or that which is in the imaginative

[257] "All lights inherently and from the point of their "light-ness" have no difference; their only difference lies in their perfection or shortcoming or matters outside their essence." Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, 79.

[258] Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth*, 127.

realm of the eighth climate—are like "bodies in suspension," not depending on a "substratum,...they certainly have places where they appear, epiphanic places (*mazahir)*, but they are not materially contained in them."[259] The active imagination is the "place of apparition of imaginative forms, but the forms themselves are "in *suspence*"; they are neither *in* this place, nor *in* the substratum."[260]

Although the body is unable to maintain the imaginative forms, they can neither exist or be maintained *in* thought, "since the great cannot be imprinted in the small, nor *in* concrete reality, otherwise anyone with normally healthy senses would be able to see them."[261] This is the case not only because of the limitations of the senses but because of the necessity of claiming that our senses move beyond what is commonly held about the bodily senses. I suggest that what Corbin is lifting up is the awareness of a sense that breaks the mode of unity and multiplicity in the awareness of other worlds. This awareness of other worlds means that they are not merely non-being, for

> if so one could neither represent them to oneself, nor distinguish them one from another, and different judgments of them could not be formed. Since they are something with real being and are neither *in* thought, nor *in* concrete reality, nor in the world of Intelligences—for they are corporealized forms, not pure intelligibles—they must necessarily exist in some other region and the latter is what is called the world of the *archetypal Image* and of *imaginative perception*.[262]

The Imaginal world is not, in the sense of image, dissimilar to what is related in prior discussions of imagination; it stands between worlds. It is an intermediate world, one between the world of the Intelligence and the world of the sense; it is more immaterial than the first, less

[259] Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth*, 127. The eighth climate is what is beyond the seven climates of the earth as found and identified by Aristotle, who divided the earth into climes. The eighth climate is what moves beyond this limitation, is not based on a separation of matter and spirit, history and myth; it is ontologically real and has concrete effects. It is characterized by its imaginative qualities and potentiality.

[260] Ibid.

[261] Ibid., 128.

[262] Ibid.

immaterial than the second. It is a world "in which there exists the totality of forms and figures, dimensions and bodies, with all that is connected therewith: movements, rest, positions, configurations, etc., all of them self-subsistent "in suspense," that is to say, not being contained in a place nor depending on a substratum."[263] The term suspense is an awkward one as it could describe something in suspended animation; and yet what remains in suspense is not the world but the self. We remain in suspense, awaiting what that world brings; we enter into a gaze, allowing the world to be, and in that being-ness, we are becoming. These forms are autonomous, imaginative forms which are not contained, or immanent with the material world; "they are independent of material matters, having their seat in the meditative faculty and in the soul's active imagination, in the sense that these two faculties are the epiphanic places where these Forms appear; undoubtedly and concretely they exist, although this does not mean that they are immanent in a substratum."[264] This establishes or necessitates a space as neither actual nor spiritual, but as a quasi or imaginative form within a subtle body.

By the act of apophasis, Corbin, in and through Suhrawardi, is able to establish the limits of the self in the actual world, and present the imaginal realm, which hints at the posture that reality is in the world of the soul and is projected outward. It is by moving toward the light of awareness that one opens up to the world.

4.3.3 Divine Names as Revelation of the Divine Being in Ibnʿ Arabī

"The world is an illusion; it has no real existence.
And this is what is meant by 'imagination'(Khayal)"

[263] Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth*, 128.
[264] Ibid., 129.

The imagination is important for Corbin, as it is the space where the divine world is realized. The importance of Ibnʿ Arabī, and where Corbin places emphasis on the difference of religions, their individuation, lies in the desire for God to know Godself in and through the manifestation of beings.[265] The recurring theme in God's becoming is due to the Divine's sadness: "I was a hidden treasure, I yearned to be known. That is why I produced creatures, in order to be known in them."[266] The sadness of the divine is due to his desire to be known. To be known is a longing, privileged only to God alone and not towards creation.

4.3.3.1 Creation as Revelation of the Divine Being, as Theophany

Creation is God's giving of God's self to be known first, and therefore all of creation is a theophany (*tajalli ilahi)*. Corbin's translation of Arabi's *The Book of the Spiritual Conquests of Mecca* explains the creation myth, and the deep relation between the material and the spiritual. Because this a theophanic reading, the physical characters of Adam, the palm tree and the seed are viewed from their archetypal aspects, introducing the theophanic imagination for the formulation of knowledge, or the revealing of what lies behind the reading itself.[267] It is in the seed that the divine lays out an immense Earth called the Celestial Earth of Hurqalya. This alternate earth is the world "where theophanies and theophanic visions take place." The Hurqualya is the imaginal world of forms within the imaginal world. But this lays the groundwork for something that is important for Corbin: that all things with their deep relation to the divine light are theophanies, the actualized material form of the divine. Corbin writes, "the initial idea of Ibnʿ Arabī's mystic theosophy and of

[265] Henry Corbin, *Alone With the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn Arabi* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 184.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth*, 136-137.

all related theosophies is that the Creation is essentially a *theophany* (*tajalli*). As such, creation is an act of the divine imaginative power…a theophanic imagination."[268]

4.3.3.2 Theophanic Imagination as Creative Imagination

This theophanic imagination that is initiated in the divine is also found within the person as the active imagination of the gnostic, as that which we create is a theophany: "The active imagination in the gnostic is likewise a theophanic imagination; the god whom it 'creates,' far from being an unreal product of our fantasy, is also a theophany, for man's active imagination is merely the organ of the absolute theophanic imagination."[269] And therefore we each represent or show something of the divine. And if we in our phenomenology are trying to find out something about ourselves, our beingness, we realize that our beingness is not wholly found in the self, but is a part of the journey toward that which we desire, found in the divine. It culminates in this epiphany: we are or carry the Divine Names and our journey towards the divine is a journey of finding the self which in part is the divine.

The task of awareness becomes key here. The awareness or initial epiphany is found in the affirmation that the reality which is claimed, the actual world, is not true reality. Our understanding is a dream, which calls for interpretation.[270] Reality has been understood as what is available to the phenomenal world, in which one perceives through the senses. From this experience one begins to delineate between things, putting them into an order according to one's understanding and reasoning. This becomes our reality and is what we call real.[271]

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[268] Corbin, *Alone With the Alone*, 182.
[269] Ibid., 182-183.
[270] Toshihiko Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 7.
[271] Ibid.

But for Arabi, this is not true reality. Arabi writes, “The world is an illusion; it has no real existence. And this is what is meant by 'imagination'(*Khayal*)”[272] This imagination is how we create an autonomous reality independent of the absolute reality. Arabi here is creating some space and distinctions concerning what we know about reality. Reality cannot be true reality if one holds to one particular ideal or worldview. It is at best an illusion; not an illusion in the sense of not being real, but in the sense of requiring some form of interpretive response. Every act we perform is an interpretive response. We are always interpreting.

The way Arabi speaks of this reality is this: “All men are asleep; only when they die do they wake up.” His saying is metaphorical in that all of humanity lives in a dreamlike state from which they awaken only when they die. The metaphor of death is not a physical death, but the beginning of the act of interpretation, where the sense and reason are removed in order to experience what lies beyond. This movement is called the mystical experience of self-annihilation' (*fana'*).[273]

One enters this reality through the Imagination. Corbin considers it a veil that both reveals and hides: "It is a veil; this veil can become so opaque as to imprison us and catch us in the trap of idolatry. But it can also become increasingly transparent, for its sole purpose is to enable the mystic to gain knowledge of being as it is, that is to say, the knowledge that delivers, because it is the gnosis of salvation."[274]

The sigh of the divine upon the exhale gives rise to the entire "subtle" mass of a primordial existentiation termed the Cloud ('ama). This cloud, which the Divine Being exhaled and in which He originally was, receives all forms and at the same time gives beings their forms; it is active and passive. There is a deep relation to the Divine that should be realized in Arabi's writing, of which

[272] Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism*, 7.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Corbin, *Alone With the Alone*, 187.

Corbin wants one to become aware. That the Divine is revealed because the divine desires to be known, to know itself, and that to know oneself is to create: that is the divine's theophany—to create. Corbin writes,

> The Creature-Creator, the Creator who does not produce His creation outside Him, but in a manner of speaking clothes Himself in it as the Appearance (and transparency) beneath which He manifests and reveals Himself first of all to Himself, is referred to by several other names, such as the "imagined God," that is, the God "manifested" by the theophanic Imagination…, the "God created in the "faiths."[275]

In the Divine's desire to know Himself (thus maintaining the notion of person as critical to maintain) God performs an act, a sigh which is an act of creation, a logos, a word, a primordial beginning. But what comes forth is but one aspect of the divine self, that is not only spiritual but also material, a spiritual materiality. In turn, the gnostic or active imagination is the space in which the theophanic/creative imagination is revealed. Our imagination is "Imagination in His Imagination."[276] Arabi's Imaginal Realm for Corbin becomes an imaginatrix, which is conjoining without deforming the theophany into other names. Thus the entryway to the imaginal realm is not found within the faculty of the mind; it cannot be. If the imaginal realm is to be taken into account, it cannot be only an intellectual endeavor, an endeavor of just the mind. Rather, it is the endeavor of the whole self, and finds not only knowledge as knowledge, but knowledge that is transformational.[277] To rely solely on the faculty of the mind would make what is derived imaginary, what Ibnʿ Arabī identifies as the estimative faculty (*wahm*). Ibnʿ Arabī also speaks of the inner and outer meaning of the term *khayal*, rendered as imagination. The outer imagination is

[275] Corbin, *Alone With the Alone*, 187.

[276] Ibid., 191. This echoes Whitehead's understanding of the Divine as the chief exemplification of the laws of the universe, which is also telling that God cannot be understood is rational being, but that the divine's becoming is an aesthetic becoming.

[277] Difference between the *muttasil* imagination, an innate part of the human condition, and the *munfasil imaginalis* of the *Malakut*. The union of these two is the Absolute Imagination. Henry Corbin, "The Theory of Visionary Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy," *Nouvelles de l'lnstitut Catholique de Paris* No. 1(1977): 233.

“in the ordinary sense of a 'tangible reality' which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical.” By this he means that what is experienced by the senses is representation; it takes whatever can be sensed and re-presents it in the mind for use.

The inner meaning, although taking this into account, includes another process: it solidifies objects into spatiality itself.[278] This means that in the world of the tangible, of the senses, we bring into that which is not seen as of yet; we make space for that which cannot be seen. This entails an imbuing of meaning in the experience of the space we are intuiting, creating at that moment an imaginal logic that develops deeper meaning in the world. Meaning too is shifted from that which is allied to the thing in itself to that which is inescapable to the experience itself.

The organ of the heart and its concentration (*himma)* creates something that moves outside or beyond the faculty of the mind.[279] Therefore it is not illusory fiction or of hallucination. Rather, the heart in its function unites and makes each one interdependent with the other. This interdependence transforms or transmits us to the imaginal space, where actual and virtual, or material and spiritual coincide together, without limit.

This inescapability from the experience introduces the question of event. One cannot be removed from the process of the experience, as the experience is only made possible through being present. This is what Corbin describes as the transforming nature of experience. It cannot be decoupled from the thing being analyzed, but then this describes something else. Since there is a transformation that is happening at each moment, for the self there can be nothing other than imaginative thinking within experience, as the self is in the state of transformation, and thus within process.

[278] Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth*, 80.
[279] Corbin, *Alone With the Alone*, 222.

4.4 Culminations Of The Imaginal In Corbin's Thought And Its Influence On The Difference Of Religions

From this brief historical perspective of the trinity of thinkers in Corbin's discussions on the *Mundus Imaginalis*, I would like to turn back and lift up important aspects not of the space of the imagination, but of the "critical" aspects, the way by which one is able to comprehend when one has arrived at the space. In other words, what are the criteria and limits, the modes of knowledge that are necessary to realize the *Mundus Imaginalis*?[280]

4.4.1 Knowing Through Presence

Corbin's critique of western thought is that it has lost the spiritual hermeneutics and replaced it with the rational in its attempts to derive knowledge. This knowledge can come by way of presence or presencing. There is a fundamental disassociation of the world and the self in Western thought, and particularly in the field of science. Although necessarily so, its focus leads to a utilitarian sense as opposed to a relational sense. Language becomes important because when a translation is used, the terms change, and in Corbin's case there is a move away from the original intention of Shiite philosophy concerning the notion of presence.[281] For instance the words "exist" and "essence" have been separated from being itself, the whole, so that the argument now becomes: Does a person have existence first, or is one's essence primary? It creates a dichotomy when there should not be one; rather, these terms show two sides of being so that there are different characteristics at play in each. By dealing with the copulative words in *ex-sistere*, in which *ex*=

[280] Corbin does speak of other scholars of thought, but these three are the focus of my thought on Corbin's *Mundus Imaginalis*. He does speak of Emanuel Swedenborg, who is another such person of whom Corbin speaks from in reviving and revealing a spiritual hermeneutics. See Henry Corbin, *Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,* trans. Leonard Fox (West Chester: Swedenborg Foundation, 1995).

[281] Corbin, *The Voyage and the Messenger: Iran and Philosophy*, 207.

out, *sistere*=to stand, it refers back to the origin from which *sistere* comes.[282] Corbin critiques Western philosophy because logical judgements have taken over the term/word, instead of the term emanating from "to be." No longer does being create the starting point; the logical argument of the word itself does. Being loses its processual state of inward/outward flows and becomes an actuality to observe.

This is what Corbin is arguing against. In the Arabic language, the distinction between outward and inward is purely conceptual. Corbin writes, "The Arabic words used to designate the action to be, to exist (*wujud*, Latin *esse*), and that of being, existing (*mawjud*, Latin *ens*) cannot give rise to the same semantic vicissitudes as in the modern Western vocabulary…[it is] never used to express the copula of a logical judgment."[283] This breaking down of the thing in itself to a linear, inward/outward, what is more real and less real, is in itself conceptual. The beingness of the thing itself is that which is. More important, the thing in itself is not the most real thing but is part of a manyness that makes up the being/becoming in itself. One cannot be reduced to a substance, or to an analysis from one perspective. The way in which we see and understand, how we think, is a mode of expression of being, *wujud*.

Corbin reinstitutes the understanding of symbol as pertinent to the rise of the imagination. He speaks to this when discussing the Divine Names of God. In response to the multiplicity of names, he writes: "if you say that a certain form is God, you are homologating that form," indicating a confession, an agreement to that understanding of the Divine, as a manifestation of the divine in that form. However, there is another component: "if you say that it is something else,

[282] Corbin, *The Voyage and the Messenger: Iran and Philosophy*, 207. The word copulative is here used purposely to blur the function of these connecting words, both spiritual and material, so that it is not neither/nor but both/and, and cannot be neatly identified as being cerebral alone.

[283] Ibid., 208. Corbin also introduces a situation which highlights the act of a being, al-*wujud mawjud*, which leads to an interesting insight: that the being is an actual becoming, that being acts; yet in that moment I wonder if that suggests a becoming rather than an act of being, a state where the self is bother rendered and in the process of rendering.

something other than God, you are interpreting it."[284] In a play of cataphatic and apophatic realization, the form both reveals the divine, and at the same reveals its symbolic nature, creating a space between the symbol itself and the reality of the divine that the symbol is expressing.

This revealed being is what Corbin calls the theophanic imagination. This is the oft forgotten side of beingness to which Corbin returns us. This theopanic imagination is what reveals the divine above in both its homologatic form as well as its interpretive form. But more important, the imagination holds the two together, manifesting in a symbol that realizes both in a way that is metaphorical or useful to the self. This is where dreams become an important aspect of the imagination. Ibnʿ Arabī quotes Muhammed, "All men are asleep and when they die they will awake."[285] The access to the divine can only be found within the presence of the Imagination, through which one derives the images necessary for understanding.

4.4.1.2 Orienting Through Difference

Corbin uses the notion of orientation, meaning situating oneself in a place, to have presence. This presence thus is an orientation of how one sees the world. Corbin writes, "orientation is a primary phenomenon of our presence in the world." But what situates us is not dependent on a presumed objective into which we fit, but rather "upon the status of the presence that we adopt, usually unconsciously."[286] Corbin seeks to return control of self at a time at which that is being reduced to causes that are more manipulative and come with a loss of the relational aspect of personhood. If personhood is of importance, then there are certain aspects of personhood, of relationality that must be maintained in order for it to survive. Any reductionism serves to

[284] Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi*, 207.

[285] Ibn al-Arabi and R. W. J. Austin, *The Bezels of Wisdom* (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 196-197. Ibnʿ Arabī interprets this quote to mean that "everything a man sees in this life is of the same kind as that which one sleeping sees; in other words an apparition that requires interpretation."

[286] Cheetham, *The World Turned Inside Out*, 6.

remove complexity, and complexity, in a non-linear sense, is necessary for the introduction of the imaginal realm.

What Corbin is trying to slow down is what he argues is the prey of agnosticism, which finds its end in nihilism, losing the capacity to achieve different modes of being, and orienting oneself back to the eternal.[287] The imaginal realm is the space between actual and divine, between the world in which we exist in our actuality, and the world of worlds which bring us deeper to our true selves, the deep relations we have with the divine and with others. Thus in his *Paradox of Monotheism* he introduces the concept of theomonism, and the necessity of right pursuit, which can be found in and through the imaginal world, a form of visionary knowledge that makes us respond in this world in social and ethical transformation of the idea of any pluralism. This theomonism emerges out of the ebb and flow of integration and difference, as he relates to the image of mirrors.[288] This image of mirrors is important as it allows one initially to see oneself as a reflection of the one (candle), but as one begins to move beyond the self, to turn to the left, or the right, one sees a multiplicity of mirrors.[289] Corbin is careful to detail the limitations of holding to one rather than the other, to hold on to either difference or integration. To hold onto difference is to see that there is no relationality to the one, to the unity. To hold onto integration is to say that all are one, and that the differences are trivial, that all becomes relative. What Corbin proposes is the integration of the integration, to see all mirrors in its difference, while seeing the candle. This requires a change of perspective. And this moves from a horizontal to a vertical, then topographical

[287] Cheetham, *The World Turned Inside Out*, 10.

[288] In my prior chapter on the imagination John Sallis uses the notion of mirrors to also speak of the play, the ability to show something. Here Corbin is showing, but there is no play; there is just the realization and expansion of knowledge.

[289] In the actual image, there are only a certain number of mirrors realized. This is so to speak of the religions in the space, with the last, Islam as the most perfect realization. However, because Corbin introduces something beyond even what is held in Islamic sufism, a system that allows for a plurality of religions, the religion of the individual person, it would not be hard to argue for a multiplicity of mirrors, or the mirrors signifying a plurality through the different systems.

understanding, as in developing cartography. As cartographies are maps, general maps so one sees the big picture, we can also argue here that what Corbin is trying to show is the necessity of mapping our worlds to see how each shapes our understanding of the divine as well as layering one with another to animate the expressions of the maps of the soul as diffractive. This would still not be a universal, but an imaginative understanding of what is being realized, as it still holds to what the individual sees. This showing through the self, the internal self, is of vast importance, as it also relates back to the understanding of the divine names of God. Each name, in its uniqueness, creates difference, creates the vast multiplicity in understanding, and thus creates the cartographic expression we employ.

This is a bold move by Henry Corbin; that it is within the inner self that one finds what is truly real. In science we only hold to the linear, the verifiable, the historical. And it is only through these that we decide. But this is where we can see that there is a loss of value, of spirit, of being/becoming-ness. For Corbin, to be a human being, to be conscious, not only means the cognitive functions that happen within the mind but what happens within the soul.

4.4.2 On Gnosis

Corbin writes that the texts of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Ibnʿ Arabī are recitals, which reveal to us the drama that is happening in heaven. However, we cannot see this through eyes of the flesh but through eyes of fire, referencing a passage in 2 Kings that Elijah's eyes are opened. This opening of eyes is a turn from flesh to eyes of fire.

To talk about eyes of fire, we have to talk about gnosis. Corbin challenges the historically held notion of Gnosticism and the troubles that come with it. He ignores that (this falls in line with his problem with reductionistic categories) and goes straight to the understanding of gnosis as

symbolic. Gnosis is a mode of knowledge, and this mode of knowledge affects the inner transformation of man.[290] In Islamic gnosis, there are three modes of knowledge: intellective knowledge ('agl); knowledge of traditional ideas that are objects of faith (*nagl*); and knowledge as inner vision or intuitive revelation (*kashf*).[291] The gnosis Corbin is highlighting here is the inner vision of gnosis, and its expression is found in narrative, in the form of a recital. This is why it is also held in the realm of the *Mundus Imaginalis*. It is more than an image, but a moving image, of an interaction between the self in the relation with the worlds as realized in the inner vision.

But recital is much more engaging than just reading a text and being informed internally. The reading of the recital is a reading and engagement in such a way as to be transformed. And this for Corbin is important. It is not enough that one is reading knowledge for knowledge's sake, but that one is internally, and thus externally, transformed. It has significance beyond the external reality, which is barren without some internal understanding.

Our theme affirms and presupposes that gnosis sees things with eyes of fire; that is to say that it perceives what is invisible to scientific scrutiny, something whose perception usually seems outrageous to the eyes of the flesh. This is already enough to protect us from the misuse of the word “gnosis” on the part of some modern scholars, even scholars who are reputed to be serious. One has no scientific or moral right to apply this word to what is precisely its opposite any more than one has the right to confuse a “theosophy” that explores the mystery of origins rooted in the hidden God with an “ideology” when this would be the last thing with which what nowadays is called an “ideology” would concern itself.

For Corbin, the spiritual imagination is of vast importance, and to negate it is to reduce the person merely to an aspect of causal events that can be manipulated to the benefit of one who has

[290] Henry Corbin, “Eyes of Flesh, Eyes of Fire: Science and Gnosis.” *Material for Thought* 8 (1979): http://www.farwesteditions.com/mft/EyesOfFire.htm.

[291] Ibid.

power, and that power is that of science or the scientific. This overlooks an entire history of the past which is not past, of that which is a-historical, based on a time that is not linear but mythical—the timeless which incorporates within it a passage of time. It decenters time as found in physics, and allows one to control what is possible, to find meaning, to make sense of the world around one.

The central question Corbin asks is ontological; it is one of being. But in order to answer this, he posits that the imaginal is of utmost importance, that to forget it is to remove a deep relationality between things divine and things actual.

4.4.3 Dramaturgy and Entrance to the Imaginal

What Averroes and Aquinas consider important—the soul—is of the same importance for Henry Corbin in his own work. Aquinas maintains the relevance and uniqueness of the soul in the human, but Averroes portrays the soul as that which returns to the Universal, thus the loss of any individual soul to the universal. In Averroes, we see a movement from the many to the one, or the loss of the individual soul in its manyness to a return to the one soul, the universal soul. Corbin, like Aquinas, is arguing a similar battle, the loss of the soul to the reductionistic program of causality, which reduces the self to impersonal forces that progress us "blindly" to our fate, and so remove any trace of what it means to be a person. The question to ponder then is: How does Corbin define a person and what makes the *Mundus Imaginalis* so important?

For Corbin, the quest of becoming human, of becoming conscious, is not to be held in the space of philosophy or science, but in the space of "a dramaturgy."[292] Prior to entering into Corbin's understanding, I want to reference Katherine Profeta's work on dramaturgy as a

[292] Katherine Profeta, *Dramaturgy in Motion: At Work on Dance and Movement Performance* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 3.

> proprietary structure of a single play or a body of work. We might intuit that it points to the skeleton of the work—my preferred metaphor since it refers to a structure that is both weight-bearing and enabling of motion and articulation. The skeleton remains after allegedly less essential components are removed, and yet is still particular to the organism it held up, not so generalized as to claim universality…Dramaturgy includes but then extends beyond the text as structure: 'Shakespeare's dramaturgy' is a skeleton found on both page and stage, concerning both how the play was written and how it was meant to be performed.[293]

This passage from Profeta fits well in describing Corbin's use of the term dramaturgy. For Corbin, the texts of Avicenna and Suhrawardi are recitals, both on page (as text) and as invitation to the stage of the inner world. The person entering in, at the disposal of the lure of the divine, acts as the dramaturg, to apply the "knowledge and abilities to the conversion of" the world outside oneself, to invest life into the world.[294] In the dramaturgy, the dramaturg moves from the actual to the world as symbolic, through movement and action, in order that meaning may be imbued in the world. Thus the person as dramaturg opens up to a dialectical process between the actual world and the world of the recital. The dramaturg dissects and builds, de/constructing old forms or ways of knowing in which the spiritual and physical, the internal and external play a role in the development of understanding in the world.[295]

Thus the human as a becoming person is held as a symbol maker or interpreter, one pivotal in making sense in the world, primarily (in Corbin's understanding) to make known the Divine so as to show the Divine Names, and accidentally in so doing to discover who we are in this cosmos. The dramaturg becomes a liminal space in which things past and future become present, and in our process of becoming we stand in suspense in the discovery of meaning.

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[293] Profeta, *Dramaturgy in Motion*, 3.

[294] Ibid., 5.

[295] Ibid., 6,9. The "Dramaturg threatens to fall into the same pattern, if we understand his relationship to the Philosopher as a commitment to create practical solutions that serve a narrowly constructed political philosophy, rather than (in the more generous interpretation of Epic theater) to open up a dialectical process." Ibid., 7.

Recitals, then, are the entryway to the imaginal realm, the *Mundus Imaginalis*. And this is an interaction between the texts not solely in their exoteric role, but in their esoteric role: to be engaged in a manner that is not critical but one of presence, one of being, of being there.

4.4.4 Imagination as Space, the 'Alam al-mithal

In *Celestial Earth*, Corbin grounds his findings on translations of commentaries on the *Fusus Al-Hikam*. The *Da'ud Qaysari* translation develops the *Mundus archetypes*, which is also known as the *Al-alam Mithali*, the world of Archetypal images. It argues that it is a spiritual universe, one that has an affinity with the material universe.[296] Nevertheless, it is different from the material universe in that it also has an affinity with a separate intelligible universe in which its nature is one of pure light. The material universe and its counterpart or pole each have limits, and these limits necessitate the Imaginal world, the inter-world, which separates the one from the other. This is the difference, the inter-world, between one and the other.

Corbin goes to great lengths in detailing this world, so as to not lose sight of the importance of its role. The imaginal world is not a fantastical world, nor is it an accidental world. It is not created in the sense that it is due to the creation of images or of finding meaning of the objects themselves. These forms exist in each particular universe and are the base objects for that universe, meaning that they cannot be replicated or understood outside of it. The universes, as Ibnʿ Arabī writes, are known by Avicenna as Intelligences.[297] There can be no direct relation of one thing in one world and its direct counterpart within another world. Although the substantial form exists, its meanings can only be realized in that particular space, and therefore it is critical to note that it is

[296] Corbin, *Celestial Body and Celestial Earth*, 144.
[297] Ibid., 144-145.

the multiple realities that are important, not a single one, and moreover no unified one in the sense of all in one.

When trying to understand something, we create a world in which the mode of being in that presence is realized. This space is not controlled by quantitative space or quantitative time, but rather a qualitative, discontinuous space. This space is the event of souls. The imagination is therefore the receptacle, the womb "which partakes of the intelligible [but] is yet incomprehensible."[298] The receptacle is a spiritual condensation, a world of visionary events.[299]

Corbin in his text *Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam* initiates a discussion on the problem of the use of the word *imaginary.* As described in the prior chapter on Deleuze, the imagination is moved to the notion of imaginary, which is now devoid of a place where truth can reside and refers to pure fantasy. For Corbin, the imaginary is equivalent to signifying the unreal, something that remains outside of being and existence, something utopian. This is why he uses the Latin term *Mundus Imaginalis*. This term is different from the term imaginary as the two words coupled together initiate a different thought process and bring to mind a different consciousness of being, that of the imaginative consciousness and the cognitive imagination. This *Mundus Imaginalis* is what the theosophists of Islam consider to be the eighth climate. The eighth climate is understood as the land of "no-where." It does not mean utopian or Utopia; indeed, it is quite different from that. The term *Nakoja-abad* signifies the city, the country, or the land of no-where, which is not within any actual space but in the imaginal space, and that imaginal space can only be entered into through gnosis and dramaturgy, as noted earlier.

When Corbin speaks of the no-where and refers to it as the being beyond the mountain of *Qaf,* he is not referring to a particular or special location, time, and place but is relying on a

[298] Cheetham, *The World Turned Inside Out*, 66-67.
[299] Ibid., 67.

theosophical tradition as found in Sufi mysticism in which that mountain represents the sphere of spheres, or the ninth sphere, which includes the whole of the cosmos. This imaginal realm begins when we leave the place of the senses, but maybe even more so when we leave the limitations of our sensory experience, so that the question of where it is located or from where I depart loses its meaning. For Corbin to enter into the space is to enter into the interior or pass into the interior of finding oneself outside once again, which speaks of being on the convex surface or the inner portion of a lens. This convex surface of the lens is the internal, the invisible, what is known as the esoteric.[300] So to depart from the where is to leave the external or natural appearances that include the hidden internal realities. John Sallis also speaks of this as being about when we enter into the imagination and in its enveloping of us we enter it into its internal space where we begin to see its internal realities beneath the shell and even so still do not fully realize its internal realities. As Corbin writes, "Once this transition is accomplished, it turns out that henceforth this reality, previously internal as Hidden, is revealed to be enveloping, surrounding, containing what was first of all external and visible, since by means of interiorization, one has departed from that external reality."[301] Corbin wants to save what is important: the interiorization of things and that which is hidden, as that is what makes or brings reality to that which is material. So this spiritual reality, as Corbin argues, is not within a specific location, but that specific location is within spiritual reality. It is in the internalized spiritual reality that All Things become: it is not a place, it is not a where; its place is no-where. This is what makes the guideposts and the locations as found in the imaginal representations of writers such as Ibnʿ Arabī important: they are symbolic in nature and signify things. This also speaks to the aspect of the Divine Names: that the expression in ourselves, that

[300] Corbin, *Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam*, 6-7.
[301] Cheetham, *Green Man, Earth Angel: The Prophetic Tradition and the Battle for the Soul of the World*, 6.

the reading of this text as recital as we are engaging ourselves as social animals, highlights Derrida's notion of writing (and reading) as drama.[302]

"The notion of the imagination, magical intermediary between thought and being, incarnation of thought in image and presence, of the image in being, is a conception of the utmost importance."[303] In so saying, Corbin reminds us of the necessity of the imagination as an important part, the creative action; it is "magical" in its form of creative activity, its ability to produce an image that brings to fruition some creative action. But the image also becomes a body, which houses the thought and the soul.[304]

4.5 Conclusions

In looking at how Corbin understands these three Sufi thinkers in Islamic thought, what we see are three things that are important to understanding the function of the imaginal realm. First, the imaginal realm is a space in which the dramaturgy unfolds, and one is called to journey within it. Not only is the recital happening, but one is called to partake in it. We are in turn a part of this dramaturgy. Second, without the *Mundus Imaginalis*, it would be impossible to see reality, and by reality I mean the space in which understanding is unfolded, made known, and enfolded so that in

[302] In Sarah Wood, *Derrida's Writing and Difference: A Reader's Guide* (London: Continuum, 2009), 114-115. Sarah Wood works through Derrida's text and notes that in the act of writing, we must be several, and because of this, the terms used become "supplementary mediations that produce the sense of the very thing they defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence, of originary perception.' This means that the divine names that are formed through the *mundus imaginalis* are not and cannot be understood in the context solely of the divine and self, but in the triangulation of the divine, others, and self. This in turn goes against the logocentric modes of science, the movement of idealization, "an algebrizing, de-poetizing formalization whose operation is to repress-in order to master it better-the charged signifier or the linked hieroglyph." Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 284-285.

[303] Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi*, 179.

[304] Ibid. The image itself is a space for the introduction of the birth of an idea, a body, whether magical or mental, where possibilities may form. At first glance this may be contrary to what Deleuze is claiming in the image of thought, but I would disagree. The image of thought is an image which contains a singular form of thought. In Corbin's case it is not. The Image is a unique manifestation, containing the "thought and will of the soul." And it is not the same, since, as I hope to express, that the divine also imagines, and therefore there can never be the same thought and will in each derivation of the names, but an aim hoping for its culmination, and thus novelty.

the actual world one is able to proceed in abundant knowledge. The reintroduction of the imaginal is similar to Sallis' gazing, in which time shifts and one allows the thing in itself to become, to make it known. But third, the imaginal realm introduces a certain reality, that of multiplicity and transformation. The multiplicity of the intelligences, through the recitals as kingdoms by which one journeys, causes one to admit the necessity of logics, and an exorbitant logic that allows imagination as its development. Imagination is central to any logic. This is pivotal. This shows that the removal of the imagination from logic introduces ideals sans spirituality or more important, meaning. It seeks to produce the ideal, without realizing that the imaginal is an aspect of its own development within logic; it is only because it engages with other logics, kingdoms, and intelligences that it is what it is.

Adler's mode of thinking about the individuality of the souls while holding to a unity of truth—a singularity of truth found in religion, the sciences, etc.— lays out the problem of the multiplicity of truths. In the example given in my first chapter, writing within the framework of J.S. Mills, to be a truth, something must be accepted by a majority of persons. He goes from the external experience of accepted truth to what is understood in revelation and reason as the singularity of truth. What is missing is an imaginative realization that revelation does not ultimately lead to reasoning, but rather imaginative reasoning that promotes vision. It is, I think, a "prior to," in order that one can move from the actual to the speculative. But this experience is not only for the few but for everyone. It is a democratic experiencing, one in which each person's understanding must be given in order that an image, through composition, through contrast, can arise. Adler's understanding of the soul stays within the midst of a Christian understanding, and the soul is saved, not in Christ, but in Christ through the church.

What Corbin's imagination makes possible is the individuation of the soul, in which the soul maintains a relational connection with the divine. Through the idea of the mirror or the veil,

there is a lifting of the veil, or the repositioning of the mirror to glimpse the other mirrors available, which all point to the light in the center. The individuation of souls, the individuation of religions, allows for the multiplicity of journeys towards the divine. Thus there is both a pluralism as well as unity of religions that can only be found through the imagination.

> In the days of my youth, I met a shaykh who was a man of great mystic science, a *malamati* shaykh, whose true face was unperceived by the mass of mankind. One night, I was contemplating a vast plain in the plains of Mystery when suddenly, on the approaches to that plain, I saw God in the guise of that shaykh. As I came up to him, he made a sign to me, showing me another plain. I advanced towards this plain and I saw a similar shaykh and again the shaykh was God. He made another sign, showing me another plain, and so on, until he had disclosed seventy thousand plains to me, and each time a plain drew nearer, I saw a figure similar to the one I had seen first. I said to myself: And yet, God the Most High is unique, one, indivisible, transcending (*monazzah*) small or large numbers, along with equals, contraries and similars. Then I was told: such are the theophanies of the eternal Attributes, they are boundless. At that moment, I felt the gripping presence of the esoteric realities of *tawhid* from the sea of Magnificence.[305]

So if the divine uses the imagination as a way of revealing something to the self, both to God's self and ourselves, then there is a place for Imagination that is not hierarchically diminished, but is given place in the process of life as life. And this gives us the power to create, as exemplified by the divine: "On both sides we encounter the idea that the Godhead possesses the power of Imagination, and that by imagining the universe God created it."[306] The imagination then is powerfully able to form how we think and what we think; "this is the world over which the Imagination holds sway; that in it the Imagination produces effects so real that they can "mold" the imagining subject, and that the Imagination "casts" man in the form (the mental body) that he has imagined."[307]

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[305] Henry Corbin, "The Jasmine of the Fedeli D'amore: A Discourse on Ruzbehan Baqli of Shiraz," *Sphinx 3: A Journal of Archetypal Psychology and the Arts* 3(1990): 212-213.

[306] Corbin, *Alone With the Alone*, 182.

[307] Ibid.

Both in thinking of the Imagination and thinking about how it speaks to religious pluralism, the question becomes one of origins and being. Corbin holds to a particular creation account that gives rise to his own work but in reality does not help hierarchizing religion. His reliance on origin, right origin, or right orientation, although helpful, still means that any other origin is attenuated. The mirrors are an interesting image, but they are an image that maintains at its center the candle. What if we were to maintain the mirror for symbolization, attaining some grasp of the reality yet not fully? This would then suggest that anything can be a symbol or signifier. Beginnings would then help define things, meanings, but would not necessarily be the origins of things.[308]

[308] Catherine Keller, *Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming* (New York: Routledge, 2003), xv.

Chapter 5: Process Imagination and the Opening of Religious Pluralism

Imagination cannot be acquired once and for all, and then kept indefinitely in an ice box to be produced periodically in stated quantities. The learned and imaginative life is a way of living, and is not an article of commerce.[309]

The opening quotation specifies what I maintain: that imagination is a way of living, and not a device or function by which to bring across a truth through narrative. To limit imagination to the scope of narration is to invalidate its potential to build knowledge, to pursue meaning for one's own, as well as transcending outward to others, as holding to Whitehead's understanding of the adventure of ideas. To this point, I have been looking at the methodology of scholars who have understood the imagination as a primary resource for any novelty, or, said differently, as the primary resource in the production of ideas or the development of one's creativity. A fresh set of ideas is necessary in order that the ideas themselves do not become commonplace and thus stagnant. This is what Alfred North Whitehead sought in his process thought —for the development of ideas to be a pursuit of adventure.[310] His instruction on philosophy is akin to mysticism. Whitehead writes, "Mysticism is direct insight into depths as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism."[311] The pursuit of mysticism is to peer into the background of all things to gain insight. Mysticism is an appearance of the whole in an instant. And yet to articulate this intuition of the instant requires first expression, then some way of making sense of our intuition in connection to the experiences we already have of the actual world. This

[309] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education: And Other Essays*, 102.
[310] Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 174.
[311] Ibid.

is a complex expression of experience, a history of what has been understood before now, and a novel understanding of the two. In other words, we integrate ourselves in the process.[312]

All of this suggests a creative imagination. However, how Whitehead develops the activity of the imagination (which I argue is articulated through the action of creativity) is quite different from notions of the imagination as understood by Adler, who relegates imagination solely to the process of narrative myth. Whitehead's philosophy of organism rejects hierarchy and negation for a relational metaphysics that holds all things as necessary. Any thought that does not take into account every other actual occasion, which is Whitehead's understanding of the only real things and which cause all things in the actual world, is an abstraction.[313] Imagination is therefore an integral process of actualization in the world. But more than this, there is the suggestion that in process, we always begin, work with in the midst, and end, with imagination.

According to Randall E. Auxier, Whitehead never fully defines imagination.[314] And yet Whitehead speaks of speculation, of the necessity of imaginative generalization for there to be novelty and new expression of ideas. Imagination is an ever-present yet always elusive aspect that envelops all things and cannot simply be given a place alongside modern notions of myth. Instead, imagination is the space where potential and possibility manifest themselves. The imagination is the place of becoming, in which the actual occasion in its construction is imaginative in its free or limited capacity. It cannot be contained in the icebox of knowledge but must be sought for and is a requirement for every novel becoming.

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[312] Bachelard attends to this in saying that we do not create the complex, but rather we participate in and with the complex. He has a similar understanding to Alfred North Whitehead's understanding of eternal objects, in which it is characterized when engaging with the fact. See Gaston BachelardRobert S. Dupree and James Hillman, *Lautréamont* (Dallas: Dallas Institute Publications, Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1986), pages. and Alfred North Whitehead, “Immortality,” in *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1948).

[313] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 24.: "actual occasions are the only *reasons*; so that to search for a *reason* is to search for one or more actual entities." This is what Whitehead terms the ontological principle.

[314] Whitehead, *Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures 1926*, 199.

What this leads to is an understanding that all things—even what we term God—imagine. This has already been established in the prior chapter on Corbin, that God imagines so that it may know itself in the form of divine names. This gives some weight to what Whitehead writes concerning the difference of God: "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification." In short, God is not an exemption to what we understand of the universe but is the exemplification of it. If God is the exemplifier of the universe in all of its acts, then the divine one who creates also imagines. And if God imagines, then any one system would be inadequate to understand the all-divine, and the Divine's own becoming; we are partakers of the Divine's knowledge of itself.

In order to awaken this form of thinking, Whitehead establishes key differences in his work. The focus of this chapter is to highlight what I argue are key aspects that introduce the creative and constructive modes of actual occasions, of which God is its chief exemplification. I begin with what is consistent throughout his work, that of mutual immanence. This then leads to the other aspects of his work, the movement from logic to creativity. This ultimately reshapes how we perceive the world. Any movement towards truth is a movement of interdependence and thus creativity in the world we shape. This leads to the realization that to imagine is to have a certain freedom as to the outcome of its realization and actualization in the world. What remains is then not a movement towards sameness, but towards difference and truthfulness. When returning back to the argument of religious pluralism, although each group may hold their unique differences as it pertains to the understanding of the divine, in the theological study they would have to open to the imaginative inquiry of the multiplicity of religions, as both mutual immanence and creativity are key signatures of every aspect of our becoming. It is only in difference that they can progress into deeper truth. But to do this their needs to be the realization of the thought that all things are inter-related.

5.1 Mutual Immanence

In *Cloud of the Impossible*, Catherine Keller speaks of the doubling of an image in the mirror as an enigma. This is interesting to us here because it both accepts what Adler calls a commonsense (That which I see before me is a chair) and it also obscures it (How does one truly know that that which I see before me is actually a chair? What if on further investigation, with a change of perspective, something new is revealed?). The image that I see and that which is made are representation and differentiation. Keller writes, "Nothing knowable comes constructed *ex nihilo*, void of context. If something is known at all, it cannot be absolved of relation; therefore nothing is known ab-solutely…Each is what it is only in relation to its others. To know another is to participate in the construction of that other within the mirror play of a shared context."[315] This is critical to note, because of three things: first, because relationality cannot be absolved from knowing; second, because knowledge cannot be created out of no-thing; and third, because there is a mirror play of a shared context. This inescapable connectivity is critical in understanding the idea behind Whitehead's mutual immanence, that all things have some relation to one another.

Mutual immanence is the understanding that 1) nothing is known outside of relation; and that 2) all things are related to one another in some aspect. Critical for Whitehead's work, mutual immanence leaves open possibility, so that judgment becomes deferred. It, like the imagination, continues to take in and produce the new, knowing that it is not quite the response, or the real.[316] In a more complex but important understanding, Whitehead writes that,

> The general common function exhibited by any group of actual occasions [however] is that of mutual immanence. … If the group be considered merely in

[315] Catherine Keller, *Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 20.

[316] Roland Faber, "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," in *Beyond Metaphysics?: Explorations in Alfred North Whitehead's Late Thought*, ed. Roland Faber, Brian G. Henning, and Clinton. Combs (New York: Rodopi, 2010), 103.

> respect to this basic property of mutual immanence, however otherwise lacking in common relevance, then—conceived as exemplifying this general connectedness—the group is termed a Nexus. Thus the term Nexus does not presuppose any special type of order, nor does it presuppose any order at all pervading its members other than the general metaphysical obligation of mutual immanence.[317]

In stating that in its most basic sense the property of mutual immanence in a group is termed a nexus is to imply that it is akin to Plato's *khora*, that space or receptacle "whose sole function is the imposition of a unity upon the events of Nature. It is a natural matrix for all transitions of life, and is changed and variously figured by the things that enter it; so that it differs in its character at different times."[318] Compiling all these parts together, at its most basic, mutual immanence is a mode of connectedness, that all things are connected. It is a fundamental relationality.[319]

And this fundamental relationality shows the importance of Whitehead's work moving forward, for mutual immanence is a denial of one system over another, that instead seeks the relation of each with another. It is a becoming "intermezzo," a submerging into the middle, to be "less than…abstract unifications…It means to become minor."[320] Mutual Immanence becomes a relation that reminds us that what we consider real are really abstractions, and these abstractions cannot become without other relations that make it what it is. To do so is to exhibit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. In its most minor influence it reminds us that we are something more than what our commonsense notions tell about the world and how we relate to it. As a medium of intercommunication, mutual immanence also understands that without our relation to the other we in some way lose our creative value, and that we are ultimately affected by it. The effect is simple:

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[317] Faber, "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," 103. See also Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1942), 201.

[318] Ibid., 187.

[319] Roland Faber, *God as Poet of the World: Exploring Process Theologies* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 210.

[320] Roland Faber, and Jeremy Fackenthal, eds. *Theopoetic Folds: Philosophizing Multifariousness* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 232.

one cannot attain knowledge without presupposing others within its own development of knowledge.

Put differently: without relation there can be no becoming. Something cannot become unless it has some relation, "to know some thing is to participate in its actualization."[321] In Whitehead's essay on "Immortality," fact and value are each unable to become without the other. There is no way to grasp what is factual without being able to experience and conceptualize it and to derive some creative value from it. But even more, it is impossible to experience something without an event in which the facts are made relevant for analysis. Immortality and mortality refer to two aspects of the universe which presuppose one another. They are two worlds that cannot be without one another. In order to understand the infinite, one must understand the finite, and vice versa. Together they "constitute the concrete Universe."[322] Either considered by itself is what Whitehead calls an abstraction. One needs both in order to speak of it. Mutual immanence is here seen as the relation by which each presupposes one another.

This may seem to defer any form of judgment or determination, but it need not be so. Whitehead distinguishes between the world of activity and the world of value. On its own, the world of activity focuses upon the "multiplicity of mortal things," highlighting the constant generation and active creation of the now.[323] On the other end of the spectrum lies the world of value as timeless and immortal. The issue with this is that immortal and timeless value destroys any reason as to the how, or for what purpose; the contextual is lost in the metaphysical. The introduction of the law of mutual immanence describes for Whitehead how both worlds interact and form novelty; one world functions based on the interaction or borrowing from the other world,

[321] Keller, *Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement*, 21.
[322] Whitehead, “Immortality,” 61.
[323] Ibid."[T]he world of values must be conceived as active with the adjustment of the potentialities of realization...[and] involves the exclusion of discordant values."

which introduces some form of novelty within it. For instance, value does not make sense or cannot be considered unless it has some connection to the world of activity.

Whitehead argues that we must judge, and yet that judgment is a process of unifying, and not a process of deciding either/or.[324] It is also not a dialectic, in which the thesis remains and what is best of the antithesis remains for the use of the thesis in question. The dialectics is a negative dialectics, removing something for the sake of its own continuation, denying as opposed to affirming in some way. Rather, the values are in line with the world in its present "now" moment, and must be made apparent. They must also adjust the potential of its realization with "matters of fact." This would suggest that it is not supplementary, but in line with, its realization made manifest in the event by valuation. This is so precisely because the thing in itself is complete barrenness unless there is some value or meaning given it. [325]

Mutual immanence therefore means that each actual occasion has in its concrescence (in its process of actualization/becoming) some aspect or understanding of the other. Breaking that down further, I cannot define one aspect of a thing and then have it apply to everything else. There are no ultimates, according to Whitehead's revisionist metaphysics and reformed subjectivist principle. Rather, since we are all built on relations, any form of explanation is just an abstraction because it has not fully taken into account all the relations that make it what it is. The implication is important for Whitehead's motivation for the use of imaginative generalization. For Whitehead, civilization survives on the adventure of ideas, and, if it becomes stagnant or fails to progress, there is a need to move on. In order for these ideas to take shape as well as to develop in intensity, a work of imaginative generalization is involved through the process of mutual immanence. This mutual immanence in the same way enforces an imaginative engagement, what Stenger calls the

[324] Whitehead, "Immortality," 61.
[325] Roland Faber, *The Divine Manifold* (New York: Lexington Books, 2014), 131-132, 170, 172.

"So what?" of process.[326] Mutual immanence becomes the impetus for imaginative supplementarity in the form of creative becoming, imaginative logic, and imaginative reasoning.

I find Keller's mutual immanence as mirror play to have deep connections with Henry Corbin's discussion of the mirror in his *Paradox of Monotheism,* as well as with John Sallis' discussion on the notion of the mirror in *mythos* and *logos* and its similarities with Whitehead's aspect of mutual immanence.[327] For Corbin, mirrors become vital to see how one, in one's journey of the divine names, reflects the divine. But in the repositioning of the mirror, one can also see other mirrors reflecting the candle, which represent their mirroring of the divine. This second move, if one is not careful, can suggest the relativism of the self and one's religious system. All are the same and so it can go either by way of the destruction of all so one remains, or that a specific religion is not important because it does not offer anything significant in its system of belief; it becomes relativized and makes suspect its own truth—and arguably the validity of truth itself. This suggests both the unity of the self with the divine and the pure difference of self and others. Corbin, by shifting the positioning of the mirror so one sees mirrors of mirrors of mirrors, or the integration of integrations, is showing the relationality of all things with the self and the divine, but in the same instance showing both the difference/uniqueness of self and others as well as how the divine is to be seen within that context. True understanding calls for the intermezzo of becoming, an integration of integrations.

John Sallis in his work on Plato also discusses the mirror play between *mythos* and *logos*; What is attained in the *logos* and *mythos* are "asymmetrical" relations, ones that are unable to dialogue with one another. What is required is a soul, a receptacle that can only be realized in and

[326] Roland Faber and Andrea M. Stephenson, *Secrets of Becoming: Negotiating Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 23.

[327] Henry Corbin, *Le Paradoxe Du Monotheisme* (Paris: L'Herne, 1981); Freydberg, *The Thought of John Sallis: Phenomenology, Plato, Imagination*; Sallis, *Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues*.

through the image. However, the image is only producible through the senses, and thus requires the material; experiences are necessary to produce the images for the interplay or dialogue of *logos* and *mythos*. The introduction of mirrors, so that what is viewed is an image, a vision of what is experienced, begins to bring together and enrich the dialogue necessary for progression. For Sallis, the image must be introduced in the sensible, where it manifests and has its becoming. For both Corbin and Sallis, the use of the mirror may be internal, but it is not void of any actuality. This already includes the sensible, the interplay of images and the intellect. Thus the imagination in the play of mirror shows and reveals truth, but at the same hides, because one's vision is limited. Returning to Keller, the mirror both reveals and obscures what is represented. There is an obscurity due to emphasis or ignorance. In turning to learned ignorance, one enters into the play of mirrors, an entrance back into the deep, that there is a relation; what one must do is to describe how it becomes.

Mutual immanence therefore shifts the power of logic because mutual immanence already shows that there are relations already in place. Logic thus shifts to a form of creative reasoning, or imaginative reasoning. It paves the way for a mode of creativity that still maintains modes of logic, but introduces the manyness of truth by way of the activity of imagination.

Taking this vein of thought, how does this engage the question of religious pluralism? For Adler, questions of religious pluralism are to be discussed in the actual world, looking at the effects or outcome of religious experience, or of the understanding of the divine. But these are held together by a thought, an image of thought that automatically dictates the outcome. Here is the problem that keeps arising, if the image of thought remains the same, how can there be any difference that provides novelty? Novelty is apparent and was the driving force of Whitehead's own work. But how can there be novelty in the same? If this is the case, then mutual immanence cannot be the relational grounding for all things. Rather it would be one of linearity, of cause and

effect. But for Whitehead this cannot be the case. In the actual world we are called to conform our ideas to fact, with some correction. This again entails not that what was thought was incorrect, but rather that in the encounter of error there is a unifying of ideas as experience, and something forms anew.[328] There is no simple relation, but complex relations that unfold, and even in this unfolding there is a need to move from the experiencing to interpreting what has been experienced, and seeing if what has been interpreted conforms to the experience in some way. I mention some way, holding to Whiteheads understanding that it be both adequate and applicable.[329]

Since there can be no simplicity to judgment or in relations, each religious system must engage with one another, knowing that their formation has many relations, whether directly or indirectly. In the manyness of the relations and their responses, they are not called to enter into a mode of judgment that excludes, but one that unifies to produce something novel. For Whitehead, novelty can only come by way of mutual immanence, the deep relation that all things are interconnected. But even more so, because of mutual immanence, religion itself, or one's own particular religion, because it takes into account the other in its own becoming, considers one's own religion as relative to others. This point is intriguing, as to relative to others is not to take one's own religious dogma as less than others, but rather as one along many others. Mutual immanence turns logical judgment into contrasts, so that what emerges are novel unifying judgments which happen only within that particular context. So within religious traditions, dogma arises from experiences, emotions, habits and beliefs, and that particular formation cannot be compared to other traditions. Yet, when contrasted what emerges is a novel way of understanding the divine and divine experience in the world. This suggests some creativity in the world.

[328] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 183.
[329] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 3.

Mutual immanence calls one and all to be resolute, to be intermezzo, and walk along the way towards truth. And that truth is found in the discovery of relationships with one another. It is the many, becoming one, and are increased by one. I will continue to talk about how creativity is paramount to novelty, becoming, and religious pluralism.

5.2 Shifting From Logic To Creativity

5.2.1 On Logic

Whitehead's speculative philosophy takes seriously the role of logic. He defines the notion of "logical" in its Aristotelian sense, that there be "logical consistency," that constructs be defined in "logical terms," and that general logical notions be exemplified in specific instances.[330] This means that what is to be made reasonable should be applicable in specific instances. Whitehead is sure to maintain that logic in part guides the movement of knowledge from the mystical to the known. In the preface to Hartshorne's *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, he writes that "logic is the backbone of philosophy," and he attributes this in part to his readings of Whitehead as well as others.[331] And yet, as seen in both, Hartshorne writes, "a philosopher should also have a sense for the non-logical side of awareness. Ideally he should have more in common with poets than even Aristotle, Leibniz, Husserl, or Russel have had."[332] Therefore there is this need for harmonization throughout philosophical inquiry that engages both logic and intuition. I would even argue that in order to grasp the intuitive side fully, logic is a subset by which to make sense of, to enjoy even, what is experienced. Without it one cannot fully enjoy it. Nevertheless, it is to remain

[330] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 3.
[331] Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1970), xvii.
[332] Ibid.

a subspecies in the ultimate notion of Whitehead's becoming. Whitehead writes, "Speculative boldness must be balanced by complete humility before logic, and before fact."[333] This again shows that logic is contingent upon speculative boldness and fact. One cannot remove logic; it removes the ability for propositions to be formed, for the development of logical consistency.

But which logic is Whitehead purporting to use in his own philosophy of organism? It is not entirely the logic of Aristotle; Whitehead maintains that Aristotle's notion that the law of non-contradiction should be held. In determinism, logic insists that there cannot be any contradiction. But Whitehead does not clearly conform to Aristotle's understanding of logic because it was inadequate for the needs of his day.[334] Whitehead was in search of a logic that focused on relational systems of order and structure, preserving transformations. Logic's focus was on patterns and partiality. The pattern held by logic is due to the understanding of importance and is partial. First, Whitehead makes a claim of importance that should be noted, that morality, logic, religion and art are a subordinate species, and where logic, and religion is irrelevant.[335] Logic has its importance, but it is not central. It allows one to make sense of what one experiences in every act of becoming, becoming being the central notion.

So what is the problem that Whitehead tries to correct in the discussion of logic? It is the understanding that in subject predicate logic there can be only two relata, the subject and the predicate. Whitehead cites the example "when John likes Thomas," where one understands that there is a one-to-one relation.[336] Put another way, the problem is the refusal of understanding the "ultimate fact of multiple relations."[337] Whitehead posits that it is primarily through the schools of Aristotelian philosophy and logic that go without any relations other than subject and attribute,

[333] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 17.
[334] Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 105-106.
[335] Ibid., 16.
[336] Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 150.
[337] Ibid.

"Namely all apparent relations are to be resolvable into the concurrent existence of substances with contrasted attributes."[338] There seems to be a loss of adventure, of possibility, in the judgment from logic in the form of a proposition. Judgments maintain finalities, cutting out what is false and therefore seeking what has been "verified as true." But it does not take into account the notion of perception, the complexity of how one perceives within space, time, and the multiplicity of parameters that make that event true. What is lost are possibilities, of the differences that arise from error. Whitehead writes, "false propositions have fared badly, thrown into the dust heap, neglected. But in the real world it is more important that a proposition be interesting than it is to be true. The importance of truth is that that it adds to the interest."[339] This does not entail a truth that is singular, but truths that may come from the adventure of this particular proposition and the inquiry into how the particular proposition comes into its truth. Therefore, there is a rationalization of how the proposition comes to be true that can be recognized for the self, and then beyond the self. This is the beginning of the breakdown of one-to-one relations of the fact and its meaning, as different encounters lead to different perspectives in which many may be true based on that perspective.

So we see two logics here. Mortimer Adler uses an Aristotelian logic of common sense and non-contradiction as the primary method to understand the world around us, and to denote the invalidity of pluralism.[340] As a reminder Adler argues that what is ultimately necessary are notions of common sense and logic, where common sense is the experience of the world in its reality, and

[338] Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 150.
[339] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 259.
[340] Adler, *Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy*, 130-131. Here he defines the breakdown of Aristotle's logic for daily life. Although helpful, I am concerned about the way it makes up common sense by distinguishing between what is and what is not. I am strongly persuaded by Whitehead's work on multiple relata as the causal relation for why things are as they are.

logic orders the world in order that the sense of the world "makes sense," and therefore enters into common sense. He was developing a general theory of how we attain knowledge.

Whitehead's main goal in his work was to use the tools at his disposal to develop a general theory of things, based upon symbolic logic and mathematics. As Hartshorne notes,

> Logic has discovered itself to be the study of relational structures as it involved in meanings. Metaphysics ought to be the study of relational structures as embodied in reality as such or taken generically. Instead of focusing on the meager, arbitrarily limited question of how particular actualities are related to universal properties, how an S is P, we need to focus on the general case of how actualities, as such, are related to actualities of the past, and to potentialities for future actualization…relationship to other actualities includes all relationships and is the general case.[341]

Here Hartshorne lifts up Whitehead's shift to a logic that seeks relations as opposed to the actualities themselves, looking at how multiple relata cause the subject to become through experience. This highlights the notion that event is more important, as event creates what is experienced. An event is defined as a "nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum."[342] It is an inter-relation, a construction brought about by some quality which for brief moments mutually brings together actual occasions. The philosopher Nelson Goodman writes, " A stone is a vibration of quanta that maintains its structure for a while, just as a marine wave maintains its identity for a while before melting again into the sea. … We, like waves and like all objects, are a flux of events; we are processes, for a brief time monotonous."[343] Whether it is a stone, a human being, or a social theory in action, they are all events that are to be experienced. I say this to show that one is not a material subject, but are a

[341] Charles Hartshorne, *Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), 14-15.

[342] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 73.

[343] Carlo Rovelli, *Reality is Not What it Seems: The Journey to Quantum Gravity* (UK: Penguin Books, 2017), 115-116.

made up of multiple relations. And thus there can be no one-to-one relation to logic, nor is there a common sense but requires a logic of relations that hold to a coherence of things.

In his *Modes of Thought*, Whitehead writes that philosophy is "the endeavour to find a conventional phraseology for the vivid suggestiveness of poetry." His goal is to be able to extend language for "use in other connections of thought."[344] Logic is "based upon the concept of inconsistency, the notion of the finite is definitely introduced," as the finite is that which excludes other things that are comparable to itself.[345] "By means of process, the universe escapes from the limitations of the finite. Process is the immanence of the infinite in the finite; whereby all bounds are burst, and all inconsistencies are dissolved."[346] Whitehead does not reject deductive logic but places it within limits, in the finding of the infinite within the finite. Deduction, in its proof positing "is a tentative procedure, finally to be judged by the self-evidence of its issues."[347] The logic that Adler uses, one of common sense, of practical reason, that holds to a deductive process, is at best a tentative procedure that must be judged or evidenced by the outcome of things, but does not take into account the complex relations of how that thing comes to be. This is the problem of deductive logic in Adler's work, and that which Whitehead is attempting to overcome on his own. Although logic is helpful in analysis, at best it is exact in one respect and not for the whole. Whitehead writes, "[l]ogic, conceived as an adequate analysis of the advancement of thought, is a fake. It is a superb instrument, but it requires a background of common sense."[348] To be clear, the common sense that Whitehead speaks of would be more akin to a receptacle within a receptacle. Within that receptacle one can understand within that space. But it is only as accurate as the space it holds. Any system of formulation that is exact, although it may be helpful is at best erroneous because

[344] Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 50.
[345] Ibid., 52.
[346] Ibid., 54.
[347] Ibid.
[348] Alfred North Whitehead, *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Rider, 1948), 74.

logic extracts, removes, and thus doesn't relate outside of its receptacle; Mutual Immanence forces this lure for relationality, for a width and depth of becoming, of finding a meaning beyond actual fact. Mutual Immanence, however, because of its requirement of relationality, sets the precedent that what is done is not move towards an originary, to a beginning, but rather to becoming creative in light of the multiplicity of becomings in and through relation. Logic in its fulfilment of judgment is in an instant made relative to all things, and must once again go through the process of making sense of things. If logic is once again to begin in the process of making sense of things, then, as Whitehead makes known, it cannot have a primary role in the understanding of what is true or not. It is helpful in making a judgment, but the judgment has no meaning beyond itself. Creativity, which is the activity of imagination, allows for the schematization, the structuring of what could be possible.

5.2.2 Creativity as the Category of the Ultimate

If mutual immanence is the receptacle that calls for becoming, creativity is the activity which allows for the novelty of becoming. They both function as the lure and manifestation of novelty. Creativity in particular is that which has the power to affect and bring forth what is possible and make it actual. Whitehead defines the creative process as essentially Aristotle's notion of substance or *ousia*, "the actualization of potentiality," however, it is void of passive receptivity, "the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world— a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable element of divine ordering."[349] Creativity is therefore the impetus, the urge, the lure, which brings the movement from potentiality to actuality, and holds within it not only all things in and through the receptacle; that means the

[349] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 179. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 31.

multiplicity of actual occasions are at the disposal of creativity in the becoming of the actual occasion. It creates out of the profoundness of the cosmos.[350] The notion of actualization of potentiality is important as it makes a connection to Bachelard's understanding of the imagination in my prior chapter. It is worth reiterating this quotation here:

> In the realm of the imagination, infinity is the place where the imagination asserts itself as pure imagination, where it is free and alone, vanquished and victorious, proud and trembling. Then images soar upward and vanquish; they rise and are shattered by their very height. Then the realism of unreality is evident. Forms are understood through their transfiguration. Speech is prophecy. In this way, the imagination is indeed a way of going beyond, psychologically.[351]

In the space of the imagination (receptacle), the images (in their multiplicity) rise upward (creativity). This rising upward is creativity in the actual prehending of actual occasions as datum to be felt moving towards a satisfaction. There is a movement from possibility to actuality in the image being shattered by its very height, moving beyond the possible to the actual. This rising is the process of creativity, where the many become one and are increased by one. However, what is realized and understood is transfigured, highlighting difference as the culmination of creativity.

Creativity, then is a "many becoming one, and are increased by one." This statement signals a difference in how the universe happens; it is a process of order amidst chaos by way of differentiation from, and back again. Roland Faber in *God as Poet of the* World, writes that creativity in these three forms (many, one, increased by one) speaks not only to the becoming of ourselves in and through creativity, but that the "*universe* itself as a 'moving whole' becomes within

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[350] See Keller, *Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming*. on her discussion of *creation ex profundis*, creation out of the deep. See also Faber, *The Divine Manifold*., particularly ch.8, for Faber's discussion on multiplicities. This also holds to Whitehead's fourth category of explanation, that "it belongs to the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming.' Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 22.

[351] Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement*, 5-6. The notion of image in both Bachelard and Sallis can be understood as event, since image is a unification of many aspects of mind and of the material. The image is also a gathering together of thoughts, ideas, and feelings packed together with material, the body, and in its shattering, it becomes. This is the creative process.

this unity."[352] Any form of unity is a unity that takes into account all relations (mutual immanence) and becomes by the becoming of the universe through one's own perspective. And creativity is that happening or event of unification. However the unity thus conceived is also relativized "as one amongst many in a universe that precisely thereby is creatively renewed."[353] The unity becomes and perishes at every moment to become a datum for future becomings. Creativity in this sense is ambivalent toward unification after its becoming to bring forth the activity of novelty once again. Just as Bachelard's quotation above notes, creativity acts as a luring force. It surrounds the image or the universe in their particular relations, and in its uprising or continual reverberations, moves possibility to actuality by reaching its height and then shattering, thus signaling that the act of creativity (the activity of the imagination) is not for self-glorification but for the fulfillment of actualization.

Creativity, just like mutual immanence, is "the ultimate notion of generality at the base of actuality."[354] But, just as in mutual immanence, creativity has no ground nor form nor characteristics of its own; it has no conditions and yet is conditioned by that to which it relates.[355] Creativity is made apparent by analysis of the event, and thus also entails a double imagination and creative process—one in its becoming and one in its analysis of that which is.[356] But it also shows what was maintained in the opening quotation, that imagination deals with a way of living, is a process of novelty and not stagnation. The engagement of the imagination with logic, reasoning, and analysis introduces the novel by way of difference, what cannot be accounted for

[352] Faber, *God as Poet of the World*, 24.
[353] Ibid.
[354] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 31.
[355] Ibid.
[356] Ibid. See also Elizabeth M. Kraus, *The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's Process and Reality* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 131. The second aspect will be discussed below by way of Conceptual Reversion.

but must be so. It is not a form of hierarchical alignment, but a horizontal one, a realization that there is a relation, and that relation must be accounted for, thus introducing a contrast.[357]

5.2.3 Conceptual Reversion and Free Imagination

I have been speaking of mutual immanence and creativity as a basis of thinking about the imagination. But Whitehead also speaks of imagination as the mode of conceptual reversion. Mutual immanence and creativity are the part of process that is apparent in all actual occasions, and this shows the relationship between all things. However, the question arises about the freedom of the individual actual occasion in its becoming: How can there be freedom in its determination if we are held by a relation to all things? Whitehead introduces the category of conceptual reversion within his category of conceptual valuation. Conceptual valuation states that "from each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt."[358] In a much more descriptive passage of writing in his "Immortality," Whitehead writes, "the activity of conceptual valuation is in its essence a persuasive force in the development of the Universe…the two worlds of Value and Action are bound together in the life of the Universe, so the immortal factor of Value enters into the active creation of temporal fact."[359] The realization of mutual immanence is found in the concept itself, namely that any form of finding meaning in the factual side or in finding some eternal value outside of fact requires the embodiment of one another.[360] You cannot break the two apart.[361]

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[357] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 162-163.
[358] Ibid., 26.
[359] Whitehead, "Immortality," 63-64.
[360] Ibid., 64.
[361] This will become important when we I also begin to talk about perception and the imaginative development of symbol below.

Once again, where does freedom take place in creative determinism? Every actual entity is its self-cause, in which it is able to determine for itself.[362] In this regard, Whitehead writes, "There is an origination of conceptual feeling, admitting or rejecting whatever is apt for feeling by reason of its germaneness to the basic data."[363] But even more, the imagination is not to go against the world, but to find novelty. One does not deviate for its own sake but rejects something due to some partiality that the actual occasion wants to lift up. This is emphasized in Whitehead's conceptual reversion: "There is a secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole."[364] What needs to be remembered here is that Whitehead is describing how imagination shows itself by way of difference, that there are some similarities as well as diversities in the datum being prehended or felt. We have come to a crisis or adventure that calls for some creative thinking, and once it has been satisfied, we see the outcome of creativity. So, the mode of valuation and reversion provides the means whereby novelty is introduced into the becoming of an occasion.[365] This mode of higher conscious thinking allows for the freedom to think otherwise within the confines of what is evaluated, because in one's own becoming one feels and images something not previously understood or experienced.

It is here that imagination leaves itself open to movement from possibility to actuality by way of logic or other modes of determination. What makes this different than in Adler's use of logic over imagination is this: imagination in the mode of conceptual reversion allows the actual occasion in its concrescence to be the final cause of choices and ways of understanding, rather than

[362] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 88. Each actual entity "is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency."

[363] Ibid., 87.

[364] Ibid., 26.

[365] Stephen David Ross, *Perspective in Whitehead's Metaphysics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 69.

necessarily following the implications of sameness.[366] Whitehead takes time to reflect on this in his *Religion in the Making* in which he details the emergence of religion. Whitehead's description describes the self's own engagement with religion in the form of layers that go from ritual to emotion, emotion to belief, belief to rationalization, and back again.[367] All forms are necessary, and none can be denied. It is the relationality between them that allows a manifestation of the end result to become as it is.

These stages also relate to one another; the stage of ritual begins with experience which elicits an emotion. In order to experience that emotion again a ritual is performed. There is now a reversal and a higher-level cause, that to achieve that emotion of elation, a ritual is performed. However, one does not perform a ritual for the sake of emotion; one now forms a belief that gives reason for the emotion and ritual. Beliefs can be given to a group of people and form tribal beliefs, beliefs that fit for a large number of people. It is the sameness here that is both helpful and problematic; it is helpful because one can form a group around a set of beliefs, but it is ultimately closed in, negating that which is different from the logic of the group. Sameness, although safe, is dangerous. One is unable to deviate from what the tribe offers as good, as ethical, as holy, as metaphysical. It requires the next phase, that of rationalization that obscures what is presented to us, so as to critique whether or not what is said in the tribal settings of religion and belief is validated. This rationalization moves religion from communal forms to "what the individual does with his own solitariness…religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man. "[368]

I want to argue here that, because we are now the criteria and creators, we are using a mode of imagination that looks at the relations of life in all of its aspects. We become receptacles within

[366] I say necessarily because it is possible that the actual occasion may repeat the same. But the possibility remains in each concrescing occasion in which the imagination in its freedom may offer a new perspective, and thus a change.

[367] Whitehead, *Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures 1926*, 15-33.

[368] Ibid., 16.

receptacles, weaving together religion in all its aspects so as to shape our own internal life. This is why Whitehead continues to argue that religions will cease if we do not continue to allow for some emergence that does not solely happen within a particular religion itself, but with all religion in their relations to one another. As Whitehead writes, "[t]he decay of Christianity and Buddhism as determinative influences in modern thought is partly due to the fact that each religion has unduly sheltered itself from the other…Instead of looking to each other for deeper meanings, they have remained self-satisfied and unfertilized."[369] The quest for sameness causes decay in the influence that religion can give, the imaginative breadth that religion provides, to thought. Loss of imagination, of the activity of creativity, is what brings about decay.[370] The urge to find a reason is a creative, imaginative act. To stop is to lose the urge, the impulse to progress, and this leads to decay. This urge is found in the pursuit of adventure, that when an individual travels they meet "strangers on terms of kindliness. He returns home, and in his person and by his example promotes the habit of thinking dispassionately beyond his tribe."[371] The person is forever changed and has a shift of thinking; their prior beliefs can no longer be held, and the need for a system of rationalization takes place. It is up to the self to undertake a process of making sense of the world.

Whitehead presents creativity as the ultimate notion that sits at the base of actuality.[372] Here we see a difference that I believe makes apparent a fundamental shift of the role of imagination, or its activity (creativity). In its pejorative sense the imagination is understood as a system that transfers or translates information from the senses into the space of the mind. The mind, the place of ideas, is held as the place of consciousness; the imagination lies at the bottom

[369] Whitehead, *Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures 1926*, 146.
[370] Whitehead, *The Function of Reason*, 18-19.
[371] Whitehead, *Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures 1926*, 39-40.
[372] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 31.

or lowest of the layers of the mind to show its necessity, but not to trust it due to its propensity to shift one away into fantasy.

Whitehead's use of the term creativity highlights an imagination in process, an activity held within the process of imagination itself. This is exemplified in his statement, "the true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation."[373] What is ultimate here is that discovery or knowledge formation is not possible without creativity. This creativity is found in all forms of consciousness, as well as in all sentient things, as "man to molecule and below have sentience."[374]

Creativity is the force, albeit luring force, of the imagination. When it is coupled with mutual immanence, the relation of relations that calls for each thing to presuppose one another, we are entering into a virtual space that is imaginative. This suggests that the receptacle that is formed for every becoming is an imaginative one, and functions as the *khora*, the foster mother of becoming. Imagination, upon its search, remains hidden, for its space closes upon analysis, as another mode is used. Imagination is the receptacle of connectivity that allows for the development of an image, or a feeling which moves from possibility to actuality by way of a proposition, not so as to be definitive, but to develop patterns, indeed a multiplicity of patterns of the cosmos. This then shifts how we are to perceive the world around us.

[373] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 5.

[374] Peter Sjostedt-H, "The Great God Pan is Not Dead: A.n. Whitehead and the Psychedelic Mode of Perception," *Psychedelic Press Journal* 20(2017): 52.

5.3 Perception And Imagination

In his work *Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect*, Whitehead discusses the effects of two modes of how we perceive. Its value for the subject of imagination will lie in the development of his resolution to work within these two modes, called symbolic reference.

The first of two modes that Whitehead discusses in these lectures is called presentational immediacy. Characteristic of more advanced organisms, this refers to "our immediate perception of the contemporary external world, appearing as an element constitutive of our own experience. In this appearance, the world discloses itself to be a community of actual things, which are actual in the same sense we are."[375] Presentational immediacy allows us to take in the actual world presented to us. However, this appearance given to us is filled with qualities–colors, tastes, sounds, and textures–which are both our sensations as well as of the actual thing being prehended.[376] The qualities that are being given are affected by my spatial extension to the object itself, and therefore my body, and by the elements before me that affect the object in the event on which I am focused.

I focus here on presentational immediacy because of what Whitehead states it performs.[377] He writes, "This relatedness of spatial extension is a complete scheme, impartial between the observer and the perceived things."[378] Whitehead is stating that in presentational immediacy, what the observer sees or perceives is what the observer considers to be actual. And yet Whitehead has stated that we do not slow down long enough to think through and see the qualities of the thing observed, to deconstruct the thing in itself.[379] Take, for instance, the notion of a chair as being the color red. One could immediately state that the thing observed is a red chair. However, it is not

[375] Alfred North Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959), 21.
[376] Ibid.
[377] Roland Faber, Jeffrey A. Bell, and Joseph Petek, eds. *Rethinking Whitehead's Symbolism: Thought, Language, Culture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 16-17.
[378] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 22.
[379] Ibid., 1-5.

necessarily a chair, but is in itself a construction made of a certain material, wood, plastic, metal, painted to be the color red, and shaped so as to rest oneself upon it. And one could even break this down further, meaning that the object could be used in a variety of ways, not impeded by the presentational immediacy of acting on the object being a chair. This suggests a conditioning, a rapid route memorization in which, upon seeing the object, one identifies it. It is a seeing, but it is not, as Sallis or Bachelard would argue, a gazing, or envisioning of the object in it its elementals in a way that could bring forth possibility. Presentational immediacy may provide sensuous richness, but it does so by being confined to the present moment, without any thickness of duration.

In Whitehead's case, pure presentational immediacy is stubborn because it "refuses to be divided into delusions and not-delusions," or appearance and realities.[380] It is mere appearance, because it is all or nothing, and thus, for Whitehead, it is vivid, precise—and barren. It is our way of objectifying the world around us, although it still remains an abstraction because we objectify what is presented to us, and not its "formal completeness."[381] Presentational immediacy is delusional in thinking that the actual is all that there is in the thing observed, and, because it misses the formal components of experience, what is given to us is an abstraction of its objectivity. In other words, for Whitehead the event of the chair is never merely "loose and separate," or that it can be reduced to "local matters of particular fact," "there is nothing which 'simply happens.' "[382] This is so due to another reality stated earlier, that the thing in itself, as a datum, already "includes its own interconnections."[383] Presentational immediacy is therefore "vivid, precise, and barren," displaying "a world concealed under an adventitious show, a show of our own bodily production."[384] This is not an understanding of the actual world in need of meaning, but rather an

[380] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 24.
[381] Ibid., 25.
[382] Ibid., 38.
[383] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 113.
[384] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 38, 44.

"abstract image of the way our contemporary world could potentially be divided."[385] For this very reason, it leaves us with a hollow sense of depthless mere appearances.

The mode of causal efficacy is, for Whitehead, a more primordial mode of perception that operates everywhere.[386] This is so because it involves "the overwhelming conformation of fact, in present action, to antecedent settled fact."[387] It deals with the conformation of the past to the present. For Whitehead, causal efficacy is "vague, haunting, and unmanageable, " specifically because it is what is given to us by the memory of experience. Whitehead uses the term *heavy* to depict the weight of causal efficacy upon us to move us in a continual flow of the same if one is not careful. He writes, "This latter type, the mode of causal efficacy, is the experience dominating the primitive living organisms, which have a sense for the fate from which they have emerged, and for the fate towards which they go—the organisms which advance and retreat but hardly differentiate any immediate display. It is a heavy, primitive experience."[388] This leads to a sense of revulsion on the part of the self when "some primitive functioning of the human organism is unusually heightened, or some considerable part of our habitual sense-perception is unusually feebled."[389] In movement of heightened or weakened states, causal efficacy—that which brings us to our "fight or flight" experience—permeates throughout, dulling our ability to respond in a manner different from a causal response.

[385] Faber, Bell, and Petek, *Rethinking Whitehead's Symbolism: Thought, Language, Culture*, 176. See also Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 123.
[386] Faber, Bell, and Petek, *Rethinking Whitehead's Symbolism: Thought, Language, Culture*, 18.
[387] Ibid.
[388] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 44.
[389] Ibid.

5.3.1 From Intersections to Symbolic References

On their own, both of these modes supply two forms of knowledge: with presentational immediacy we receive knowledge of the immediate present. But since we have not taken the time to reflect on it, to make something of it, we are caught with vividness and barrenness. In causal efficacy, we risk repeating an intensity of emotions without expression or articulation of what it is. We are left in awe and repetition. The question of their relation and combination, in actuality their mutual immanence, requires an intersecting of both modes so that the process may begin. Any form of imaginative undertaking, any form of symbol making, requires some intersectionality. Whitehead determines two points of intersectionality: sense-data and locality.[390]

Sense-data is given to the percipient for presentational immediacy.[391] However, we realize sense-data as an experience because we have felt it in some way in the past in the form of causal efficacy.[392] This realization means that sense-data, with all its vividness and spatial relation, can only be understood as an experience precisely because we have experienced it in the past. However, the only way that one can experience this sense-data is through some event in which one can entertain the data. This is the hidden nature of the imagination: sense data in presentational immediacy and sense-data in the mode of causal efficacy both need a place in which to make sense and connect what is happening.[393] So there is no one-to-one relation or no simple reference of two relata. There is more of a triangulation as opposed to a true one-to-one relation, meaning there is no "I see the mountain," but rather "I see the mountain with my eyes."[394] Common sense assumes sameness in sense-data localization to create what is common in sense, but this is not the case here.

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[390] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 49.
[391] Ibid., 50.
[392] Ibid.
[393] Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 3-5.
[394] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 52-53.

Because of the complexity of perceiving sense-data, it is difficult to work with the common-sense notion that Adler attests to in the development of truth in philosophy and religion. For instance, in his development of criteria of religious experience, he writes,

> In these different fields of study or inquiry, the criteria employed, and the methods used for testing the correctness of our judgments differ. Yet the logic applied to the entertained truths that are being judged in these different fields is exactly the same despite the differences that exist in the criteria and methods employed in ascertaining the correctness of our judgments.[395]

My contention is this: that if the criteria differs, and the methods differ, then logic also differs. It will not be able to achieve the same results. There can be no one-to-one relation of logic, but what is required Sallis calls exorbitant logic, Bachelard calls a logic of mobility, what Corbin shows within the different intelligences or kingdoms, and what Whitehead calls symbolic logic. What this entails is a mode of relationality that creates novel symbols and meaning. This also means that causal efficacy cannot maintain sameness, but is part of what creates difference. What this means for religious pluralism is this: there is no one logic that can make sense of the becoming of religion. Each springs forth from their own contexts, experiences, and philosophical ideas. Any gathering comes by way of imagination reasoning, and by symbolic reference.

5.3.2 Symbolic Reference

This intersectionality leads to the culmination of symbolic reference, a derivative experience from causal efficacy. It is a "mode of experience that functions by being directed towards or related to another component or element in the experience."[396] Thus symbolic reference

[395] Adler, *Truth in Religion*, v.

[396] Keith Robinson, "Originary Symbolism: Whitehead, Deleuze and the Process View on Perception," in *Rethinking Whitehead's Symbolism: Thought, Language, Culture*, ed. Roland Faber, Jeffrey A. Bell, and Joseph Petek (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 36.

is meant to provide some meaning based on something that is important in the immediate present or future, and is directed by an aim, a focus. For Whitehead, symbolic reference has a relational component, and therefore the symbol it creates, and its signification are arbitrary, as understood in his "principle of relativity." There is no one way of arriving at a unique symbol or meaning; rather, it is through various processes of relations that one creates interpretations of the event, transferring our "emotion, purpose, and belief, which cannot be justified by an intellectual comparison of the direct information derived from the two schemes and their elements of intersection."[397] There is no regression to an originary feeling that is ultimate; creativity is the ultimate category that lures one towards progress, to imaginative ways of knowing and creating new symbols in different relational patterns and intuitions by their combination and conformation.

At first glance it would seem that when discussing sense-data it would be apparent that imagination is at play. Whitehead would suggest that it is when one breaks away from either the mode of pure presentational immediacy or the pure mode of causal efficacy that one is able to enter into the free play of the imagination. It is truthful. In the pure mode of presentational immediacy there is no room for imagination; imagination is left out and what is left is the repetition of the same, not in a Deleuzian sense, but rather in the sense that it is what it is, and there are no delineations or realizations that what one senses is both oneself and the other in the prehension of the thing in the event.

Neither does the pure mode of causal efficacy have the ability to break into free imagination, as its role is to maintain some familiarity with the past, some connection to the past. But if its role is purely to the past, it may be (as was the case in the Humean and Kantian debacles) a past from experientialist or idealist realities, which are at best fallacies of misplaced concreteness

[397] Whitehead, *Symbolism: It's Meaning and Effect*, 30-31.

or the fallacy of simple location. No thing just is, neither does something just happen. In order to know something, there needs to be some level of importance, value, or concern, and this concern is harmonized with what is perceived in both modes of perception. This entails some form of freedom to decide.

5.3.3 Prehension

This radical shift of Whitehead, that all actual entities (occasions) have sentience, counters what has been considered the de facto understanding of matter and the soul: that matter is unchanging and not "acting." Rather, what is acting and thinking is the *res cogitans*, the intellect.[398] For Whitehead, all things have the power to act upon and affect other things.[399]

One of Whitehead's most interesting realizations is about the bi-furcation of nature. Whitehead resists splitting nature from mentality, or bifurcating nature into the "nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness."[400] This division of nature is that which is realized in the mind, and that which causes awareness, the invisible aspects, or the unseen not yet known realizations of how we came to feel or become aware of that thing as it is realized. This awareness is an awareness of the realness of nature, but we have only a partial perception of the nature that is realized. Whitehead writes that we are aware of the appearance of trees, their greenness, the song of a bird, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of chairs, the sensation of velvet, and yet we are not aware of the system that makes up whatever causes the color, the sound, the feeling, the warmth, or the feeling.[401]

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[398] Ivor Leclerc, "Whitehead and the Dichotomy of Rationalism and Empiricism," in *Whitehead's Metaphysics of Creativity*, ed. Friedrich Rapp, and Reiner Wiehl (New York: State University of New York Press, 1-4.

[399] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 119-120.

[400] Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 30-31.

[401] Ibid., 31.

The method of bifurcation focuses the mind, which in itself seeks simplicity, focusing or reducing things to their apparent qualities, or "to the particles that affect the mind to produce a perception of that appearance."[402] Brianne Donaldson's work, *Creaturely Cosmologies*, succinctly reduces the issue of the bifurcation of nature into three difficult choices:,

> (1) To reduce the world only to our illusory perceptions or ideas of it, (2) to dismiss the phenomena of subtle particles like electrons and molecules as purely logical terms that are not "real" but only help us calculate apparent nature, or (3) to define the world only in its real/material aspects while denigrating our so-called "psychic additions" of color, warmth, and sound by which we perceive our surroundings.[403]

Whitehead wants to push against the idea of two systems of reality, in which "one is conjecture and the other is the dream."[404]

These problems introduce a statement Whitehead makes concerning the role the imagination. He writes that the spiritual world is not a world of unrealized ideals which is against a real world of unspiritual fact. He wants to resist any bifurcation of nature between spirit and fact, or the material and the spiritual. It is the real world against common sense—a very complete common sense—which is "compacted out of miscellaneous data, not at all on the same level, by the help of the imagination."[405] This may at first be a detriment to the function of the imagination, and yet I believe he is advocating that imagination is a necessary aspect of the real world, functioning between real world and common sense. The imagination is always at work, dealing with the information of the knowledge given, or that knowledge on which we are focusing. With the focused knowledge, and with common sense, which has its own set of issues, the issue being built upon is the prior understanding or common sense of those looking at incomplete data, which

[402] Brianne Donaldson, *Creaturely Cosmologies: Why Metaphysics Matters for Animals and Planetary Liberation* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 32-33.
[403] Ibid., 33.
[404] Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 30.
[405] Ibid., 48.

marks the deficiencies of our thought. And yet, the imagination provides a response. Whitehead is pushing against the idea that thinking—in a limited common sense which is not common—or seeking modes of logic—which is not the sole method—leads to a universal understanding. Here, the role of the imagination is held under the mode of logic that identification occurs through exclusion.

Thus, it could be argued that imagination or imaginative generalization is a term used in the ontological space, that of being, which is already actualized as a proposition, a question in the world. Imagination in the activity of creativity is then this act in which all things, conscious and unconscious, participate to produce novelty. Whiteheads writes that creativity is the "pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world."[406] Whitehead then begins to describe what conditions the pure notion of creativity, namely the actual world. This locates any form of action, or acting, to be made not in the individual soul but rather in the actual occasion itself. An actual occasion is a "drop of experience, complex and interdependent."[407] What this means is that the actual is not simply passive matter that is manipulated by the active psyche, but is rather a complex makeup of experience, memory, causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, in which is produced a feeling. The experience ensures that what is presented comes from a creative synthesis of experience, memory, causal factors, what is present through the senses and is grounded in some factuality, that of the event. Imagination takes all this complexity and, with the understanding of mutual immanence and the activity of creativity, both deconstructs old worlds and constructs new ways of becoming.

But the imagination in the form of creativity does not need consciousness in order to create novelty. And this aspect is important to Whitehead. He does not want to uphold consciousness as

[406] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 31.
[407] Ibid., 18.

central, but rather sentience as something of importance in all actual occasions. It is why he focuses on the importance of causal efficacy in his discussion on perception.

5.3.4 The Limits of Any Metaphysics

In "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," Roland Faber discusses the paradox of Whitehead's understanding and move away from a metaphysics of eternity to a metaphysics of novelty. Faber writes, "This is the *nucleus of the paradox* of Whitehead's metaphysics: that it strives for a *generality* that is always already *undermined* by the creative passage of structures and the creative advance of a world of events beyond any structural stability, which would allow us to analyze this world in terms of universals."[408] The question of generality, that there can be a theory that can account for everything within it, is always pushed beyond its limit in the creative advance of events. Thus, the metaphysical assumption is already broken, needing to be tweaked, in order for it to accommodate this new series of events. It is no more causal than creative. This is so because of the abstractive nature of structures. Structures are creative modes of understanding the object as an event to be analyzed (internally in the form of becoming) and is also expressed for analysis (in the form of an actual occasion as datum for prehension). The metaphysical structures are "nothing but abstractions of the process of becoming itself; they are neither concrete nor are they actualizing forms of eternity…any metaphysical claim must have that status of a *possibility for actualization*" and must therefore describe how that claim can be made possible.[409] The metaphysical structure, in and of itself, is a structuralizing system

[408] Faber, "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," 93. See also Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 20.

[409] Faber, "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," 93.

that is limited by the language and concepts we develop, and, although powerful and creative, is still limited, and must maintain the notion of a limit.

But it is here that I would suggest that the creative aspect of the metaphysical structure Whitehead espouses is developed in an imaginative, speculative environment, and therefore invokes the notions of the pursuit of adventure, beauty, truth, and peace, albeit with its possibilities for danger. This is enabled through the experience of an event, and an internalization of the feelings of that event for analysis. Before it enters into the mode of ideation, it enters into the move of imaginative possibility. The limits are in what can be envisioned, how open one is to the experience itself. Agreeing with Faber, Whitehead's revisionary metaphysics is an opening to a becoming of metaphysics, with the paradox of the relative "impossibility of the endeavor" to form a "coherent, logical and necessary system" to analyze the uttermost generalities of the actual world.[410] This opening to the becoming of metaphysics therefore means that it returns to the space of the imagination, to the process of creative novelty. Imagination is not simply the transfer of senses to symbol, but rather the complex space of structuring the world around us.

Whitehead's imaginative generalization, with its deconstructive and constructive components, does not call for a simplification of things, but rather for the realization of a complex of relations that allow the current event to take place. It therefore cannot call for anything that is simple, but provides the possibility for more novelty. One cannot explain the reason for the thing being what it is by simple location. There is a complexity of relations happening when an event takes place; when we ask how the event is felt by the actual occasions (those who are feeling the event from their location, time, and distance from the event), those questions and the responses to them eradicate any simple understanding of the event. Whitehead discusses the problem of simple

[410] Faber, “Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics,” 93.

location in science, in which secondary qualities and primary qualities are not hierarchized. Whitehead instead calls for a reorganization of these qualities, horizontalizing them in order that we might think through the complexity of the world in which we live, realize our interconnectedness with all things, and thus rethink the role of imagination. Whitehead writes that "our apprehensions of the external world depend absolutely on the occurrences within the human body."[411] The human body, although resilient, can be co-opted, tricked, to perceive almost anything. He says that our body regulates how we see our world, and our body is situated in a spatio-temporal world, and acts as a mirror within the bodily life. For example, I do not exist only in one space, unaffected and unconnected to the outside world. Rather, at the place where I am located and for the time I am in that space, I am in reference or relation to every other location and thing. In a real way, everything is everywhere at all times, and I am everywhere at all times. Every "location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world."[412] If this means that every standpoint acts as fact, and is a mirror of the world around it, it can only reflect a portion of the universe as it pertains to the tone of the self. And the tonal quality can be narrowed or widened, depending upon how complex one allows the self to be.

Whitehead uses the term "speculative" to leave room for possibility, since we are so complexly related to all things. But this leads to another aspect which is often not understood, and has not been comprehensively rethought: that of the imagination. The goal of imagination is to combine a multiplicity of things within it, meaning that it too becomes a receptacle for the possible, for possibility to take place, for creativity or the novel to be known.

While this may create an axiomatic structure in which each affects the other in weak or strong requests, making sure that there is a coherent system in which to come back to and interpret,

[411] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 91.
[412] Ibid.

I suggest that there is another way to think through Whitehead's categoreal system that informs his metaphysics. Roland Faber, in his article "Whitehead at Infinite Speed," develops Whitehead's notion of system in a way that completely shifts the frame of thought from a system that is axiomatic in thought to one that is organic in its process.[413] In defining his system, Whitehead wanted to develop and to structure thought that was adequate, logical, cohesive, and applicable, yet he was very aware that in its organization lay the very means for its own deconstruction. As Faber writes, Whitehead "affirms systematization as [an] organic process that, at the same time, confirms and deconstructs [the] system."[414] Faber continues by noting that, "Whitehead 'system' as a scheme of thought is nothing but a 'reservoir of potential developments that, in its abstraction from experience, does not reflect reality or pure reason, but creates imaginations by which speculative reason furthers life."[415] Right here we see the role and function of imagination being lifted up in Whitehead's work; imagination as a space or force (as Sallis suggests) appears from two modes in prehension: from the experience itself, followed by what happens in the process of higher consciousness. Free imagination is made possible when we are not held hostage by causal efficacy or by presentational immediacy, but by the symbolic formations that allow a better life in all its variety to progress.

What is of particular interest is Faber's statement about Whitehead's notion of system being of finite reality as opposed to being about actuality, and that it comprises finality rather than infinity.[416] Structure in and of itself is an abstraction that comes from concrete actuality, and thus is irrelevant without inclusion in the becoming of actualities.[417] Since imagination deals with the

[413] Roland Faber, "Whitehead At Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event," in *Schleiermacher and Whitehead: Open Systems in Dialogue*, ed. C. Helmer, M. Suchocki, and J. Quiring (Berlin: DeGruiter, 2004), 45-46.

[414] Ibid., 47.

[415] Ibid., 48. See also Whitehead, *The Function of Reason*, 69-76.

[416] Faber, "Whitehead At Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event," 49.

[417] Ibid., 49-50.

development of structure, it deals precisely with what Whitehead is stating here: that in the development of structure, the structure itself is a universal hypothesis that deals with a finite reality as well as stating that the reality we are experiencing and articulating is at best finite, precisely because we are providing interpretation of how we experience the world as given through facts or the actual occasion in the form of a datum. In its finality it sees its own deconstruction, yet with it the possibility for its articulation in actuality. Thus the structure in its becoming must be finite so as to produce what is actual.

What Faber suggests as being in Whitehead is therefore a different understanding of a system that "rests on a 'ground' or principle; it encompasses a 'whole' to which the system is applied; and it strives toward an 'aim' or satisfaction." I focus on the ground as creativity, since this is imaginative power or the power of free imagination that envisions a whole universe toward a common goal. From this perspective, creativity or production is the key to any becoming, and therefore shifts the understanding of unity/plurality, ground/plane, necessity/contingency, and description/construction.[418] Through the aspect of creativity, one begins in multiplicity and in its finality becomes the one; and yet following the notion of the Whiteheadian "system," the notion of the one increases the multiplicity, and is at the same time deconstructed in the successive event. The many become and are increased by one to become a multiplicity once again. Thus unity is always temporary. As creativity is the ground of all becoming, it is the "immanent self-activity of actualities that can never be conceived devoid of its embodiments as activity of actualities, except for reasons of conceptual abstraction."[419] Faber looks at the categories of importance through the ground of creativity, beginning with unity/plurality; as Whitehead says, "the many become one and are increased by one."[420]

[418] Faber, "Whitehead At Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event," 60-64.
[419] Ibid., 60-62.
[420] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 21.

For Whitehead, then, without the imagination as a groundless ground of creativity in multiplicity, there is no teleology, no aim towards novel togetherness. Even more, imagination provides for the manifestation of novel order. Whitehead writes, "Since the principle of speculation is *creativity*, its importance lies in *imagination* itself…it *constructs* generalities that, as abstractions *produce possibilities for the intensity of the process*. Whitehead's 'description' only works by way of '*imaginative construction.'*"[421] The notion of abstraction is for Whitehead an imaginative construction that helps us make sense of the world. It could be taken in a pejorative sense, that it is not true reality. But abstraction has its importance in its actual "assemblage of togetherness," in that it has found a pattern that leads to a deeper understanding of the universe.

The creativity that is introduced actually shifts the type of logic that must be used. It introduces and embodies in Whitehead's work a relational logic, which studies structures or relations of meanings. Hartshorne lays out a metaphysics, that which Whitehead espouses and Hartshorne seeks, a metaphysics that studies "relational structures as embodied in reality…how…particular actualities are related to actualities of the past, and to potentialities for future actualization."[422] But this is only brought about due to two other aspects in Whitehead's philosophy of organism, namely mutual immanence and creativity.

5.4 Concluding Thoughts: Imagination and the Opening of Religious Pluralism

In the analysis above of the role imagination plays in the formation of truth, there is something that always maintains itself throughout: the need for a teleology. There is some intention

[421] Faber, "Whitehead At Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event," 64.
[422] Hartshorne, *Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970*, 14.

for the rise of the imagination, some need for a move from the external to the internal, from the real to the unreal, from logic to an aesthetics. Without this, there is complete barrenness. Even more, we lose sight of the questions that are moving our discussion. In Whitehead's sense, why is there novelty? Why is there something rather than nothing? These questions move us to enter into a space of reflection, of wonder, and what lies waiting for us is a space of construction, a space to find a reason why. Without this space, and without this force of creativity, we cannot attain to a truth. Truths are not ready made, but are a construction, waiting to be discovered. And so we need several parameters, places of limitations within ourselves to make something out of the questions. Sure, we need a logic, but we also need the imagination, a place for logic to play, to ask the what if questions. I would argue that the actual occasion, in its concresence (the movement from indeterminism to determinism), is that which is the imagination. It's malleability, its ability to take in the universe, to feel the feelings of other actual occasions in its own becoming, to come to a satisfaction, is the activity of the imagination. The openness of the imagination leads itself to many meanings. This can, in its inception, lay the groundwork for the openness that religious pluralism offers. Religious pluralism should leave open the manyness of religious expressions. By allowing the imaginative, aesthetic aspect to lead this space, it opens up to a different set of questions. For instead of maintaining a logic prior to experience, one opens up to the experience itself. It realizes that the experience is real, and we should make sense, in an affirming way, of it. By doing so, it enlarges ones understanding of the divine as experienced by others. The size of God grows.

What would happen if imagination were not a process of becoming, of knowledge formation, of the art of life? This is analyzed in the first chapter, where I probe the question of logic as the main method of attending to truth, and its outcome for religious pluralism. Adler argues that opinion, soft logic, and myth are not valid ways of coming to truth because they do not keep to a logic that holds the law of common sense, and that maintains the law of non-contradiction. A

logic that comes by way of sameness is a logic that excludes that which is error or logically inconsistent. There is little room for growth except for within the system in which it exists.

This is exemplified in his focus on macro-systems, the nation, the state, and religion. It is these large systems that govern and decide what are the limits of truth. Opinion becomes corrected by its accordance to the larger understanding of truth within religion, state, and nation. Myth gives way to the metaphysics and beliefs formulated from the truths as established by the earthly macro-systems. Yet here a problem arises. Macro-systems that claim truths now contend with one another to see who is correct, who will have more power. The logic of exclusion leads to a battle for superiority. It leads to who controls the criteria by which we see the world. The logic of sameness, through commonsense and non-contradiction, leads to the problem of whose thinking is superior. It marginalizes other systems of knowledge.

Now, one cannot fully disagree with this method of sameness, of holding on to ideas that stand the test of time. It can be one of many ways of understanding. It is a perspective. Truth can be brought forth from these ideas. However, two parts that are in the background of this dissertation is how truth can be many, and how religious pluralism can be a valid aspect, if not more powerful way of understanding the divine. It is about ascertaining what the divine desires—to be close with its creation, and for creation itself to be in awe at the wonder of the divine, and in their mutual acknowledgment to create a world that is akin to what the divine desires. And so to do this, some ways of attaining order are necessary, a cosmology which lures us toward a divine. Adler argues for an Aristotelian understanding of logic which creates order out of chaos, a creation of species, a place for everything, and everything in its place.

My problem has been that my experience of religion is quite different. There are many religions, each with its own complex understandings, customs, and values and in which it builds its world. In their actions, they are displaying their imaginative understanding of the world, that

which comes from possibility to actuality in the living in it. And what is more of interest is how they each coincide with one another in the actual world. And so the question of religious pluralism that Adler rejects lures me to conclude that logic, or a reductionistic logic is not the best method of seeing how the world actually is or should be, let alone how the divine is at work in the discussion of religion. For the method needed is not a hard logic, but an imaginative one. Imagination is crucial for bringing together that which at first seems contradictory.

In the history of the Imagination, I followed the rise and fall of the understanding of imagination in its philosophical and religious movements. In this section the imagination is looked at with trepidation, as it relies on the production of images as brought about through the senses. It presents the world to us in order that it may develop a response that is ideal, pure, divine. But it cannot do so precisely because it uses forms of the ideal and never gets to the ideal itself. This is why Plato advocates for the figuring of ideas, an image sans a concrete form, just a barren shape that fits all cases and scenarios. From the figure one sees the ideal. Deleuze, by thinking through the way of difference, sees the problem of imagination as producing the same. An image will always use the imaginative properties to produce the same outcome, thus being unable to break free from universal knowledges that undermine other systems of knowledge. It seems imagination has been condemned in service to sameness.

By looking at the thought of Bachelard, Sallis, and Corbin, another understanding of imagination occurs. It is the lifting up of imagination as a phenomenological process of meaning and truth. It is the understanding that fact as truth is not possible without a process toward it. For Bachelard, we see this in his juxtaposition of the real and the unreal. The real is the world that is actualized but doesn't have any sense and requires some interaction that is only possible in the unreal, in that which is hidden from the world but realized in the space of the imagination. It is from here that Bachelard uses air, fire, water, and earth as a mode of understanding how the

imagination interacts with what is happening in the external world. I have focused on the notion of air and imagination, as it best poses the form of process from possibility into actuality and its continuous recompositing of the image, the image ever changing and shifting till it reaches the pinnacle of its height, only to be shattered in the end. But what becomes of it afterwards, what satisfies it, is an external response. It has formed a picture of the world and makes meaning of a barren fact that makes it truthful. Bachelard dynamizes the world, making it a process.

Sallis understands the imagination as a mode of perceiving something of the object under inquiry. Thus Sallis is saying that the imagination is the place of relationality of the object and self; it is the place where the object speaks to us, relates something to us that cannot be otherwise known in its external reality. This is why Sallis uses the term gaze, a slowing down of the process of seeing, and moving into the mode of vision, to stay in its presence, so that the object can present itself to us in some way.

Sallis also shows that the images within the imagination in the moment of gaze are held by a multiplicity of images. He calls these peripheral and lateral horizons. One cannot see beyond the horizon, because upon shifting one's gaze the image is completely changed, one sees a different image. I recognize that Sallis is highlighting that the change of perspective shifts the presentation of the image, and a different focus; a different intention is making the image. What is held up here is that the multiplicity of images suggests that they are all related in a deep way, and in the presenting of an object by one's gaze, it shows itself—it is seen.

Corbin lifts up the imagination as the penultimate middling between the divine and actual world. His argument is that the use of logic in the fields of study limits knowledge to its efficient meanings. By entering into the long forgotten *mundus imaginalis*, another logic is used: the logic of imagination. One loses any sense of time, like in Sallis' gaze, and the question of efficiency in thought is lost. What is most important is the realization of the divine name of God. I would argue

that this is a connection of the self with the divine and the world, a way of making meaning and purpose. This pushes against any nihilism or relativization of what one does. There is no longer any competition, for all are valuable to God as each are meant to realize the divine names of God.

The three figures above use logic, but it is a softening of logic; it defers, it waits, it suffers, wanting for there to be some harmonization within the whole. This led me to introduce Whitehead and to argue that relationality between mutual immanence and creativity expands Bachelard, Sallis, and Corbin's understanding of the imagination further beyond even the phenomenological state. It is not only existential for Whitehead, but in making the claim that all sentient things have creative possibility (and thus power), imagination as that which brings forth possibility is also cosmological. In order to bring together the multiplicity of diversities to manifest what becomes, calls for an understanding that the imagination is both space and a luring force toward its actualization.

5.4.1 Imagination as Receptacle of Receptacles

This seems to be a contradiction to what I am stating the imagination is. By introducing mutual immanence and creativity as aspects of the imagination as the space and activity of the imagination, conceptual valuation and reversion seem to contradict the place and role of the imagination. But I would argue that both are aspects of the imagination by looking at Corbin's use of interpretation of interpretations, or what I would call the receptacle of receptacles. In its most general sense, the imagination functions as the most general relation that holds things together, being the fabric which begins the process of unity. Imagination is not formed by an already laid out system of thoughts in which produces the imagination, but rather that the imagination is the receptacle in which the divine ingresses the initial aim and the self-causation of the actual entity

starts.[423] Imagination provides the widest sense of unity and possibility. However, in the movement from general to specific, or from multiplicity to singularity, a "receptacle" is introduced to make sense of this abstraction, this world that makes sense of the rest of the world around us. With this in mind, the imagination is where even logic begins, whether in a relational system or a deductive one, because logic needs to "play" in its world to suggest better or more efficient outcomes.

Behind every idea there is some formulation, some buildup of the idea in its actuality. This progression may be slow; it begins within a small group, and from that group it spreads slowly but surely, until it reaches the strength needed to become a force, what Whitehead would call the idea that brings revolution, a change in society and culture. In this same mode of the effect of the idea on the populous it could be said that the formulation of the idea itself goes through a similar process of development, through the use of the imagination. This process of speculation details an imagination of sorts within the limits of the situation or context present in dealing with the problem. The problem introduces or cuts a space where the imaginative process appears, and the process of world building begins. Whitehead's use of this idea lies in his actualization of the process of imagination. Similar to my overview of Deleuze, the imagination, on grasping the idea, could be thought of as now being funneled through the idea. But instead I suggest that the process is the reverse: upon the development or satisfaction of the idea, the imagination as receptacle, as space and force, is reiterated, as a womb within a womb. It becomes more specified, a world within world, in which the images it produces are based on the relationships that make up the idea, and these slowly gather satisfaction and value from this growth. Imagination retains its mode of space and force, in its general and more precise senses. So in Whitehead's movement he signals that the process of things are because of the history of things prior to it. It is a recognition of a

[423] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 244.

phenomenological reality of revolution, but is also a development, a prior preparation that allows for the spontaneity, the manifestation of the image, or in a sense the fruitfulness of the concept. This mode that Whitehead is continually trying to lift up as we look at societal development and destruction, is this: for there to be progress in society, there must always be a progression of ideas. If ideas do not engage with problems apparent in the actual, then the progression of ideas begins to enter into a dangerous phase. This phase is a turning away from the mode of progress to the mode of accommodation to the world around it. This marks the demise of the institution, since it is no longer in the mode of constructing its relevance in the world but rather its conservation. It moves from progress to survival. Sometimes this is inevitable. The energy that is built in the formation of an idea, whether prior or ongoing, can only go so far. If we consider how people surround themselves with the thoughts of great thinkers, we see the reemergence of those thinkers' energy upon the self's thought and ideas, and the implications upon that person's, group's, or institution's thought, which leads to the grander intuitions of which Whitehead speaks. The energy does not cease to exist, but receives its satisfaction, accomplishing its goal. It waits. It is, in its actuality, insisting on its existence through the pulses of energy.

In re-engaging a discussion with Adler, the issue comes to a head in the role that the imagination plays in the function of reason.[424] Whitehead writes, "Reason is the organ of emphasis upon novelty. It provides the judgment by which it passes into realization in purpose, and thence its realization in fact."[425] Adler would argue that reason guided by logic is the best method by which to relate the truth and its discovery in the world towards progress that is unifying. Yet Whitehead does away with the understanding that "focus and exclusion" are the roles of logic and reason, and with it their justification of one idea over the other. Reason instead becomes the method

[424] Whitehead, *The Function of Reason*, 26.
[425] Ibid., 20.

by which emphasis is given. Even in the form of error, reason as a method is used to understand novelty. It is both in its correctness and in its error that one understands and forms better ideas in novelty. This, I suggest, is based not on reason alone, but reason held within imagination, and imagination wrapped within reason. Reason and imagination fall within a sort of tesseract, in which each envelops the other, along with other faculties, in order that there be a mutual engagement of sources.

This loss of final causation makes methods of reason a sort of creation *ex nihilo*, which Whitehead describes as immemorial heredity, meaning that the method is the best and thus comes as if from nowhere.[426] It also means that because it works, there is no need to understand its past, nor to move the process forward. Whitehead gives several reasons as to why the mode of final causation is removed from reason. One of them is that it may give a facile explanation as to the thing itself, or why it does what it does.[427]

Whitehead says there are two forms of reason, one from Plato and one from Ulysses, the one seeking a complete understanding, the other seeking an immediate method of action.[428] Alder desires the second to seek the first, the pragmatic leading to complete understanding, for the really real is the actual, and this gives insight into the divine. Whitehead is careful to say when and where certain forms of reason are used. For instance, in terms of natural sciences, the scientific method is clearly useful in deriving immediate methods of action. And yet, in its wider functions, the scientific method is clearly not the best method for understanding. Whitehead writes, "we all start by being empiricists. But our empiricism is confined within our immediate interests."[429] Our view of the world is filtered by our underlying interests, and thus our reasoning has this in mind, and

[426] Whitehead, *The Function of Reason*, 17.
[427] Ibid., 16.
[428] Ibid., 11.
[429] Ibid.

even more so in a pragmatic understanding, as it looks at the immediate results that have been methodologically geared to provide the pragmatic response. He continues, "The more clearly we grasp the intellectual analysis of a way of regulating procedure for the sake of those interests, the more decidedly we reject the inclusion of evidence which refuses to be immediately harmonized with the method before us."[430] This is the result of holding on to an idea, or to a particular method of reason; for in trying to grasp the methodology clearly, one excludes that which does not fit into this methodology.

Whitehead also writes something that can be regarded as disconcerting in terms of the imagination, namely that: "Reason is a factor in experience which directs and criticizes the urge towards the attainment of an end realized in imagination but not in fact."[431] And yet this is exactly where I believe he is showing the necessity of imagination rather than suggesting we do away with it. It is both a critique of pragmatic theories of truth as well as a critique of myth. Reason is a forward progression of living a better life. Thus there is this urge, this pull towards what could be. This pull towards the future is the imagination in its speculative form. I do not believe this is an either/ or case, whether imagination in the form of fantasy, or imagination in the form of speculation, with certain things in order. Both desire its expression in fact and await its arrival. Imagination becomes the impetus to move towards it, to grasp within the mind a way towards its existence.

5.4.2 Truth as Patterns of Recognition

But what does this make of truth? For Adler, truth means moving towards an absoluteness, and therefore it is something that uses logic as a constraint and as a limit. Its intended goal is the

[430] Whitehead, *The Function of Reason*, 12.
[431] Ibid., 5.

unification of truth. And through the mode of a proposition Adler is able to remove whatever is not in line with the criteria he has set as a standard for deriving the trans-religiosity he seeks.

But Whitehead asserts a different understanding of truth and propositions; propositions are not logical assertions but "a matter of fact in potential."[432] This would suggest that the proposition is making meaning, making sense of the fact in its context, and thus the fact has potential in its usefulness beyond the immediacy of the self. It moves from "this is this," to "this is this in a particular context." Second, propositions may be developed in the subject, but they need not be confined to the subject but rather "await" in the world "a subject to feel" them.[433] Here I bring in Sallis, who argues that in an image's showing one gazes upon the object to see what the object shows, and our task is to experience it. Bachelard argues that through the imagination the world becomes dynamic; this is akin to Whitehead and his statement that it is alive. Corbin, upon entrance to the *mundus imaginalis* would argue that our senses become perfected and that we experience everything in its richness.

Propositions are also not limited to one subject but can be many: "In fact, many subjects may feel it."[434] What Bachelard, Sallis, and Corbin provide are phenomenological understandings of how the individual makes vital the imagination in its perception of the world. But I argue that Whitehead expands on this notion and that the actual occasions, like tiny drops of experience, are receptacles within receptacles experiencing and imagining possibilities in the world. And so then one can move to think that when a proposition as possibility as a potential understanding of a matter of fact is introduced, it can create a collective—meaning many may surround that idea so that it has the potential to develop novelty in that specific context. Propositions are a "lure for

[432] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 22. This is originally written in "How Do We Make Ourselves a Proposition?" *A Whiteheadian Laboratory: Featuring Erin Manning, Brian Massumi, and the SenseLab* (2016): accessed February, 2017.

[433] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 259.

[434] Ibid.

feeling" for a collectivity to come.[435] This then means that because we are lured by propositions and feel its possibilities by what it shows us its potential, in its vibrancy, it would be more important that a proposition "be interesting than that it be true."[436] Truth is multiple, and therefore it awaits those who find value in it.[437]

For Whitehead, the mode of judgment, in which logic demands a response, places truth and imagination in dialogue with one another. When involving intuitive judgment with conscious imagination, we deal with both an attention to truth and an inattention to truth.[438] Both contain the same datum, which means that the datum is not truth, but is the possibility for the development for a proposition in the higher phases of experience. Both feel, but do so in a different way:

> One emotional pattern is dominated by indifference to truth; and the other emotional pattern by attention to truth. This indifference to truth is otherwise to be expressed as readiness to eliminate the true objectifying pattern exemplified in the objective datum of the physical feeling in question; while the attention to truth is merely the refusal to eliminate this pattern…the feeling is in fact the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject which is its locus; and the emotional pattern is the peculiar way in which the subject asserts itself in its feeling.[439]

Several things are important here: First, the datum experienced is the same for both the imaginative conscious and the intuitive judgment, both the thinking and desiring for making a choice as to some proposition in question. Second, the imaginative conscious seems to have an inattention to the objective pattern. Imagination seeks to develop and create; judgments seek the truth. The brilliance of Whitehead here is found in his term of mutual immanence; intuitive judgment needs the imagination to see the whole in an instant. It also needs judgment, some desire for concrete decision, which is the role of the conscious which is to rationalize. Bringing these terms together

[435] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 25.
[436] Ibid., 263.
[437] Ibid.
[438] Ibid., 275.
[439] Ibid.

eliminates any one mode of thought (judgment, intuition, imagination, consciousness). It eliminates any weakness Deleuze introduces of the imagination, that of its inability to provide judgment, and logic's lack of imagination, or rationalization's inability to reason beyond itself, and intuition's ability to see things in part. These aspects become a relation of relations to bring out what is more important, a response to the proposition, but in a way that engages a question beyond it. The in/attentiveness of intuitive judgment and conscious imagination allows for feeling and seeking of harmony that is both holding to a pattern as well as intensifying the pattern, deepening it. This is what Whitehead terms beauty.

If truth is a pattern of recognition, then the task of imagination, in moving from possibility to actuality through the mode of a proposition, is about trying to derive some notion of harmony and value from the datum in its becoming.

Imagination's function is meant to space, structure, and allow for the manifestation of a result. It does not come solely from the (physical) senses, such a sight or touch, but can also be experienced by a multiplicity of relations beyond the senses, such as language, culture, and story.

5.4.3 Religious Pluralism as a Space for the Activity of Imagination

In coming back to the question with which I began this inquiry, I once again ask, "Is there another way to formulate and affirm a multiplicity of truths, and necessitate the need for a pluralism of religions?" To begin, yes. But I argue that it requires imaginative involvement in the becoming of the aspects of religion, its doctrine, its formation, and its engagement with other religious traditions. It is not in imagination alone, since this leaves out modes of detail, of depth of knowledge that requires integration, or a radical mutuality. Each of the authors explored here—Bachelard, Sallis, Corbin, and Whitehead—calls for an open-ended system that is engaged in a

slow process of becoming. It is slow because it desires all to be included, it wants to experience all things, it wants to allow each entity to reveal itself. Imagination calls for an internal reformulation of the world, as well as an engagement that hovers above it; it seeks both change within and a sort of letting be, so that a change takes place. Imagination has a logic, and yet the logic is always shifting, always changing based on what it envelopes and that which is emphasized at the moment. As Whitehead relates in his *Adventure of Ideas*, imagination seeks the pursuit of adventure, beauty, peace, and truth. But for all these aspects one requires the space, lure, and malleability of the imagination. Here, I lift up Whitehead's quotation on peace that, in my opinion, truly acknowledges the role of the Imagination: "Peace is the removal of inhibition and not its introduction. It results in a wider sweep of interest. It enlarges the field of attention. It is the barrier of narrowness."[440] The gift of peace is the gift that nature is deeply relational and creative, and thus is a pursuit of adventure that pushes against narrowness. Imagination in its spacing, is the gift of spaciousness, that religion itself cannot be confined to any one experience of it, but rather that all religious systems in their differences tell of the experience of the divine. The continual integration of the imagination will assure that there is openness and creativity in the formation of religious truths and the opening and affirmation of the different ways of understanding the ultimate in the cosmos. If one allows for religious pluralism to become the impetus of a pursuit of the divine, the manyness, the different experiences will help manifest something never before understood of the divine, and a fresh set of ideas will emerge from it. Imagination is an aspect of that becoming.

Imagination in religious pluralism, allows for the deferment of judgement in its logical form; and yet it requires logic to be able to see from a unique perspective. It cannot survive on its

[440] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 285-286.

own. So it requires some mutuality of mutuality. Imagination suggests that there be deferment so that one can experience and wonder, but as an additional layer a contrast should arise that, for a moment calls for a response by way of perspective. This perspective allows for religious pluralism to be articulated in various responses (how one understands the divine, the relation of humanity and the divine, the understanding of "sin"). It leads to ebbs and flows between imagination and exorbitant logic, from gazing and standing in wonder of the experience, to its articulation in logic and reason, as well as a mutual shift of each other's method. This ensures that religious pluralism maintains differences, but in their coming together in the midst of differences, novelty emerges that cannot be understood outside of the particular composition of the moment. The concrescent act of becoming is imaginative becoming by the particular perspective of the actual occasion. Religious pluralism is found when we defer judgment, and affirm difference, and imagine within the imagination what could become, and in that space, progress towards its actuality. In that actuality, what is seen is imagination become.

5.4.4 A Working Method of a Process-Aesthetic Imagination for Religious Pluralism

As a summarization and the further development of the methodology that is at once aesthetic, non-judgmental, and open to seeking the divine within all streams of religion, I would like to finalize with 4 aspects of a methodology that are important.

5.4.4.1 Gaze

The initial aspect that I would argue is that, because there is intentionality towards something, whether to learn or to understand, there is a need for wonder. That wonder takes the form of the gaze. This metaphor holds weight as it calls for the deferment of logic, and is a taking in of the world around us. There is something about slowing down, about intuitively engaging, to

prepare what happens in its exteriority. The gaze allows the other to speak, in which way that it chooses to engage with the seeker in. It is dialogue that negotiates how both will learn and the context in which it happens. But it is a slowing, a positioning of learning, of a romance.

What we are focusing our gaze on is an image, but this image is not unreal; it names an occurrence (an event!), a means, a locus, in which sense becomes and is present to sense. What is there prior and afterwards is an image which belongs to one's self, as it is the act of perceiving what is situated and differentiated from the perceived. It is one's own because of one's engagement with the image. This would take into account Whitehead's understanding of mutual immanence, that all things are presupposed in the development of understanding, as well as what is expressed is novel because the image, the feeling, the superject, is what becomes of the world around the actual occasion with one's engagement with it. Put in another way, the image is the outcome of one's perception and engagement of the imagination. It has become.

The terms look and manifestation introduces something beyond the mere sense image as produced in perception, and the mere formation of the thing by our senses, to the mode of gazing and seeing what manifests from the thing itself. The gaze deepens the image, intensifying the prior manifestation of the self-showing of the thing, showing its truth. Upon my gazing at the object, and upon its manifestation, the thing in itself upon presenting itself provides a look that cannot be set apart from itself, and cannot be set apart without violating its very sense, meaning that upon looking at that object it is connected to the image it has produced as well as to that which is produced in the subject. The movement of the gaze animated objects, to the constant presence of self-showing, that pushes beyond construction to things themselves opening up their mystery.

The gaze shows a powerful similarity to Whitehead's prehension, the taking in of datum, its necessity for any act of mutual becoming. The actual object as datum is felt by the actual occasion in its concresence. It feels the feelings of the actual object. Put in the space of religious

pluralism, I experience the religion as it is in its fullest sense, without criteria. I experience it. It is only then that I can express it in some way. But this experience requires that I take part in it.

5.4.4.2 Dramaturgy and Embodiedness

The hermeneutics of religious pluralism begins with the gaze. But it isn't vision alone that we feel from; rather, we are fully embodied in the process. This entails that we fully take on the other as if a part of us. It is a full embrace. We participate in the process of becoming of something that, although never imagined, is happening in the imagination. We are open receptacles within open receptacles, one that holds all in all, as we expand in our own becoming. This engagement can be visualized in the simplicity of taking part of the other's system of belief, and feeling the divine within. Then and only then do we realize that in the experiencing the divine, that, in part we are connected by the divine, and that in our own becoming we have a deep relation with the other.

The person entering in, at the disposal of the lure of the divine, acts as the dramaturg, taking from Corbin's work. In the midst of experience we In the dramaturgy, the dramaturg moves from the actual to the world as symbolic, through movement and action, in order that meaning may be imbued in the world. Thus the person as dramaturg opens up to a dialectical process between the actual world and the world of the recital. The dramaturg dissects and builds, de/constructing old forms or ways of knowing in which the spiritual and physical, the internal and external play a role in the development of understanding in the world.

Thus the human as a becoming person is held as a symbol maker or interpreter, one pivotal in making sense in the world, primarily (in Corbin's understanding) to make known the Divine so as to show the Divine Names, and accidentally in so doing to discover who we are in this cosmos. The dramaturg becomes a liminal space in which things past and future become present, and in

our process of becoming we stand in suspense in the discovery of meaning. But at the same, not only do we realize the divine names in our own becoming, but realize that the divine name that we realize can only become due to are deep relationality with other religions and it's expression of the divine name.

5.4.4.3 Mutual Immanence

What was just described above is a frame of mutual immanence, of the deep connectedness of all things. This is the most critical thing that must be understood: without relation there can be no becoming. Something cannot become unless it has some relation. Thus anything in its finitude is because of the backdrop of the infinite, in the unknown background. Those for there to be any expression, any pattern that is to be noticed or developed must presuppose other aspects so that one can show itself. It is impossible to experience something without an event in which the facts are made relevant for analysis. Immortality and mortality refer to two aspects of the universe which presuppose one another. They are two worlds that cannot be without one another. In order to understand the infinite, one must understand the finite, and vice versa. Either considered by itself is what Whitehead calls an abstraction. One needs both in order to speak of it. Mutual immanence is here seen as the relation by which each presupposes one another.

Mutual immanence, in its articulation always takes into account and presupposes the other, but also are not derived from one another.[441] This turn is fascinating; It is our taking in of the other, our confession that all are related, but what we express is not the same of the other, but something novel. This is turn leads to creativity.

[441] Roland Faber, *The Garden of Reality: Transreligious Relativity in a World of Becoming* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 104.

5.4.4.4 Creativity

Creativity is therefore the impetus, the urge, the lure, which brings the movement from potentiality to actuality, and holds within it not only all things in and through the receptacle; that means the multiplicity of actual occasions are at the disposal of creativity in the becoming of the actual occasion. It creates out of the profoundness of the cosmos. In the space of the imagination (receptacle), the images (in their multiplicity) rise upward (creativity). This rising upward is creativity in the actual prehending of actual occasions as datum to be felt moving towards a satisfaction. There is a movement from possibility to actuality in the image being shattered by its very height, moving beyond the possible to the actual. This rising is the process of creativity, where the many become one and are increased by one. However, what is realized and understood is transfigured, highlighting difference as the culmination of creativity.

Creativity, then is a "many becoming one, and are increased by one." This statement signals a difference in how the universe happens; it is a process of order amidst chaos by way of differentiation from, and back again. Creativity develops a pattern to be realized and expressed, a "divine name" in religious dialogue.

The imagination lies as an in-between space in which we see the process of religious dialogue that is non-judgmental; it allows for the experience to develop the intelligibles by way of gazing. These intelligibles can only be formed by being fully engaged, fully embodied in the process. This is a deferment of judgment, of logic taking over and moving into the mode of critique. It is after the mode of experience that one enters into analysis; this analysis allows for creativity to arise, a many becoming one, where novel ideas are formed. The imaginative has formed into an idea, a proposition that goes from theory into practice. This can only be done by way of mutual immanence, having deep relationships that help in the assemblage of patterns to be

known. It is only by engaging with other religious systems that one comes to deepen the knowledge of the divine.

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